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“The Rhetorical Dimensions of Radio Propaganda
in Nazi Germany, 1933-1945”
(Abstract)
The intrinsic power and subtle influence of broadcasting is not readily
recognized by the average consumer of mass media. This circumstance has an
abusive potential for those wishing to use the electronic media for ulterior
motives. Such was the case between 1933 and 1945 when the Nazis unleashed
their manipulative mass media campaign that helped facilitate totalitarian control
over the German people. This dissertation is the study of its radio component.
Special emphasis is placed on the origins, construction, and subsequent
implementation of Nazi broadcast rhetoric heard on domestic and short wave
radio during the twelve-year period of the Third Reich.
In refusing the notion that a solitary critical perspective can be used in the
creation of political consciousness and culture, I admit to using any theoretical
insight or concept that sheds light on rhetorical efforts.

In the practice of

criticism, I believe this is the function of rhetorical theory. Therefore, the following
selected theoretical methods are employed:
Crable’s theory of rhetoric as organization is shown as an appropriate
means of describing the radio divisions within the bureaucratic Propaganda
Ministry.
Bitzer’s work on the significance of the rhetorical situation is applied to the
simple act of listening to finely crafted radio programming in Nazi Germany.

-xThe speaker’s link between rhetoric and ideology is explained with
McGee’s “ideograph” theory.
The construction of a new language suited to the goals of the Nazis is
analyzed by examples of Burke’s unifiers and McGuire’s close textual work on
Mein Kampf.
Marcuse divides the language into pragmatic and mythical layers, while
the rhetoric and motivations of eight American “radio traitors,” who served as
Nazi broadcasters, are investigated and tied into the overall propaganda scheme.
The consequences of this inquiry indicate that the National Socialists, with
Dr. Goebbels’ masterful propagandistic insights, tapped into the needs of a postWorld War I German society and rebuilt a nationalistic spirit that unfortunately led
to war and greater devastation than had been seen some three decades earlier.
The new medium of radio, as a major source of information or mis-information,
played no small part in this tragic outcome.

Frank Rybicki
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Introduction
This dissertation is the study of a form of rhetoric that emanated from one
of the first worldwide electronic mass media campaigns. Robert Herzstein’s book
on the subject sets forth a commonly held belief, The War That Hitler Won:
Goebbels and the Nazi Media Campaign. Of course, when we speak of “mass
media” today, the connotation falls within the inclusive realm of everything from
print material to the Internet.

I chose to narrow this study to a particular

“medium” that was enjoying enormous popularity in the historical moment before
and during the Nazi domination of German society.
When Hitler assumed the Chancellorship of Germany in 1933, the power
of radio as a political tool had yet to be unleashed to the extent that would soon
become evident. Hitler and Goebbels had witnessed the defeatist effect of Allied
printed propaganda on German morale during the First World War. They also
firmly agreed on the power of the spoken word as set forth in Mein Kampf, “The
great masses of a nation will always and only succumb to the force of the spoken
word” (Hitler, 1939, p.136). The political culture of post-war Germany was in
thorough disarray and provided fertile ground for the seeds of propaganda.
Therefore, the new medium of radio innocently became the Nazi’s newest
weapon in an already impressive propaganda arsenal that had nourished
National Socialism’s acceleration to ultimate political power.
However, as a means of propaganda, radio was somewhat different. The
industry was state-controlled by the Weimar government and off limits to other
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entities prior to 1933, but the political potential was fully realized and the Nazis
took swift action to implement their pre-ordained plans for radio broadcasting.
Throughout this dissertation, the methods for exploring and exposing the
rhetoric embedded in message construction and dissemination will not be
narrowly confined. I will reject the notion, as did Windt and Hines in, The Cold
War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950, that a single critical perspective
can be used in the construction of political consciousness and culture, “We freely
admit to using any theoretical insight or concept that will help us illuminate
various rhetorical efforts because we believe that is the role of rhetorical theory in
the practice of criticism” (p. xxi).
“Rhetorical Dimensions of Radio Propaganda in Nazi Germany, 19331945” is divided into the following chapters:
Chapter 1, “Rhetoric as Organization: Radio Broadcasting in the Third
Reich,” initiates this study with an orientation of the organizational aspects of the
Propaganda Ministry and its radio subdivisions, which were full of colorful
announcers and administrators who left their respective marks on the
propaganda process. This will serve as a grounding of sorts to familiarize the
reader with the necessary personal, historical and political backgrounds that
were crucial to choices in rhetorical message construction and their subsequent
distribution.
Instead of following the beaten path that has led to the uncovering of
rhetoric that is produced by the organization, I will argue, by applying Crable’s
theory of rhetoric as organization (1990), that the organization itself was the real
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“rhetor.” To crystallize this point, it will be necessary to discuss Ehninger’s study
(1968) on the “three great systems of rhetoric,” in order to lay a foundation in
support of Crable’s work that suggests a “fourth system” where the emphasis is
placed on the ontological nature of the rhetor.
Crable puts forth twelve elements that form the criteria linking rhetoric as
organization.

Each of these twelve points is theoretically explained and

subsequently applied to particular instances inside the organizational aspects of
the Propaganda Ministry, specifically the administration and operational areas
that controlled radio broadcasting. Once the political and bureaucratic broadcast
structure was in place, the Nazis were challenged with providing news and
entertainment that would march in step with the cloudy ideology professed by the
Party. The programming plans included strong elements aimed at the restoration
of German nationalism that was thoroughly compromised by the World War I
peace terms dictated by the Treaty of Versailles.
In Chapter 2, “The Agency of Radio: A New Instrument for Propaganda
Programming,” we become acquainted with the types of programs and their
accompanying political rhetoric broadcast to the German people.

The new

medium of radio made the Nazi’s carefully created messages irresistible in the
early days of the regime. The roots of the Hitler and Goebbels obsession with
propaganda methods are explored, including an explanation of the infamous
“stab in the back” theory from World War I, leading some Germans to believe the
second war was merely a continuation of the first.
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Bitzer’s theory on the significance associated with the rhetorical situation
is shown to be applicable to the simple act of listening to a broadcast.

His

thought is grounded in a philosophical and epistemological commitment to
realism and views the rhetorical situation as having such a degree of control over
discourse, that it should be considered as “the very center of rhetorical activity”
(Lucaites, Condit, & Caudill,

p. 220).

His points to consider for rhetoric

becoming situational include the notions of exigence, audience, and constraints.
We will apply Bitzer’s rhetorical situation theory to a radio-inspired, and truly
episodic, nationwide winter clothing drive organized by Goebbels for those
soldiers fighting on the frigid Eastern front.
In the interest of exigence modification, Rolo’s (1942) rhetorical discursive
strategies help illuminate ulterior motives hidden away by the Berlin government.
Each strategy was intended to overcome the opposition’s political objections
through their respective and calculated implementations by the National Socialist
Party.
On the air, an examination of the sequential order of news stories will help
illuminate the self-serving rhetoric employed by the Nazi announcers, whereby
such manipulation served to divert the listener’s attention toward a more
inclusive, self-serving narrative. Also highlighted is the “verbal newsreel” known
as “Front Report,” where combat soldiers were interviewed in an effort to bring
the military and civilian populations together to share in the major Nazi radio
theme of bearing witness and living through extraordinary times.

Also, the
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Wunschkonzert or Request Concert, was similarly situated to bring the home
front and war front together.
Since news and political commentaries were outnumbered in terms of
clock hours at the rate of 7 to 1 by music, the Nazis had to be certain that
composers and compositions also fell in line with the ideals of National
Socialism.

Here, the rhetorical need for racial and ethnic purity made itself

known without elaboration as most, but not all, of the great German Masters
were cleared for domestic broadcast.

In the same manner that music could

move the masses and contribute to the “Volksgemeinschaft” or people’s
community, a core concept of Nazi ideology (Michael & Doerr, 2002, p. 423),
German society was experiencing the rise of one of the great orators in modern
history; unfortunately, Hitler’s legacy is an undeniable personification of evil. His
belief in the power of the spoken word is well documented and led to the
establishment of a Nazi Speaker System where training was provided for those
who wished to devote their lives and talents to the cause of National Socialism.
The inclusion of Chapter 3, “The Nazi Speaker: Linking Rhetoric to
Ideology,” is intended acquaint the reader with the state of public speaking during
the Nazi era in Germany and illustrate the link, via McGee’s “Ideograph” theory,
between the construction of rhetorical discourse and the Party’s ideology.
Veterans of the first war were overwhelmed by the implementation of Allied
propaganda and its consequential effects on troops and civilians. In spite of the
volume of “printed” leaflets dropped on German front lines and cities, the Nazis
were clever enough to not only embrace the propaganda idea, but also to
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prepare it for mass distribution through updated “electronic” advancements of the
radio age in order to compete with and counter the established propaganda
methods of the British and Americans.

No longer would propaganda be

considered “dishonorable” as the Kaiser’s military elitists previously viewed the
subject.
This Nazi propaganda contained words that are described by McGee as
“ideographs.” The important fact about ideographs is that they exist in real
discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness
(McGee, 1980, p. 7).

With a functioning political consciousness, the Nazis

invented a completely new vocabulary to underscore important elements of their
ideology.
Due to the Nazi’s desire to have the masses blindly and unquestionably
accept their message, a deep distrust of intellectualism is also highlighted in this
chapter. The hope was for people to judge the emotional impact of a speaker,
his clearness, and understandability, as opposed to an evaluation based on logic
or philosophy.
To this end, the Nazi Speaker System was set up as an elaborate training
instrument and was divided into different instructional levels based on geographic
considerations, purpose, and subject matter. Here, the reader is introduced to
the Nazi Rhetorician, Hans Krebs, who, by virtue of his well-received handbook,
served as the unofficial expert on matters relating to the Nazi speaker’s methods
for moving the mass audience to action. We will also preview the list of books
that Krebs believed indispensable in carrying out the work of the public speaker.
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The chapter concludes with an insightful look at the problems associated with the
transition from public speaker to radio announcer, where matters of style and
technique faced immediate reappraisal.

Perhaps the most common difficulty

among those making the move was adapting to the absence of visible spectators
for immediate audience feedback. We will discover most Germans agreed that
Hitler was among this group. However, those who made the transition and found
themselves behind the microphone in service to the Nazis had to properly deal
with many new situations of language usage developed within the Third Reich.
In Chapter 4, “The Rhetorical Language of National Socialism,” we
examine the necessity of the new language of Nazi German, which was
supposedly initiated as a means of societal thought control. While all aspects of
German life were influenced, we will consider the short-range manifestations of
language on the radio and the long-term implementation in the German
educational system. The latter being the home of the dreaded intellectuals with
their feared capacity for critical thinking. The role of radio is discussed in the
plans for the future education of those “sub-humans” in conquered territories.
Significant contributions to thoughts on the language of National Socialism
come from information provided in a wartime study prepared by Marcuse (1988)
while working under the auspices of the U.S. Office of War Information. He
describes a two-tiered mentality that accounts for a pragmatic and a mythological
layer of language. The pragmatic is characterized by elements of matter-offactness, efficiency, and success. Germans were thinking in quantities, in terms
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of speed, skill, energy, organization, and mass. Here, we are presented with the
familiar Marcuse warning of succumbing to technological rationalization.
The German mythological layer of language included paganism, social
naturalism, and racism. Marcuse skillfully shows how the Nazis nourished these
pre-exisitng and evolving emotions found in society by blaming the Labor
movement and the Weimar government with its pro-Christian stance.
The rhetorical nature of the new German language leads one to consider
the role of Hitler’s Mein Kampf as a type of theoretical guide. Through McGuire’s
(1977) close textual analysis, we find mythic themes that are rhythmically
repeated such as birth and re-birth, locating a life mission, carrying out the will of
the gods, stagnation and decay, and a transformation of death to new birth.
From Burke’s (1973) chapter “Hitler’s Battle,” in The Philosophy of Literary Form:
Studies in Symbolic Action, much attention is paid to the unifying devices used in
Mein Kampf, including the identification of a tangible enemy, the Jew, who
functioned as a scapegoat and deflected the potential for objective thinking.
Burke also mentions the use of “ideas as imagery” in completing associative
mergers (pp. 200-201).

His categorization of Germany as a country in dire

emotional need also explains the motive behind Hitler’s rhetorical appeals to
nationalism.
The use of this “invented” language by the Nazis was so important that the
media were issued an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 directives on word usage
(Townson, 1992, p. 140).

We will see how Goebbels controlled the flow of

information at his daily Reich press conferences in Berlin, where his blatant and
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binding orders included the substitution of “Ministry of Lies and Advertising” for
direct references to the British Central Office of Information.
Delicate subjects were to be carefully handled by the media, as was the
case for newspaper and radio reporters who were forced to tread lightly on the
crushing defeat of the German forces at Stalingrad. Propaganda procedures for
military reversals were unfamiliar and perhaps never formulated. Evidence of
this point is established by the virtual disappearance of Stalingrad from all
newscasts during the successful weeks of the Russian counter-offensive.

In

spite of losing over 500,000 troops in this military catastrophe, that arguably
turned the tide of war against the Germans, we will see how the Goebbels
propaganda machine initiated a mythic rhetoric and turned tragedy into triumph
as the defeat at Stalingrad was transformed into the saga of Stalingrad.
As the German apprehension of fighting a war on two fronts developed,
efforts were intensified at keeping the U.S. from entering the war on the side of
the British and creating a threat from the West. In spite of massive aid being
shipped to England and Russia, the Germans still believed their short wave
broadcast strategies to North America could encumber active U.S. participation.
In Chapter 5, “Rhetoric on the Shortwave: Nazi Broadcasts to America,”
we will see strategies that were implemented by the Nazis in direct correlation to
the fluid political situation before and after Pearl Harbor. These strategies took
the form of outright praise for American restraint to predictive warnings when all
other means had not produced the desired outcome. Winning American support
for Germany was considered unrealistic and unnecessary by the Nazi
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propagandists, although the amount of hard work aimed at the maintenance of
U.S. neutrality spoke for itself.
The reader will also be introduced to the work of the Princeton Listening
Center, an impressive collection of linguists, scholars, engineers, and
stenographers

whose

unique

abilities

established

America’s

systematic

shortwave eavesdropping apparatus. This organization monitored short wave
broadcasts from around the world, particularly those directed at North American
audiences. These men and women heard the rhetoric of several Americans
broadcasting for the Nazis and subsequently indicted for treason by a Federal
Grand Jury in 1943.
Numbering eight in all, a ninth was indicted for broadcasting from Rome;
these Nazi sympathizers brought all of their deep-rooted biases and prejudices to
their positions behind the microphones in Berlin. Some were more overt than
others; a few maintained their innocence under the pretext of being nothing more
than objective political commentators.

I chose to provide some background

information and on-air quotes from these “radio traitors,” in an effort to
understand their individual motivations and their respective degrees of sincerity
as they engaged in rhetorically spreading the doctrines of the National Socialists
with Goebbels’ new weapon of mass influence, the radio.
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Chapter 1-Rhetoric as Organization: Radio Broadcasting in the Third Reich

Rhetorical Approach
Any discussion of the rhetorical dimensions of radio propaganda used by
the Nazis in their twelve years of dominance prior to and during the Second
World War in Germany must begin with an analysis of Hitler’s propaganda
organization. This organization, through the manipulation of the mass media,
was responsible for influencing the actions and attitudes of millions of German
people.
Of course, any discussion of propaganda inherently carries a rhetorical
element necessary for the propaganda to function. Since the present focus is on
the organizational nature of Nazi Germany’s propaganda efforts through the use
of broadcasting, we can safely make the point that most organizations are
inherently rhetorical. They provide their own brand or style of rhetoric to the
audiences with which they wish to communicate in order to persuade, influence,
etc.
However, I will argue that rhetoric should be defined, at least in this
instance, organizationally.

By applying the theoretical framework of Crable

(1990), Ehninger (1968) and others, I hope to show that the efficient radio
broadcasting propaganda apparatus, conceived and monitored by Dr. Joseph
Goebbels, may be explained in the context of a “fourth great system of rhetoric”
(Crable, p. 116). In order to understand this concept, it is helpful to review the
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previous concepts upon which the “fourth” it is built. The first three systems were
identified by Ehninger (1968) as those we would associate chronologically. His
categorizations of these three rhetorical periods are based on three important
factors: clarification of assumptions and roles, the need for pragmatic concerns,
and isolation of conceptual difficulties (pp. 140-141).

A Brief Overview of Ehninger’s Three Great Systems of Rhetoric
Ehninger (1968) claims that the classical scholars were interested in
making rhetoric teachable; therefore, the conceptual information available at the
time had to be divided into separate disciplines. The pragmatic goal was to instill
a bias, using rhetoric, towards winning or ultimate persuasion. The speech-act
was the focus of this system and as Ehninger states, contained naïve notions
about the message and the mind of the audience (pp. 133-134). Due to the
earliest system’s heavy reliance on fundamental categorization, Ehninger prefers
to call it the “grammatical” system of rhetoric.
By the eighteenth century, Kames, Campbell, and Priestly would take a
different view of the speech-listener relationship, privileging the notions of
speculation and intuition.

At that time, the winning of causes had been

subordinated and the bias of rhetoric was identified by an epistemological
orientation. Ehninger called the second great system “psychological” (p. 134).
With the emergence of Dewey, Richards, Burke, and others in the 1930’s,
the third great system of rhetoric began to focus on the “social” or “sociological”
in which the key was the understanding and the contribution to positive human
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relations. Ehninger explains rhetoric in this period as having an “ethical and
aesthetic dimension” (p. 139). Crable seems to think that the starting point had
shifted from winning causes and epistemology to a rhetoric of axiology (p. 116).
To this end, the Nazis tailored much of their broadcast propaganda to convey to
the German public the value in adhering to the war effort; yet, their propaganda
broadcasting organization itself was better suited to a critical analysis using the
fourth system where contemporary discourse is produced by organizations not
individuals.
It should be noted that due to chronology, each system was built upon
ideas expressed in previous systems.
carried through time.

Valuable concepts were adopted and

Crable also points out that the theoretical focal points

changed, from speech-act to speech-audience, to act-audience-society.
Nowhere was the emphasis placed on the rhetor.

Philosophically, the three

systems moved between starting points of pragmatics, epistemology, and finally
axiology.

Crable thinks it ironic that in light of Plato’s influence, no system

emphasized ontology as his theoretical “fourth” system does (p. 117).
Upon closer examination, these three systems of rhetoric were actually
three “systems of rhetorical THEORY” (p. 117).

They were not systems of

practice other than managing tasks at hand. Therefore, since Ehninger’s study
covered rhetorical phenomena up until the time of Burke, Crable believes that a
void developed in the second half of the twentieth century as the pragmatics of
rhetorical efforts were missing the mutuality of theory construction and practice
(p. 117).
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Crable’s Fourth Great System of Rhetoric
Supported by John Naisbitt’s Megatrends (1982), Crable saw that a fourth
major system was developing.

He took Ehninger’s definition of rhetoric, “an

organized, consistent, coherent way of talking about practical discourse”
(Ehninger, p. 131), and Naisbitt’s analysis of “Ten New Directions for
Transforming Our Lives” (the Megatrends subtitle) and concluded that
contemporary discourse “is produced by organizations, not individuals: it is
organizational rhetoric” (Crable, p. 117). The fourth system puts emphasis on
the ontological nature of the rhetor. Crable sees rhetors as organizational beings
with theoretical and philosophical links to the past. Theoretically, the speech-act,
speech-audience, and the act-audience-society aspects of rhetoric are
incorporated into the system as well as the philosophical dimensions of
pragmatics, epistemology, and axiology (p. 118). The fourth system examines
the rhetor and the link to the organization. The rhetor is essential in defining the
organization and possibly as representative of a constituency (Crable, 1986, pp.
62-63).
Concerns and biases of the other three systems are incorporated into the
fourth system where the focus becomes the nature of the rhetor in terms of the
organizational representative or spokesperson. This affiliation transcends mere
attributes or characteristics of the rhetor; it is the sine qua non of identification
and frames the fourth system as “organizational rhetoric” (Crable, 1990, p. 119).
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Ehninger had the foresight to realize that the three systems he categorized were
not to be carved in stone. They would be useful as catalysts for scholars in the
development of rhetorical foci shifts that the changing needs of the future would
ultimately demand. The allowance of these contemporary and future frameworks
is seen as a conceptual introduction to the advancement of organizational and
rhetorical theory. This is where I believe that Crable has situated himself with his
fourth system.

Explaining Crable’s Verbal Model of Organizational Rhetoric
Based on a critique of Burke’s “pentad” model of the third system, Crable
cautions us not to equate the rhetor with agent or actor (p. 120).

Burke’s

framework of symbolic action through pentadic analysis includes the Agent or
Actor and brings about or initiates an Act for a specific Purpose by way of a
device or mechanism, Agency, which is utilized within a context or Scene (p.
120). In using elements of the pentad in describing his own model, we discover
Crable’s reassessment and reassignment of meanings.

For instance, he

disagrees with Burke’s notion of the Actor in the “organizational system” of
rhetoric in which we find ourselves today. Crable does not see the Actor as
instigating anything or as being an originator to any degree. In fact, he goes so
far as to suggest the actual extinction of rhetors who purely expressed their own
views, if they indeed ever existed in the first place. Instead, the rhetor now
becomes the representative for organized interests. We will see this correlation
when the application is made to the Nazis and their radio propaganda
organization.
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Using the Burkean definition of the terms, the Actors do not actually use
the Agencies.

For Crable, the Actors are the Agencies, “the instruments of

rhetorical representation of the organizations which are themselves, in true
Burkean terms, the Actors or instigators of the Acts” (p. 120). To further illustrate
this important point, one may recall the old American gangster film genre when,
during the course of the story, the crime boss uses the metaphor of “mouthpiece”
when describing his lawyer.
In actual dramatic productions, Actors speak from memorization of a
script, which is processed through numerous entities such as writers, directors,
and producers. For Crable, in this overall production endeavor, the script really
is an Agency used in the Act, although in Burkean terms, the dramatic actor is
the Agency within the Scene (p. 120).
The nuances of Crable’s fourth system are demonstrated using an
example of his perceived differences between American Presidents Carter and
Reagan. While claiming that Carter did not understand the fourth system, Crable
argues that it was readily apparent the President thought too much, confusing
himself and the nation.

He thinks that Carter “was under the misguided

impression” that Presidents should “ponder solutions to problems,” in essence;
they should become Actors or Agents initiating a change (p. 120). Conversely,
Reagan understood that he was to revert to his role as an actor in the Hollywood
sense, but in the Burkean sense, he assumed the role of Agency for the
“production company” which was the Reagan Administration.

This President

learned his lines, rehearsed his scripts, and called upon his acting experience to
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the point where he eventually became known as the “great communicator” (pp.
120-121).
Elements of Crable’s Model
Just as earlier theorists have borrowed ideas from their predecessors,
Crable freely admits that his system could be viewed as merely an extension of
Burke or something that his theory “could accommodate.” However, as (Toulmin,
1972) suggests, derivation should not necessarily be considered in any negative
sense, but merely as a bridging function whereby earlier systems have and will
continue to contribute to other systems either in development or not yet
conceptualized.
Here then are Crable’s 12 elements to his fourth system model. When
they are functioning, we have effective, modern, rhetorical practice. When we
assess them, we have effective rhetorical criticism (121). After setting forth the
elements, I will re-visit each and connect them with my contention that the
rhetoric of the organization of the Nazi use of broadcasting is capable of being
examined organizationally using the fourth system:
Production/financing organization
Function served by the same or different organizations or a series of
interconnected organizations
Perceived “circumstances” as viewed by BOTH the production organization(s)
and the audience(s)
Includes factors of an alleged physical nature, public opinion, opportunities, laws,
and so forth
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Organizational “self-concept
Including judgments, values, fears, needs, desires, images of/by the organization
Audiences: external/internal
Intended/unintended; and known/unknown
“Support” as the organizational goal
Including support for desired image, for supportive opinion, for help on decisions
or issues, for some affect on attitude (or some combination of these from one,
several, or many audiences/publics)
Stage managers
Either from within the organization or from without, as in the case of advertising
agencies or public relations agencies
Script writers
The acknowledgement of which makes the question of “ghost writers” less
interesting; may be drawn from the ranks of the stage managers
“Set” or “forum”
Becomes the apparent context within which the message is to be understood;
may be the White House rose garden, the Camp David lawn, a ghetto corner, a
press conference, etc.
Media delivery systems
Interpersonal, public, mass, or more likely in combination
Message intermediaries
Gatekeepers, opinion leaders, etc.
Spokespersons or “representatives”
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Actors in the Hollywood sense; those who “make appearances” to gather support

Perceptions and evidence of impact
Feedback, response, etc., (pp. 121-122).

Even though the terminology associated with “rhetor” is implied in many of these
elements, we must not lose sight of the fact that Crable argues for the valid
rhetor as not the individual but the organization itself as an entity. This model is
helpful when studying the combination of actions that construct rhetoric, which is
eventually “represented” to the audience(s).

We will fail in our attempts at

completely calculating what may be called organizational rhetoric when elements
of this model are consciously ignored or mistakenly overlooked (p. 122).

Production Functions and Interconnectedness
The organizational chart of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment
and Propaganda appears to be a page out of any organizational communication
textbook extolling the virtues of Fredrick Taylor’s “Scientific Management” theory
with its unconditional concerns for hierarchical deportment and scalar chains of
command. Even the title of the organization itself is exhaustive. Goebbels found
the use of the word “propaganda” to be problematic. He repeatedly called for the
word to be used in a positive sense by the Germans, although when used by the
enemy, “propaganda” would be substituted for the highly negative overtone
associated with the word “agitation” (Irving, 1996, p. 576). However, German
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broadcasting actually came under the control of not only the Propaganda
Ministry, but also the National Socialist Party, and the Reich Chamber of Culture.
Whereas the Propaganda Ministry was responsible for content, the Nazi Party
component organized and supervised the listeners. The Chamber of Culture was
regarded as the professional organization. Its sub-division was the Chamber of
Broadcasting where the “Professional Association for Broadcasting” was situated
(Hardy, 1967, p. 264). The mandatory membership in this organization consisted
of those unique, artistic individuals with hands-on involvement in the relatively
new medium of radio (Kris & Speier, 1944, p. 52).
Moreover, the coordination or “interconnectedness” of these organizations
was virtually assured when one realizes that the key positions in all three main
divisions were held by the same Nazi Party officials. Goebbels was the Minister
of Propaganda, President of the Reich Chamber of Culture, and Director of the
Party Propaganda Department. Hans Fritzche, who played a major role in the
radio broadcasting apparatus of the Third Reich, headed two departments in the
Propaganda Ministry and served as chief of the Chamber of Broadcasting within
the Reich Chamber of Culture (pp. 52-53). Within the Ministry of Propaganda,
there were three sub-divisions that were identified with broadcasting activities;
the Radio Division, the Propaganda Co-coordinating Division, and the Troops
Entertainment Division.
There was a publicity section in the Chamber of Broadcasting along with
a special Listener Research Section that gathered informative data from radio
wardens and formed associations with German universities that were conducting

21
research in this significant, yet undeveloped facet of broadcasting at the time (p.
54).
Radio on the national level also came under the jurisdiction of the
Propaganda Ministry and the administrative management fell within the Radio
Division. There, it was further supervised by a Director General and divided into
programs of political relevance such as news reports, commentaries, broadcasts
to foreign countries via short-wave, and counterpropaganda.

The Program

Division dealt with musical programs, features, and general entertainment for the
home front and the troops.

This Program Division was also in charge of

coordinating links and exchanges between the 26 stations that made up the
Greater German radio, a non-commercial government institution (p. 54).
The technical organization of radio transmitters facilitated a national hookup that could come from any of the thirteen regional sites.

For instance, a

program from Hamburg may be followed by one from Munich.

However, all

regional stations could be linked together to insure nationwide distribution. Nonpolitical or children’s shows along with cultural broadcasts were the only program
materials designated for regional distribution to facilitate provincial differences
and interests (p. 54).
From 1933, when the Nazis were officially in power, until the end of the
war in 1945, the Radio Division of the Propaganda Ministry grew from three to
twenty-one departments, ultimately employing a staff of about two thousand
(Bergmeier & Lotz, 1997, p. 9). During these twelve years, Radio became the
Ministry’s largest division and second in importance only to the Propaganda
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Division. Goebbels made it clear at the outset of the war that the Radio Division
had the responsibility for maintaining the political direction of the German radio
operation and that all suggestions or ideas were to be brought to its attention (p.
9).

Of course, the Propaganda Ministry had the final say in all matters of

broadcast material superceding the opinions of regional directors, supervisors,
and editors (p. 9).

Circumstances Perceived by the Organization and the Audiences
Crable’s second element in his “fourth great system of rhetoric” model
enables us to examine some of the shared perceptions of circumstances
associated with German listening audiences and the Nazi Party’s use of radio
that constructed the historical moment.
In her introduction to The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt
reminds that in spite of blatantly open criminality, totalitarian governments still
rest upon mass support and argues that scholars and statesmen alike often
refuse to recognize it. Academics were taken by the fascination with propaganda
and brainwashing, while political leaders such as Conrad Adenauer repeatedly
denied it (vii). With respect for awareness, a publication of secret reports on
German public opinion during the war years, issued by the Security Service of
the SS Meldugen aus dem Reich. Auswahl aus den Geheimen Lageberichten
des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1939-1944, Neuwied & Berlin, 1965, edited by
Heinz Boberach, reveals that most of the so-called secrets were actually well
known by a remarkably well informed German public.

This includes the
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massacres of Jews in Poland and the preparations for the invasion of Soviet
Russia. In addition, the reports indicated that in spite of propaganda efforts,
many Germans had been able to form independent opinions (Boberach pp. XVIIIXIX).
Steinert (1977) divided these German civilian “opinion holders” into five
groups: 1. those considered members of the public or the all-encompassing
masses; 2. those interested members of the public; 3. the informed public; 4. the
opinion elite or opinion-makers, i.e., communications elite; and 5. the political
elite. As a result of this division, Steinert argues that most opinion research
concentrated its efforts on the first two categories and occasionally the third.
This becomes somewhat problematic when one considers the complex
composition of the majority, from the disinterested, uninformed masses to the
interested and lesser-informed segments of society (p. 17).
What becomes clear is the existence of a national opinion during and after
the political ascension of the Nazis; however it was not openly manifested. The
talent of Goebbels was found in his understanding of the German psyche and in
his sense of the problems that individuals and families faced (Baird, 1974, p. 18).
His perception helped the Party to uncover what was important to the average
citizen. This “finger on the pulse” of the Weimar Republic is what helped the
Nazi Party grow and gradually acquire seats in the Reichstag.
There is no shortage of shared issues to discuss, but for the purposes of
linking a concrete shared perception to the second element in Crable’s model,
the organization (broadcast propaganda) and the audience (the German people)
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shared a concern for the fate of Germany in the post-war era. Both groups
sensed the decline in nationalism that ensued from the humiliation imposed on
their country by the Treaty of Versailles. Journalist William L. Shirer was an
eyewitness to a major link in the oppressive chain being shattered that had held
down the nationalistic spirit of the German people for the sixteen years that
followed the Treaty. This observation is taken from an entry dated March 16,
1935 in his famous Berlin Diary:
Today’s creation of a conscript army in open defiance of
Versailles will greatly enhance his (Hitler’s) domestic position,
for there are few Germans, regardless of how much they hate
the Nazis, who will not support it wholeheartedly. The great
majority will like the way he thumbed his nose at Versailles,
which they all resented, and, being militarists at heart, they
welcome the rebirth of the army. (p. 31)
Shirer’s observation is important since it helps illustrate the point that public
opinion was not thoroughly manipulated with respect to the issue of nationalism
and therefore becomes a more credible point when applied to Crable’s model as
a shared concern.
The Nazi propagandist was able to deal with national unity in a way that
radically differed from a democratic government’s appeal to patriotism.
Nationalism was seen as an opportunity to further the Nazi cause.

When

speaking to the German people about the German people, the main task was to
keep the man in the street from knowing himself and was accomplished through
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the use of a collective identity (Kris & Speier, p. 163). The individual was nonexistent and melded into the larger collective notion of “Germany.”

One’s

greatest virtue was to think, feel, and act like every other member of his or her
race. It was hoped that the radio would make the people believe what he or she
was being told about “the German people” and consequently begin to think, feel
and act as the propagandist suggested. By this power of suggestion, the radio
worked on the public’s everyday perception of itself to create a different reality, or
an ontological sleight of hand to suggest that everyday life was not as it
appeared (p. 163).
Kris & Speier go on to say that suffering was born with a heart made of
iron because it was a prelude to a future measured in centuries. Germans were
not governed; they were led. They demanded every new law imposed upon
them. Indoctrination was actually enlightenment. The people did not read books
or like music; they had culture. The German did not have a good time; instead it
was enthusiasm, boundless and national (p. 164). Of course, the trends of the
war dictated the message construction and this component of Nazi Party rhetoric
shall be examined later.

Organizational self-concept
Hans Fritzsche was a leading Nazi political broadcaster during the war.
His sharp, sarcastic wit helped him gather a large following of faithful listeners.
In a 1933 broadcast speech entitled “Dr. Goebbels and his Ministry,” Fritzsche
outlined the new Ministry’s direction and goals while heaping unrelenting praise
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upon his superior. Fritzsche’s remarks will help connect Crable’s third element,
the organization’s self-concept structure.
Goebbels was characterized as a martyr who had beaten all the odds and
suffered much indignation in his political battles. At Hitler’s command he had
conquered the Communists in Berlin and saved the Nazi Party, which had been
on the verge of collapse in 1926. The French and the separatists in the Ruhr and
the Rhine also proved to be no match for him earlier in his career. In short,
Goebbels was revered second only to Hitler in Party circles. Associate Press
correspondent, translator, and editor of The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943, Louis
P. Lochner, confirms this belief in Goebbels stature.

“I believe it is no

exaggeration to say that at the time when Goebbels diaries were written the little
doctor was the most important and influential man after Hitler, not even excepting
the seemingly all-powerful Heinrich Himmler” (p. 25). The non-Party, average
citizens were also well aware of this fact.
In his speech, Fritzsche denied the Propaganda Ministry’s role as a
bureaucratic or administrative component of the state; his organizational selfconcept was described as “rather a spiritual center of power that stays in
constant touch with the whole people on political, spiritual, cultural and economic
matters. It is the mouth and ear of the Reich government” (Fritzsche, 1934).
He also spoke favorably of the Radio Division’s role in uniting the entire
radio system. Characterized as once a collection of private broadcasters where
the Reich, political parties, the states, and private interests co-existed, this new
technology had been cleansed, united, and organized. Fritzsche also spoke of
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radio’s power to draw the nation together for vicarious involvement in festivals
and ceremonies. He noted that while the Führer would speak to an assembled
audience of a few thousand, the radio was carrying the event to millions. By
today’s standards radio’s potential to reach the masses this is common
knowledge. However, we must keep in mind that electronic communication in
the form of broadcasting was still in its early stages. Therefore, the claim of
reaching “millions” of listeners was no small boast. Fritzsche went on to say that,
“Without exaggerating, one can say that there is no country in the world where
radio is anywhere near as intensive an intermediary between the government
and the people as in Germany” (Fritzsche, 1934).
In his first address to the new managerial staff of German radio in March
of 1933, Goebbels told his gathering, “I hold radio to be the most modern and the
most important instrument of mass influence that exists anywhere.”

He

continued, “I am also of the opinion, and one shouldn’t say this out loud, that in
the long term radio will replace newspapers” (Welch, 2002, p. 39).

Audiences
The Germany of Hitler’s day was a modern mass media society. Millions
of news consumers were found in newspaper readership, in newsreel film
audiences, and of course in the new medium of radio with its advantage of
immediacy, if and when Goebbels decided to use this benefit. Germans listened
at home, in public places, and even at work. The element of the audience is
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Crable’s fourth in the model of organizational rhetoric as the “fourth great
system.”
The Nazi broadcasters were careful to provide the right mix of programs
that included news, entertainment, and specials, the latter being the category of a
Hitler speech. Under the watchful eye of the local Party radio warden, it was
actually forbidden to leave one’s desk at work until a broadcast of a political
nature had concluded. Inexpensive radio sets were mass-produced and were
capable of receiving a limited number of state controlled stations. By 1939, three
million of these sets had been sold (Gellately, 2001, p. 185). As was and still is
the case in most of Europe, radio license fees were also imposed on the
audiences with installment plans in place to facilitate listenership. Communal
listening was encouraged and compared to the experience of church worship. If
one had a problem with paying for the receiver or the accompanying six dollar
per year license fee, there were massive loudspeakers set up in public places
(Kris & Speier, p. 57).
The law prohibited listening to any type of foreign broadcasts, which
required special care at times since, in at least one instance, the wavelength of
the BBC’s German language transmissions fell between a German regional and
national station. Known as “black-listening,” the act was punishable by jail, hard
labor, or death and fell under the radio warden’s jurisdiction (Burleigh, 2000, p.
206). Statistically, there were about four million radio listeners when the Nazis
came to power in 1933. This number would quadruple and peak during the early
war years when continuous military victories was common, however, “black-
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listening” to a variety of foreign broadcasts would become a mounting problem
for Goebbels as the war progressed beyond the German army’s debacle at
Stalingrad (Gellately, p. 185).

Support as an Organizational Goal
In March of 1933, Goebbels gave a speech before the German press to
introduce the rationale behind the new Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and
Propaganda. He took a carefully calculated approach with his audience to gain
their support, which is Crable’s fifth element in the rhetoric as organization
model:
Goebbels ingratiated himself by flattering his audience, referring
to them as the ‘seventh great power that is better suited than
any other to shape and to influence public opinion’.

By

presenting himself as ‘one of them’ he hoped to gain a
sympathetic understanding for some of the measures he was
about to outline. (Welch, 2002, p. 172)
On the subject of radio, Goebbels promised a “modern tempo.” Claiming
that the process of creating a mood need not be boring for the listener, he cited
the fine work done by his charges in the few weeks since January 30th, the date
of Hitler’s official takeover in 1933.

References were made to those who

believed that listeners would be driven away in droves by the new organization.
Instead, Goebbels claimed that millions of new listeners were welcomed, in spite
of concrete research, because the Government was producing its propaganda in
the “atmosphere-laden halls of mass gatherings” (Welch, p. 178).
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He then elaborated on the vicarious involvement theme by stating that
radio will be aware of its great national responsibility and that individual listeners
will have the opportunity to be involved in great forums of nationalistic
celebrations:
I think it is an impossible situation if a national event, such as
the opening of the new Reichstag or the Thanksgiving Service
in the churches of Potsdam or a parade by a Potsdam regiment
in front of the Reich President, has an audience numbering only
10,000 or 15,000.

That is completely out of date.

A

government that permits that has no need to wonder why
nobody above and beyond that 15,000 has any interest in the
national event. On the contrary, I regard it as essential that the
whole nation, for nowadays we have the technical means, must
listen in to and play a direct part in these kinds of events. (p.
178)
Goebbels also alluded to the banning of broadcasts in the old Reichstag
sessions of the Weimar Republic. This would no longer be the case since the
new Government had nothing to hide. The sessions would be held in a manner
befitting the “honor and dignity of the German people.” The people would know
everything that the Government was doing and the reasons for the ways in which
it was behaving. Radio would therefore offer participation in great events and
“serve the conservation of German art, German science and German music, and

31
not only objects from the past but also objects from the present when they have a
future” (p. 178).
The organizational support was petitioned within a context of trust and
nationalism. Gaining and maintaining the confidence of the people was crucial
for the future plans of the Party and the radio was seen as an excellent
communication tool to help achieve their objectives.

Stage Managers
The physical nature of the Nazi propaganda apparatus was intended to be
hidden from public view.

The illusion was never to be connected to the

illusionists. On one rare occasion, “Goebbels had a fit of blinding fury” when he
discovered that a magazine had published a photo of a radio production worker
putting an album on a turntable which contained a track of a triumphal bell chime
heard after special announcements. At a Berlin press conference, journalists
were instructed that “problems of stage management, Regiefragen, should not in
principle come before the public. All that goes on behind the backcloth belongs
to stage management” (Zeman, 1964, pp. 39-40).
In all, there were five heads of the Radio or Broadcasting Division during
the life of the Propaganda Ministry. We will briefly examine these men as the
sixth element of Crable’s model of rhetoric as organization, stage managers.
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Dressler-Andress.
Horst Dressler-Andress was actually an actor trained at the prestigious
Reinhardt school at the Deutsches Theatre in Berlin and became Goebbels first
appointee in July of 1933. His interest in the impact of radio broadcasting as it
related to the theatre led to his pamphlet Radio as a Propaganda Instrument for
the Arts. Goebbels became familiar with his work and Dressler-Andress became
involved in formulating Nazi Radio policy. Party officials saw him as a left-wing
socialist. He was dismissed in the spring of 1937 due to his narrow belief in
radio’s ability to spread culture, disguised as Nazi ideology, to the masses. It
would have served Goebbels better had this “stage manager” regarded
propaganda as much more of a vehicle for the Party (Bergmeier & Lotz, 1997,
pp. 9-10).
Kriegler.
Hans Gottfried Kriegler joined the Party in 1926 and three years later,
played a noticeable role in Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg’s Campaign for
German Culture. Kriegler also spent a brief stint as a Storm Troop leader, which
likely helped secure his appointment as director of the regional radio station at
Breslau. His “serf-like diligence” and Party connections may have been factors in
his promotion to the leadership role of the Radio Division of the Propaganda
Ministry. Kriegler was credited with a strong increase in listenership during his
tenure; however, he was a much better follower than leader and subsequently
held the post until shortly before the invasion of Poland in September of 1939 (p.
11).
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Berndt.
Goebbels next choice, Alfred-Ingemar Berndt became his close colleague.
Berndt had the pedigree that the Minister of Propaganda had been searching for,
coming over from the leadership of the Ministry’s Press Division. Trained as a
journalist, Party members were amazed at his talent for “slyness and cunning,
fabrications and lies.” Berndt’s reputation was such that it eventually surfaced
years later at the Nuremberg trials.

His work included a plan for occultist

propaganda, which Goebbels thought the English and Americans would fall for
rather easily (Goebbels, 1948, p. 220). After only a few months, he surprisingly
announced that he had completed his task and had placed “the German
broadcasting system on a wartime footing.” With this, he declared his intention to
enter active combat since he believed the experience was essential to the role of
the propagandist. A few months later, Berndt returned to his Broadcasting post
and approximately one year later was promoted to the highly regarded leadership
role of the entire Propaganda Division. Goebbels was forced to dismiss Berndt,
honorably, near the end of 1944 when he was found shooting at downed Allied
pilots on the open road. Weeks later, Berndt was killed in action while serving
with an SS unit (Bergmeier & Lotz, pp. 12-13).

Diewerge.
In Berndt’s absence from the Broadcasting Division, Wolfgang Diewerge
was left with much of the routine work and assumed the leadership after his
superior’s promotion. He joined the Party in 1930 after completing a law degree.
Diewerge became a fanatical Nazi and anti-Semite “expert” (p. 13). He worked
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his way through the ranks of the Propaganda Ministry from its very beginning.
Unfortunately, for Diewerge, he became a victim of a massive reorganization that
further centralized power.

This move was headed by another intimate of

Goebbels, Hans Hinkel who became one of the most feared operators in the
Propaganda Ministry and its highest-ranking SS-officer (p. 13).
When morale was at an all-time low in the fall of 1942 as the country
prepared for the second winter of the Russian campaign, Goebbels alluded to the
“inadequacies of German propaganda methods” and Diewerge paid the price.
He was transferred for special assignments by the Minister’s office (pp. 15-16).

Fritzsche.
Hans Fritzsche would hold the position as head of the Broadcasting
Division until the end of the war. The former head of the Ministry’s German
Press Division was trained as a journalist and did not share the Nazi fanaticism
of his predecessors; however, he was a much better administrator and Party
member since 1933 (p. 16).

Fritzsche was also very good behind the

microphone and found himself on the air almost daily prior to and during the early
part of the war. It is tempting to compare the audience perception of Fritzsche to
the Allies’ Edward R. Murrow, but under the circumstances of Party domination,
Fritzsche’s tainted objectivity would prevent such association. In fact, he towed
the Party line to a degree that earned him the nickname “His Master’s Voice” (p.
16).
This is not to say that many Germans found his style less than appealing.
Instead of provoking the people, he used a reassuring, intelligent tone in his
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“analysis” of situations. The propaganda unit of the Sixth Army welcomed him for
a short time prior to Stalingrad, but Goebbels knew he needed Fritzsche in
Berlin. Upon his return, he was named “Reich Commissioner for the Total War
Effort,” and Goebbels informed him that he wished to be involved only in key
issues pertaining to the Broadcast Division, in other words, Fritzsche assumed
considerable power right up to the war’s conclusion (p. 17). Ironically, as the war
was winding down, Fritzsche was on the rise as a star Nazi. On April 21, 1945,
he delivered his last broadcast and was shortly thereafter taken prisoner by the
Russians (p. 17). At the Nuremberg trials, he was the highest-ranking surviving
member of the German propaganda organization. His carefully conceived and
rehearsed defense centered upon being misled by Hitler and Goebbels
concerning their war policy. Despite protests from the outvoted Soviet judges, he
was acquitted of all war crimes and released in October of 1946 (p. 18).
However, Fritzsche would subsequently be forced to face his own country’s
prosecution. A German de-nazification court ignored his rhetoric and pleas of
innocence, sentencing him to ten years hard labor and the loss of his pension (p.
18).

Speech Writers
It was the Reich Propaganda Minister’s ambition to become a respected
writer. Goebbels studied history, philology, and the history of art and literature.
Eight noteworthy German institutions of higher learning welcomed him as a
young student; Bonn, Freidberg, Wuerzburg, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt, Berlin
and Heidelberg where he was awarded his Ph.D. in 1921. He immediately wrote
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a novel, Michael, and two plays, Blutsaat or Blood Seed and Der Wanderer or
The Wanderer which were all coolly received by producers and publishers
(Goebbels, 1948, pp. 4-5). However, it was a stroke of luck for the Nazis that
Goebbels was merely misdirected in his choice of genre. His skill in propaganda
writing provides an excellent example of Crable’s seventh element of rhetoric as
organization, script writers.
Goebbels was a master showman who understood techniques for
manipulating audiences.

In February of 1943, he gave one of his most

memorable speeches at the Sportpalast in Berlin.

It was also broadcast

nationwide to the German people (Riess, 1948, p. 249). The subject was a call
to the concept of “total war” as a response to the German military disaster at the
hands of the Soviets at Stalingrad, a major turning point in the war.
On this occasion, Goebbels worked on the speech for a few days. He
wrote it out in longhand instead of the customary dictation method employed for
such purposes. Then threw most of the speech away and revised it until four in
the morning on the day it was to be delivered. As his secretaries typed the
speech page by page, he was beaming with confidence. He practiced before a
mirror in his silk lounging robe making mental notes where to pause or add
emphasis.

Hans Fritzsche was working in the room next door and watched

Goebbels read a line or two and then comment, “Here they will go wild with
enthusiasm” (p. 249).
He then went back to the mirror, outstretched his arm and gesticulated
with his hands. Fritzsche heard him laugh, whisper a few lines, and then scream
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out the next. The bizarre rehearsal continued until his colleague asked Goebbels
what would happen if the audience did not respond as anticipated:
Goebbels was dumbfounded. “You forget that by that time I will
have spoken for almost an hour. From there on I can make them
climb trees if I feel like it,” he replied. Fritzsche was silent. He also
knew that Goebbels would have a few hundred men stationed as a
claque, as was done during all of his speeches. (p. 249)
The Minister’s work paid off when the speech was immediately rated a
tremendous success, stirring the somewhat fabricated audience. The extreme
manipulation he sought and his loathing for the masses are underscored in his
ungrateful comments that followed one of the most auspicious events of his
career:
On the shoulders of the frenzied people, Goebbels was carried
triumphantly off the platform. Madga [wife] and half a dozen of his
closest associates were waiting for him. He was so hoarse that he
could only whisper: “What unprecedented, nightmarish lunacy! If I
had commanded them, ‘Go jump out of the window of your
apartment,’ they would have done it” (p. 252)!
Using his talent as a speechwriter, Goebbels became the puppeteer and
millions of German people in the listening audience responded or were satisfied
with what they heard. However, one must understand that there were many
other tools in the propaganda arsenal that were well suited to the new medium of
radio. The collective identity of the nation’s population, “Germany” would have
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the ability to become one with the Party via the carefully produced celebrations of
the mass meeting.

The “Set” or “Forum”
At the height of Germany’s military victories in 1941, Goebbels related to
officials of the Propaganda Ministry that he was quite proud the “style and
technique”

of

the

orchestrated

public

ceremonials,

where

massive

demonstrations were linked to the myth and ritual of the Party occasion. He used
these ceremonies for years to build up the people’s faith and confidence in Hitler,
who was unquestionably the most essential legitimizing force within the Nazi
political system (Welch, 2002, p. 111). In this context, we apply Crable’s eighth
element of rhetoric as organization, the set or forum from where the message is
to be understood.
The Nazi torchlight parades, bands, uniforms, insignia, flags, and other
theatrical elements were all intended to compliment the impact of Hitler’s strong
words with strong deeds.

Such was the rationale with the weekly movie

newsreel Deutsche Wochenschauen and most notably the documentary
commissioned by Hitler, Triumph des Willens, or Triumph of the Will, released to
the world in 1935. Filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl used a great deal of footage from
the Nuremberg Reichsparteitag of 1934. Hitler was portrayed as a “statesman of
genius” who re-built the nation from the disastrous consequences of World War I
and defended homeland territorial claims from foreign intervention (pp. 114-115).
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These rallies were not enough for the Nazis who understood the
importance of national unity; therefore; it was on these occasions that Hitler’s
speeches were broadcast throughout Germany inviting vicarious involvement.
Life came to a standstill as individuals melded into a national community that was
mesmerized by Hitler’s message and rhetorical skill.

This audience

transformation was described by Goebbels as moving “from a little worm into part
of a large dragon” (p. 115).
The mass meeting was also became an essential element in Hitler’s
speeches due to “a flood of complaints” received after he had tried his hand at
broadcasting from a typical radio studio.

The perception was that of an

ineffective speaker vocalizing too quickly with slurred elocution.

Unlike his

adversary, Franklin D. Roosevelt who mastered the calming, interpersonal
technique of the “fireside chat,” Hitler was uncomfortable in this type of
environment since no immediate audience was present to provide a stimulus.
Also missing was a background or “acoustic backcloth” to strengthen the
message such as cheers, applause, and the rhythmic chants of the iconic “Sieg
Heil!” In fact, from 1933 when he announced Germany’s departure from the
League of Nations, until the summer of 1944 when he addressed the country
following an assassination attempt, no further studio broadcasts were made by
the Führer (Zeman, p. 51).
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Media Delivery System
As the political nature of Nazi radio broadcasting was taking shape,
Goebbels saw to it that everyone had the realistic opportunity to receive the
message by means of some sort of media delivery system, Crable’s ninth
element in the model of rhetoric as organization. This was accomplished in 1933
through the mass-production of the “People’s Set” or the Volksempfänger.
These sets were minor propaganda items themselves since the prototype
model commemorated the date earlier that same year when Hitler came to
power, the VE 301, or Volksempfänger 30. Januar (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 8).
They were also one of the cheapest wireless sets produced in Europe, selling for
75 marks, with an improved version available for 65 marks in 1936. By 1938 a
cheaper

model,

the

DKE
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or

German

Mini

Receiver,

Deutscher

Kleinempfänger, was also mass-produced for the price of 35 marks and was
made available with the option of installment payments (Bramsted, 1965, p. 74).
These sets were capable of receiving the nearest regional station
Reichssender

by

means

of

medium

Deutschlandsender on long wave.

wave

and

the

national

station

Of course, the provision of short wave

reception was not provided due to the inherent temptation of tuning into a foreign
broadcast grounded outside the lines of Nazi ideology (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 8).
The

Propaganda

Ministry

issued

an

advertising

poster

for

the

Volksempfänger that depicted one of the sets surrounded by thousands of
people with a caption that read: “All Germany listens to the Führer with the
People’s Radio.” By the beginning of the war 70% of all German households, the
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highest percentage in the world, had a wireless set of some sort (Welch, 1983, p.
42). By 1941, the 15 million receivers in use reached approximately 50 million
listeners (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 9). As the war progressed, those who had grown
weary of hearing the same worn out Party line and were able to afford a better
quality set, had the advantage of the short wave feature.
Radios were not only useful for the crucial dissemination of Nazi ideology;
they were also sought after as a high profile personal possession for the
household or office. The Minister of Propaganda knew this and exploited this
need with his own rhetorical act:
Goebbels used his ministerial position to gain popularity among
those who served in the mass media and fine arts. He created the
Dr. Goebbels Radio Donation, the purpose of which was to give
free radios to those in need. From 1933 to 1942 he collected many
thousands of radios from men involved in the broadcasting industry.
During the war Goebbels gave the radios-an item in short supply-to
wounded soldiers and to the survivors of men fallen at the front.
On one day in 1942 Goebbels donated five thousand radios in this
manner. (Herzstein, 1987, p. 132)

Message Intermediaries
In a totalitarian society, there is little room or patience for voices of dissent
in the form of opinion leaders. Zeman points to the fact that during the six years
of peace prior to the war that the Nazis allowed themselves, they interfered with
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public and private life to an extent unknown in the history of Germany (p. 52).
The ideology of the Nazis was, of course, completely dominant. As an extreme
example, through a complicated intermingling of messages and interpretations,
Nazi ideology was even upheld to a large extent by The Concordant of July 20,
1933 with the Vatican and Pope Pius XI (for the entire text see Stackelberg &
Winkle, 156-161). Theoretically, Hitler was assured the support of millions of
German Catholics, in return for the state’s respect for the Church’s
independence, especially in matters of education.
However, there were elements of the Party situated squarely between the
radio listeners and the broadcasting apparatus of the Propaganda Ministry. The
Propaganda Department of the National Socialist Party exercised control over
local-level Party officials known as “radio wardens,” who now serve as Crable’s
tenth element in his model of rhetoric as organization, message intermediaries.
Nazi radio wardens were charged with reporting on technical aspects of
broadcast reception, public reaction to broadcasts, and the uncovering and
subsequent reporting of groups or individuals referred to as “black-listeners.”
Identified as those who had mistakenly strayed from the Nazi monopoly of
information by listening to short-wave foreign broadcasts, these subversives
were charged with serious crimes punishable by heavy sentences (Boelcke,
1970, p. 108). Goebbels compared “black-listening” to a soldier administering
self-mutilation to avoid combat. The radio wardens were also well aware that
citizens of the Reich knew that no such ban on foreign listening existed in Great
Britain during the war (Zeman, pp. 176-177). Remarkably, to the German “black-
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listener” or Schwarzhörer, the English actually admitted their shortcomings as
well as their moments of victory. These types of news disclosures acted as
seeds of credibility for foreign broadcasts as the tide of war slowly turned against
Germany after Stalingrad, making the Nazi propagandist’s job increasingly
difficult.

The people were hungry for war news, which was hard to find on

homeland radio during periods of military reversals.

Enemy broadcasters in

Russia exploited this fact by periodically airing the names of those German
soldiers being held captive with the intent of reaching hopeful loved ones, further
compounding the appeal of “black-listening” being dealt with by the radio
wardens (p. 178).
These wardens also were involved in organizing collective listening, highly
sought after since subordination of the individual’s will to the assembled
community kept the group members from thinking for themselves, especially on
solemn occasions. Thinking was not necessary; action was the goal. As Ellul
(1965) points out, action is the means in which propaganda’s effect becomes
irreversible; once obeyed there is no going back.

It is this past action that

necessitates belief by acting as justification and authority for subsequent action.
Without these elements, the leap to action would seem unjust, absurd, and
intolerable (p. 29). Therefore, the assemblies of groups or an innocuous activity
such as the physical positioning of loudspeakers to facilitate community listening
were by no means minor activities in the minds of the Nazi hierarchy. Generally,
radio wardens would see to it that every citizen had the means to be reached, for
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whatever purpose, by his leaders in the Broadcasting Division of the Propaganda
Ministry.

Spokespersons or Representatives
Crable’s next element in the model of rhetoric as organization is the use of
spokespersons in the “Hollywood sense” to make appearances and gather
support. Obviously, an “appearance” on radio was comparable to the familiarity
an audience had with the unseen voice of the commentator. Goebbels, thee
master spokesperson, polished his technique. There were a few other elites
among the ranks of Nazi announcers whose talks were regarded highly enough
to be re-broadcast in support of international short wave propaganda efforts (Kris
& Speier, 77).
As noted, Hans Fritzsche was the most significant German broadcaster
during the war, speaking perhaps a thousand times to the German people. His
appealing ridicule of the Allies was punctuated with a wit, and sarcasm, which
endeared him to millions of listeners. After Stalingrad, Fritzsche took on a more
polemical style, peppered with a “know-it-all cynicism” that was less popular with
audiences than his prior rhetorical technique utilized in earlier wartime
broadcasts (Herzstein, p. 183).
Other notable commentators included those who used the broadcast
medium to speak on military topics to the citizens of the Reich.

The three

branches of the German armed forces: the Luftwaffe (Air Force), the Wehrmacht
(Army), and the Kriegsmarine (Navy) all had one regular day of representation
per week.

45
General of the Air Force Quade had a regular series known as “Our Air
Force” emphasizing the traditions of the Luftwaffe going back to the First World
War. He avoided political topics, although he was inclined to praise the Nazis for
their support in the dramatic build-up of the Luftwaffe he commanded.

Air

Marshall Quade was attributed with popularizing the dive bombing Stuka aircraft
among the German youth with his vivid descriptions of air operations in the
French campaign of 1940 (Kris & Speier, p. 75).
Rear Admiral Friedrich Luetzow, a staff officer at U-boat command in
World War I, represented the Kriegsmarine. His aim was to teach the listeners to
think in terms of world strategy from the naval standpoint. Dwelling on strategy
instead of tactics, Luetzow used geopolitical commonplaces to ground his
worldwide historical perspectives. A German colonial empire was seen through
his eyes as a need and a right. His assimilation into the Nazi culture was rooted
in loyal collaboration as one whose beloved Navy was restored, as opposed to
Party affiliation in the role of a fanatical anti-Semite (p. 75).
The Propaganda Ministry’s chief spokesperson for the Wehrmacht was
Lieutenant General Kurt Dittmar. His talks, or lectures as he preferred to call
them, were to military explanation as Goebbels talks were to political explanation.
Eschewing politics, General Dittmar looked at the progress and development of
the war with the remarkable detachment of a military student and the expertise of
a professional strategist.

As a means of inspiring listener confidence in his

ethos, Dittmar’s rhetoric called for a refrain from verbally abusing the enemy.
This aspect of addressing his listeners was apparently important to the General,
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who more than any other celebrity on the air at the time, cautioned the people not
to underrate him (p. 76).

Perceptions and Evidence of Impact
The manipulative underpinnings of the radio organization in the Third
Reich necessarily meant a method of evaluation was needed to measure
effectiveness. Divergent opinions have been the result of scholarly debates on
the merits of Nazi radio propaganda. It is not my intent to choose a side in this
argument.

Instead, I believe an assessment of the origins of information

gathering becomes necessary in applying Crable’s twelfth and final element in
the model of rhetoric as organization, perceptions and evidence of impact.
In totalitarian societies, the absence of free expression and threats of
retribution upon the citizenry makes the measurement of propaganda efficiency
inherently problematic and becomes furthered complicated when studying the
Nazi regime. There were two sources from which reports emanated and both
reporting bureaus were drowning in ulterior motives.
The first source we shall examine is that of the Party officials, both
regional and local, who rarely overcame the public’s reluctance at expressing
their doubts and criticisms of the Nazis themselves:
The party operated in the open. Its members and officials were
known or recognizable (by the obligatory badges or uniforms), and
the views expressed to them or in their presence were rarely of a
kind likely to place in doubt the fundamental national socialist
loyalty of the person expressing them. (Unger, 1965, p. 571)
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The average, non-Nazi German citizen was well aware of what had
happened to those individuals whose staunch belief in their right to freedom of
speech, i.e., criticism of Nazi policies, had led to disastrous consequences for
themselves and their families. Therefore, the flavor of these Party reports was
generally based on remarks from a complimentary, or at the very least, compliant
public. Another ingredient that prompted regular positive feedback to Goebbels
from Party officials was the knowledge that these reports were also providing
evidence of their own effectiveness within their region or district. Ironically, the
level of propaganda success that one reported was directly correlated to one’s
own success in discharging a fundamental duty (p. 573). However, the ultimate
pressure came from the Führer himself, “Let no one come and report to me that
morale in his region, his district, his group or his cell could ever be bad. You are
the bearers, the responsible bearers of morale” (pp. 573-574).
From these observations, we can deduce that friction was rarely noted.
When Party officials did report criticisms, they were generally of a subject matter
whereby no personal responsibilities or connections were readily perceptible.
For instance, one district leader bemoaned the repeated broadcasts of jazz
music because they “let in through the back door a kind of culture or ‘art’ which
had been ‘officially’ dismissed and branded as Americanism” (p. 569). Another
report from the summer prior to the invasion of Poland found that an increasing
number of people from low-income groups were purchasing higher quality radio
sets. This district leader attributed these actions “to the desire to listen to foreign
stations” (p. 570).

Unger makes the convincing argument that the Party’s
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situation reports on public reaction to propaganda were “utterly” consistent in
times of victory or defeat (p. 571).
On the other hand, reports filed by the Sicherheitsdienst or the SD, the
security service of the SS charged with the collection of internal intelligence,
were much more plausible since this reporting agency had no stake in concealing
popular discontent, but quite the contrary was true. The effectiveness of the SD
could be measured by the number of “hostile acts” or “subversive statements”
they were able to uncover. Consequently, “the power and prestige of the security
services as a whole depended to a large degree on how indispensable they
could make themselves to the regime” (p. 578). Public opinion reports played
right into the hands of the SD and contained information that was diametrically
opposed to that of the Party officials.
In January 1943, the SD reported of “the general prejudice against all
propaganda” and linked it to an “overbearing and boastful character.” Later that
summer, SD reports contained passages such as “the people feel tired and often
nauseated by the overplayed instrument of the anti-Jewish campaign and other
elaborate political essays” (p. 579). In March of 1943, an SD report on listener
reactions to a broadcast speech by German Labor Front leader Robert Ley
caught the attention of Nazi Gestapo chief Heinrich Himmler and prompted a
subsequent report to the attention of Hitler’s secretary and director of the Party
Chancellory, Martin Bormann. The SD report quoted these illustrative listener
responses:
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“As it was audible that he found speaking difficult, one could not
resist the suspicion that he was drunk or tipsy.” “Once again, he
has spoiled our lunch hour.” “When there is nothing else to say,
one can always abuse the Jews.” “I am often overcome by quiet
fear of how matters are to go on if such people continue to remain
in leading positions.” (p. 572)
Since honesty in reporting was insisted upon by the Nazi elite, it is difficult,
as Unger suggests, determining which reporting source was deemed most
reliable to The Reich. Circulation of reports to various Propaganda officials was
curtailed as the war progressed. It is safe to say that Goebbels’ ego would not
acknowledge such criticism of his propaganda as reported by the SD. As his
diary entry of April 17, 1943 suggests such criticism was refuted in order to suit
his own reality:
The SD report is full of mischief. Its recent issues displease me
deeply. It is entirely unpolitical and is sent to the various offices
unsifted. That involves a certain danger, for most readers of these
SD reports haven’t the faculty of political discernment to distinguish
between side issues and main issues.

Above all these reports

contain too many details. (Goebbels, 1948, p. 333)
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Chapter 2-The Agency of Radio:
A New Instrument for Propaganda Programming
Radio’s Political Impact
Ellul has stated that an appeal to the emotions at the expense of reason
can be facilitated by any means of human communication.

However, opinion

cannot form itself in entire societies without the existence of a mass media for
communication. Without it, there can be no modern propaganda (p. 102). Printed
material was utilized in this manner for centuries.

However, technological

advances in radio and the influence wielded by the National Socialists in Germany,
intersected, and created a unique historical moment for political propaganda.
As a unique, story-telling species, we have the ability to define ourselves in
the types of narratives we compose. The process involves the accumulation of
external stimuli mingling with our internal expectations, in varying degrees, in order
to satisfactorily complete the narrative to our liking (Levinson, 1997, p. 86). The
voice of the storyteller, personally unknown, is welcomed into the privacy of the
home as a pseudo-family member through the agency of radio. These narratives
created by personally unknown others take the form of news, entertainment, or
political address.
National Socialism of course preached the doctrine of Aryan supremacy,
yet the blond hair, blue-eyed stereotypical personage that they envisioned did not
match the physical description of Hitler himself.

Therefore, mass rallies with

thousands of people in attendance were effective since the large crowds
prohibited a close-up view of the speaker unlike today’s technology with massive
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wide-screen visual accompaniment. Film could be skillfully edited and produced
as evidenced by Leni Riefenstahl’s calculated documentary, Triumph of the Will.
Her camera angles and various other cinematic techniques created the
propaganda masterpiece the Führer had required. According to McLuhan, the
medium best suited for Hitler’s “explosive polemic” was the radio. In addition, had
it been available, he would have been too “hot” for any close-up shots employed
by television (Levinson, pp. 261-262).
Hitler’s affinity for the spoken word, easily facilitated by this new medium of
radio, is clearly expressed in Mein Kampf:
For let it be said to all knights of the pen and to all the political
dandies, especially of today: the greatest changes in this world have
never yet been brought about by a goose-quill! No, the pen has
always been reserved to motivate these changes theoretically. But
the power which set the greatest historical avalanches of political
and religious nature sliding was, from the beginning of time, the
magic force of the spoken word alone. The great masses of a nation
will always and only succumb to the force of the spoken word (p.
136).
He then goes on to explain, in terms similar to the Socratic critique of writing in the
Phaedrus, that the orator has the ability to visualize reaction and adjust his
message or delivery based on the reactions of the immediate audience. Whereas
the writer does not have the same luxury with his unseen audience of readers
(Levinson, p. 88). Of course, we must consider the fact that speakers on the radio
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also have no such visual audience. Therefore, how could Hitler trust the agency of
radio and still place so much value on the faces of feedback in his public
speeches?
Levinson points to a Hitler biographer, Joachim Fest, who sees two different
Hitlers. One as the young man formulating radical political ideas in Landesberg on
the Lech Prison of the Fortress where Mein Kampf originated in 1924, and the
other after assuming power in 1933:
…no conversation was possible in his presence…either Hitler talked
and all others listened, or all the others talked, and Hitler sat lost in
thought. His mind had hardened into theses he neither expanded
nor modified, but merely gave a sharper cutting edge (p. 522).
Since his views were “well beyond correction,” radio and its one-way
communication channel provided the agency that suited Hitler’s needs.

He

appreciated the visceral appeal of his words and the “instant community” that radio
afforded him when it was deemed necessary by a situation. Such was the case in
July of 1944 after being slightly wounded in a bomb blast assassination attempt.
Goebbels quickly arranged for a radio address to the nation by the Führer that
same evening. The impact was twofold; the threat of political insurgency was
extinguished and, in Levinson’s opinion, the speech actually perpetuated the war
(p. 88).
An assessment of radio’s impact during this volatile phase of world history
is unquestionably dramatic. In Germany, citizens tuned into carefully calculated
messages from strangers belonging to a new political party calling themselves
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National Socialists. The skill at which Goebbels and the Propaganda Ministry
crafted these messages gave the people hope and built up a sense of commitment
to nationalism that had been all but destroyed by the Treaty of Versailles.
Gauging these messages as ethically right or wrong, according to Levinson,
mattered little at the time:
Because the sound and impact of the human voice in such close
personal radio quarters cut through and around detached rational
analysis, exciting emotional levels of bonding, which, like all appeals
to our adrenaline, have little to do with reason (p. 89).
It is important to stress the novelty of this means of communication in the historical
moment.

Ordinary, home radio reception in other countries of the world was

enchanting; the National Socialists initially made it irresistible.

German Origins of Propaganda’s Significance
The implementation of propaganda as a means of influencing action was
critical to the Party and the accomplice to expedite the dissemination of their views
was the new medium of radio. In order to trace the evolution of propaganda’s
prominence on the list of Nazi weapons, we must return to the first war, when the
Germans fell victim to the effectiveness of Allied propaganda at home and at the
front.
The lack of interest in implementing this type of modern warfare against the
Allies in World War I is grounded in the dishonorable association with “poisoning
enemy minds.” As late as 1917, the Imperial German Armed Forces under the
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command of Field Marshall von Hindenburg considered propaganda methods as
unsoldierly and disgusting (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 1). Fighting was to be done with
physical weaponry and not with psychological fraud and deception. Frustrated by
the armed forces and the War Ministry’s blasphemous perception of the mere
mention of any type of propaganda implementation, “the military brain behind the
German war effort,” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 1), General Erich von Ludendorff, was
forced to wait. To his displeasure, just two months before the war ended in August
of 1918, a German airplane dropped the first overtly propagandistic leaflet over
Allied troop positions. By October that number had risen to 876,169 leaflets, a
mere drop in the bucket compared to the British, French, and American combined
total throughout the war of a staggering 65,595 million (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 1).
Ludendorff, a future Nazi and Hitler associate, credited the successful
achievements of Allied propaganda after the war, “We were hypnotized by the
enemy propaganda as a rabbit by a snake. It was exceptionally clever and on a
great scale. It worked by mass suggestion, kept in the closest touch with the
military situation and was unscrupulous as to the means it used” (Bramsted, 1965,
pp. xxii-xxiii).
German propaganda would further be influenced by a seemingly innocent
exchange between Ludendorff and a British general in the preliminary negotiations
prior to the World War I armistice that would “haunt German politics for the next
thirty years” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 2). General Sir Neill Malcolm, eavesdropping
on a conversation in which Ludendorff expressed a highly critical attitude towards
certain German politicians and civilians, was heard to remark, “You mean that you
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were stabbed in the back?” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 2)

Ludendorff sensed the

propaganda potential in this statement and together with Hindenburg perpetuated
that assertion in German military circles. Approximately one year later, in their
testimony before a parliamentary committee seeking the causes of Germany’s
military capitulation, Ludendorff and Hindenburg swore, “as a British general has
said, the German army was stabbed in the back” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 2).
This feeling permeated the ranks of post-war German nationalists who felt
the collapse of the nation was due, in large part, to the neglect and ultimate failure
of their own propaganda coupled with the Allied success at subverting the German
war effort. This remarkable Allied propaganda achievement was attributable to a
combined use of the mass media for the first time in history as political affairs were
manipulated using publicity and advertising methods (Ellul, p. 233).
Herzstein believes that Allied propaganda had mastery over the German
soldier to a much greater degree than it did over the German home front.
Nonetheless, defeat could be leveled at a scapegoat for all to implicate:
This belief, so dear to the German right, was closely related to the
“stab in the back” legend, according to which Germany had not lost
the war in 1918, but had collapsed because of subversion, both
domestic and foreign. (p. 73)
Militarily, the German army was by no means in a precarious position when the
war ended. It was still maneuverable and capable of fighting. This led to the
nationalistic theory that the struggle started in the first war was only interrupted
and was subsequently picked up again in the second war.
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Many German writers at the time lost objectivity and failed to recognize the
“home front” situation in their praise of the successful Allied propaganda campaign
against their citizens. The war weariness of the nation and the divisions within
German society combined to create a serious vulnerability to the carefully
constructed messages originating from France, Britain, and America (p. 73). The
influential power of the written word and the equally powerful narratives of film,
were thoroughly underestimated by the Germans in the First World War to the
extent that the National Socialists vowed it would never happen again.
Hitler’s belief in the significance of propaganda can be traced to his own
war experiences and to his earliest days in the Party. Mein Kampf discusses the
subject:
After my joining the German Worker’s Party, I immediately took over
the management of the propaganda. I considered this section by far
the most important. For the first it was less important to rack one’s
brain about questions of organization than to impart the idea itself to
a greater number of people (p. 846).
These views were most likely beginning to take shape while fighting in the
trenches with his Bavarian regiment in World War I. Hitler expressed his thoughts
on the more direct subject of “war propaganda” which, as noted, was visibly
absent at the time from Germany’s war arsenal. Once again, from Mein Kampf,
we discover a deep-seeded respect for not only propaganda expertise, but for that,
which was instigated against the Germans by the combined Allied powers:
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For what we failed to do in this direction was made up by the enemy
with really unheard-of skill and ingenious deliberation.

I learned

infinitely much more from the enemy’s war propaganda. But time
marched on without leaving an impression on the brains of those
who most of all should have taken this as a lesson; partly because
they deemed themselves too clever to take lessons from others, and
partly because the honest will to do so was lacking. Was there any
propaganda at all on our side? To my regret, I can only answer no.
(p. 228)
Of course in Goebbels, Hitler found a mastermind in the field whose
influences reached well beyond what the future Ph.D. had witnessed during the
war as a university student. Among Goebbels’ personal list of the most notable
propagandists in history were; Christ, Buddha, Zarathustra, Robespierre, Danton,
Mussolini and Lenin (Bramstead, p. 29).

Politics aside, Goebbels objectively

admired the oratory and organizational merits of both Fascism and Bolshevism.
While publicly denouncing the political aspects of Marxist parties and their leaders,
Goebbels privately praised the skill and crude language of the agitators who wrote
for the Communist and Socialist newspapers that were rampant in Berlin during
the Nazi’s formative years (Bramstead, p. 29). It was Goebbels’ belief that the
masses eagerly read these publications because the “brutal and crude ideas”
expressed therein were easily understood by the average person. To this end, the
National Socialists would model their propaganda on the negative criticism
paradigm utilized by the Marxists for sixty years (Bramsted, p. 29). Following
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Hitler’s lead, Dr. Goebbels found that, he too, was not above learning invaluable
lessons from the enemy, as the means to an end which would eventually serve the
Party’s cause.
The Public Endorsement of Radio
Shortly after Dunkirk, June of 1940, Goebbels became outraged at the
published magazine picture of a radio technician with a record album of the
“Special Announcement” theme music. This blatantly points at the Propaganda
Minister’s obsession with obliterating the public’s ability to engage in rational
thought. Goebbels wanted the German people to “surrender themselves to the
spell of the medium and be carried away by the elation of the moment without the
disillusioning intrusion of reality” (Gombrich, 1970, p. 3). Radio was the perfect
agency for this method. Walter Lippmann said that the only feeling a person can
obtain about an event in which they do not participate is the feeling aroused by
their mental image of the event (Lippmann, 1922, p. 9).
The importance of the spoken word and the utilization of mass meetings
were hallmarks of Nazi theory and practice in the field of propaganda. Therefore,
an orator-audience relationship is a conceivable model applicable to many
National Socialist propaganda principles. In transferring the orator situation to the
press, Goebbels hoped that his readers would get the impression that the writer
was actually a speaker attempting to sway the reader’s opinion (Lazarsfeld &
Stanton, 1979, p. 248).
In the case of radio, the mass meeting component could be applied
nationwide with only minor alterations. On August 18, 1933, Goebbels spoke in
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glowing terms of the revolutionary aspect of radio. Here is a small part of his
speech that was given at the opening of the Tenth German Radio Exhibition:
Napoleon spoke of the “press as the seventh great power.” Its
significance became politically visible with the beginning of the
French Revolution, and maintained its position for the entirety of the
19th Century. The century’s politics were largely determined by the
press. One can hardly imagine or explain the major historical events
between 1800 and 1900 without considering the powerful influence
of journalism. The radio will be for the Twentieth Century what the
press was for the Nineteenth. [italics added] With the appropriate
change, one can apply Napoleon’s phrase to our age, speaking of
the radio as the eighth great power. Its discovery and application are
of truly revolutionary significance for contemporary community life.
Future generations may conclude that the radio had as great an
intellectual and spiritual impact on the masses as the printing press
had before the beginning of the Reformation. (Goebbels, 1933)
Goebbels was actually setting up a rhetorical situation for the unsuspecting public
through his glorification of radio’s varying potentialities. By making this technology
desirable as an extraordinary new cultural device as well as affordable to the
German populace through a nationally sponsored mass-production effort, he
actually envisioned radio as a richly rewarding resource to be used in furthering
Nazi ideology, maintaining social order, and monopolizing information and news.
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Bitzer’s Rhetorical Situation
Until the late sixties, little attention was given to the rhetorical situation as
an important subject.

Theoretical emphases were traditionally focused on

process, creation, and presentation of discourse. Other topics given weight within
this jurisdiction of the discipline included the nature of rhetorical discourse and the
interactions between speaker, audience, subject, and occasion. Orator method
and judgements of the discourse itself seemed to be of principal interest to
rhetorical scholars.
In launching the new journal, Philosophy and Rhetoric in 1968, Lloyd F.
Bitzer’s essay “The Rhetorical Situation” shed light on the “working assumptions”
of rhetorical critics throughout the first half of the twentieth century (Lucaites,
Condit, & Caudill, 213).

His thought is grounded in a philosophical and

epistemological commitment to realism.
Bitzer explained that human relations occur in the context of rhetorical
situations where exigencies invite discursive responses. These exigencies may
take the form of social, political, economic, and ethical concerns. Consequently,
rhetoric occurs when a speaker responds to the perception of a pressing need by
addressing an audience where his or her persuasive method could conceivably
lead to exigency correction.

The type or degree of urgency dictates the

appropriate response (214).

With these elements in mind, here is Bitzer’s

definition of rhetorical situation:
…a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an
actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially
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removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain
human decision or action as to bring about the significant
modification of the exigence. (p. 220)
He is quick to point out that oratory and utterance are applicable as discourse, yet
the difference between elocution and primitive utterance is not a difference in
function.

Both are also similarly situational whether it is a cave dweller’s

communicative grunts to members of his hunting party or Quintilian addressing a
public gathering of Roman citizens. Bitzer sees the situation as having such a
degree of control over discourse, that it should be considered as “the very center
of rhetorical activity” (p. 220).

Points to Consider for Situational Rhetoric
We will re-visit the following seven points and incorporate them into specific
circumstances surrounding state-controlled radio broadcasts during the twelve
years of Nazi supremacy:
1. rhetorical discourse comes into existence as a response to
situation, in the same sense that an answer comes into existence
in response to a question;
2. a speech is given rhetorical significance by the situation, just as a
unit of discourse is given significance as answer or as solution by
the question or problem;
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3. a rhetorical situation must exist as a necessary condition of
rhetorical discourse, just as a question must exist as a necessary
condition of an answer;
4. many questions go unanswered and many problems remain
unsolved -- similarly, many rhetorical situations mature and decay
without giving birth to rhetorical utterance;
5. a situation is rhetorical insofar as it needs and invites discourse
capable of participating with situation and thereby altering its
reality;
6. discourse is rhetorical insofar as it functions (or seeks to function)
as a fitting response to a situation which needs and invites it;
7. the situation controls the rhetorical response in the same sense
that the question controls the answer and the problem controls
the solution. Not the rhetor and not persuasive intent, but the
situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity. (p. 220)
There are also three components of the rhetorical situation that Bitzer
mentions preceding the creation and presentation of discourse; exigence,
audience, and constraints. Anything considered imperfect, defective, an obstacle,
or waiting to be done is an exigence. It is also marked by urgency and is not
necessarily rhetorical if it cannot be modified by discourse. Bitzer’s examples of
non-rhetorical exigencies include death, winter, and natural disasters. At least one
exigence controlling the rhetorical situation is always present and acts as an
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organizer by specifying the audience to be addressed and the change to be
effected. The strength or weakness of the exigency is variable.
The second pre-existing constituent is the audience which rhetoric always
requires even when engaging oneself as audience. Rhetorical discourse must
produce change through decisions and actions of people acting as mediators of
change. Membership in a rhetorical audience necessitates that you are capable of
being influenced by discourse and of being a mediator of change.
A set of constraints is present in every rhetorical situation and may be
comprised of people, events, objects, and relations within the situation.
Constraints prohibit decision and/or action necessary for modification of the
exigence and may take the form of beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions,
images, interests, motives, etc. As the speaker enters the situation, constraints
must be dealt with effectively and the speaker must realize that his persona, style,
and logical proofs act as additional constraints.
In addition to exigence, audience, and constraints, Bitzer adds the orator
and the speech. These final two are contingent upon the speaker being invited by
the situation, entering it, and presenting discourse (pp. 220-222).

National Socialist Radio as the Rhetorical Situation
In the winter of 1941, the German army was suffering from the bitter cold of
the Russian winter. Up to this time, all victories had occurred in warm weather
months and the troops were not equipped nor trained for fighting in harsh, freezing
climates.

There was not enough woolen clothing to protect the soldiers from
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dangerous frostbite or worse.

Reports from the Leningrad front indicated the

soldiers were unable to burn frozen firewood.

They were desperate for

newspapers to burn, not to read. One report contained this holiday highlight, “the
main attraction of Christmas Eve was the arrival of a barrel of beer, frozen hard.
Every man tried to melt his piece of beer in his mug” (Kris & Speier, p. 415).
Goebbels began organizing a nationwide campaign to collect warm winter
clothing to be sent to the frigid Eastern front. From the end of December to the
beginning of January, the publicity extended to this clothing drive superceded
news about the fighting in Russia. Hitler put his personal seal of approval on the
campaign as only he could by issuing an order broadcast on December 23, 1941,
“Whoever converts to his own use articles collected or destined for collection by a
person entitled to do so, or whoever in any other way diverts such articles from
their proper purpose will be punished by death” (pp. 415-416).
Goebbels discourse came as a response to the Party’s feeling that an
overall drop in home front morale might occur as a result of initiating something as
drastic as a civilian clothing drive for the supposed government supplied troops in
the field. The following excerpt from Goebbels was broadcast on New Year’s Day,
1942:
When two weeks ago we appealed over the radio for the collection of
winter equipment for the Front, the address was not yet ended when
a stream of telephone calls began to pour in from all over the Reich
which for hours blocked all the lines of the Ministry…The next
day…we were interested to see that London was once again
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expecting the German revolution, the first symptom of it being the
collection of winter things for the Front. We leave the English to it as
they enjoy it so much.

Anyhow, they know as much about the

German people as a cow about X-rays. (Lazarsfeld & Stanton, p.
253)
Goebbels was employing a misdirection technique, which diverted the audience
focus from the soldier’s dire situation and their need for warm clothing to the hated
British propagandists and their BBC inspired false prophecies of an internal
uprising

against

Hitler’s

government.

The

situation

bestowed

rhetorical

significance to Goebbels’ discourse as the story mushroomed through the skillful
elaboration of Nazi radio star Hans Fritzsche. On January 3, 1942, he gives a
detailed account of the British radio reporting, “a procession of demonstrators had
stormed the Anhalter Station in Berlin to prevent the transport of woolen comforts
to the Eastern Front” (p. 254).
In the next few days, the campaign widened and took a new direction as
foreign radio transmissions were reporting the existence of preventative measures
to quell the uprising in Germany. As Lazarsfeld & Stanton indicate, the origins of
the story for the foreign press were rumors leaked by German agents in
Stockholm.

This action combined with unwitting neutral correspondents

propagating the stories, served the rhetorical function of “planting the news” to
assist in the creation of the rhetorical situation.
Bitzer’s fourth point concerning the maturation and decay of missed
rhetorical situations where rhetorical utterance was possible is valid, but hardly
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befitting the “Wool Revolution” of 1942.

By actually planting the story in the

foreign press, a strategy not germane to the Nazis alone, the rhetorical situation
and accompanying rhetorical discourse invited by such situations, were planned
and anticipated. The seed was planted and grew into the opportunity to unfold as
full-blown anti-British and anti-American radio propaganda.
Rhetorical situations, according to Bitzer, also need a type of discourse that
is capable of working within the situation and altering its reality. The popular
Fritzsche loved to employ cynical exaggeration and had this to say on January 8:
Just imagine, my dear listeners!

Just as I wanted to go to the

microphone I was phoned and told that, according to Radio
Schenectady in Spanish, machine guns have been put in position to
prevent a coup d’état against the Hitler government-so they say. I
asked where the machine guns have been set up. I was told, on the
Wilhelmsplatz. I went to the Wilhelmsplatz -- I have just come from
there -- I looked and looked; two policemen helped me; I have not
yet been able to find those machine guns; but I shall go on looking
later. (p. 254)
At this point, the discourse of Fritzsche further alters the reality of the situation,
that of winter clothing being collected for the ill-equipped German soldier in
Russia, by tying together previous events of the campaign and enlarging the
fabrication of revolt in Germany:
But these machine guns on the Wilhelmsplatz which Roosevelt’s
radio invented are not isolated phenomena-no, the most silly things
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have been invented for days. On the Anhalter Bahnhof, which first
the English and then the Bolsheviks asserted they had destroyed
and which is still standing, wild excesses are said to have occurred,
which also could only be stopped by machine guns . . . Finally,
admirals or generals-just as it comes -- have planned coups d’état
here -- planned them or carried them out. (pp. 254-255)
Fritzsche concluded his counterattack on the foreign reports of political upheaval
within the Hitler government by characterizing these enemy embellishments as a
combined effort of the British and Americans. The wild exaggerations of the Allies
become stories that actually have the ability to refute themselves:
The finest report of all, however, came from Radio New York on 8th
January; Party emissaries; it said, have had 25,000 officers executed
at the Front, and the Armed Forces are thirsting for revenge. The
BBC for four days apparently searched its mind whether or not to
bite the tempting bait. It did, on 12 January, though cautiously; for
instead of claiming that 25,000 officers were shot, it only mentioned
62 as having been overtaken by this dreadful calamity; not 60,
perhaps, nor 65, but precisely 62-oh, aren’t they accurate! (p. 255)
The Propaganda Minister, whose technique was somewhat similar to
Fritzsche’s style, also saw the opportunity for irresistible satire. Goebbels wrote a
regular piece for one of the Nazi newspapers, Das Reich. His column was read
and featured, on the air as his personal commentary during a regularly allotted
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time slot within the weekly schedule. Here, he too mocks the exaggeration of the
enemy reports:
With brazen impudence Churchill’s press falsified the results, saying
that only 4,000,000 articles had been collected, while there were
actually more than 67,000,000. And how these four million were
collected! The police literally tore them [the clothes] off the backs of
pedestrians in the streets, leaving them exposed to the winter cold,
naked and bare, swearing, and trembling. Is it surprising that the
women

of

Berlin

assembled

for

protest

demonstrations,

remonstrated against the transport to the Front of garments torn from
their backs, lay down on the railway tracks and stopped the
departure of the trains? Or perhaps they harboured the suspicion
that the hardships of the Russian winter were nothing but an
invention of the Nazis, whose only aim in this collection was to steal
their winter clothing to decorate their own bodies. (Kris & Speier, p.
417)
In leaving no stone unturned, it was Fritzsche’s turn to address the naïve listener
of the home front who might have still been confused by the flurry of this
campaign’s sustained accusations. This broadcast piece of rhetorical discourse
may be the most direct example emanating from the “Wool Revolution” of 1942:
The German people at home live their lives; they go about their work
and grapple with the problems and troubles naturally arising in this
third winter of the war-problems which will be mastered in view of the
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goal for which many a German soldier has made a heavier sacrifice
than the homeland. Then suddenly British propaganda raises the
cry: “There is revolution in Germany!” The people of Germany know
nothing about this cry, while the few who are compelled by their
profession to take note of it only react with an inward “You know
where you can put it!”--without interrupting their work. (Lazarsfeld &
Stanton, p. 257)
The rhetorical situation needed a response and invited it, but was it a fitting
response? Allowing for the fact that most propaganda is rhetorical, one must
answer in the affirmative.

By approaching this question from a purely

propagandistic point of view, it can safely be said that any response capable of
redirecting the phenomenological focus of attention away from the troops suffering
in Russia due to political problems at home, would have been a fitting response.
Rhetorically, the exigencies were modified, on an emotional level, for both Nazis
and non-Nazis listening to this episodic chain of events.

The faithful Party

member made the deduction that everything was fine and proceeded with a
“business as usual” attitude since there were no worries. The German citizen
growing weary of the political situation controlled by the National Socialists also
reacted emotionally, but their reaction was one of disappointment since a
revolution or unrest of any degree would be considered a positive occurrence.
The important point is that both groups exhibited a conviction through their
response that everything was fine, regardless of whether they hoped for a change
or not.

Creating this conviction, with significant contributions from rhetorical
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discourse, is the unannounced goal of the propagandist.

These powerful

ingredients hold rational thought in check and any possibility of comprehending of
the facts is outmaneuvered and plays no part in the situation. In short, we are
referring to thinking reduced to perception where only two answers are possible,
yes or no (pp. 257-259).

Rhetorical Discursive Strategies for Modification of Exigence
Charles J. Rolo believes that Nazi propaganda existed as a component of
their overarching philosophy of nihilism. He categorizes several strategies that
were employed by the National Socialists in the execution of their radio war
propaganda abroad. Each was patiently and persistently directed toward a limited
objective.

An examination of these strategies used in shaping rhetorical

discourse, serves as an aid in uncovering the ulterior motives that were well
concealed by Berlin during the Second World War.

Strategy of Division
As the name implies, the procedure here is to drive a wedge between allies
by attempting to proclaim that there are implied interests that they actually do not
share as one.

This tactic was employed against France prior to the German

invasion in 1940. Nazi radio broadcasts to the French people adopted slogans
such as “Where are the English?” and “The English give machines, the French
give their lives.” The fact that the two nations had a long history of armed conflict
was also a resource for the propagandists. The French were reminded that it was
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the English who had sent Joan of Arc to the stake, and more recently had forced
the French to bear a disproportionate burden of fighting in the last war (Rolo,
1942, pp.18-19).

Indignant German announcers commented on the contempt

harbored by all Englishmen for the French people. It was the “Tommies” who
relaxed in fine Parisian hotels by day and frequented the nightclubs in the evening.
Broadcasts beamed to France would ask soldiers if they had seen any British
military personnel occupying positions in the Maginot Line, and then proceed to
remind them that the “Tommies” were behind the lines and with their wives (p. 19).
While abundant evidence exists that this strategy was employed in the
foreign language broadcasts aimed at Anglo-American relationships, it seems that
Goebbels treated this alliance with more of a “hands-off” approach, with regard to
potential propaganda, inside his own country. Possibly, he was waiting for the two
nations to provide evidence of a political controversy that he had no need to invent
or fabricate. Here is part of Goebbels’ diary recorded on February 16, 1942:
The differences between England and the United States are growing
quite naturally and so quickly that we shall desist from trying to
increase them by our commentary.

The English might otherwise

take up some of our comments and use them to prove to the
Americans how undesirable such conflicts are. A precious plant like
this must be allowed to grow with the aid of natural rain and natural
sun under God’s free sky. I expect a lot from these differences of
opinion, but the time has not yet come for making them grow by
artificial means. (Goebbels, 1948, p. 90)
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No more than two months later, Goebbels found evidence in the British press that
confirmed some of his thoughts on the anticipated strain effecting the harmonious
affiliation of the British-American coalition that opposed him. Still, on April 18,
1942, he decided to hold back on an all-out domestic campaign aimed at an
apparent discrepancy between his adversaries:
The Daily Express has published a report on sentiment in the United
States. According to it, people in the United States are at present,
anything but friendly to England. England is blamed for having let
the United States slide into this war.

The British correspondent

states with resignation that one can hardly discover a single friend of
England in the United States. I believe on the whole, that is true.
The Americans will be hopping mad at the British who concocted this
soup and now ask the Americans to eat it. I am taking no notice in
the German propaganda of these controversies between England
and America. They should develop of themselves. (Goebbels, 1948,
p. 175)
The subject reappeared in Goebbels’ diary approximately one month later on May
22, 1942, only this time the source of information was an American newspaper
that, in his mind, had been an innocent political by-stander for quite some time:
The difference between the Americans and the English conception of
how the war is to be waged are becoming more pronounced from
week to week, at least judging by press commentary. The Chicago
Tribune for the first time launched a very heavy attack against the
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English war leadership and especially against the meddling of the
London press with internal American affairs. This newspaper, which
was always isolationist and would have nothing to do with the war,
has exploded in a manner hitherto unknown. As we have no interest
in causing the little plant of Anglo-American enmity to wither by
turning our sun lamps of publicity on it too officiously, we shall take
no notice of this editorial in our news and propaganda services. (p.
225)
This reference to omission was meant for the home front. The German short wave
broadcasts to London were doing their best to expose problems between Britain
and American interests. After the unsuccessful attempt at halting the stream of
U.S. military supplies to the English by way of U-boat warfare, the Nazis took a
different approach towards the British-American relationship, which had been
forged because of the Battle of the North Atlantic.

One of the most notable

commentators on German foreign radio at the time was the British defector,
William Joyce, better known to his impressive following as “Lord Haw-Haw.”
Joyce’s voice was so recognizable that in the end, it betrayed his identity,
heretofore naturally hidden so well by radio’s anonymity.

He was arrested in

Berlin after talking to some British soldiers, was found guilty of treason, and
sentenced to death. His broadcast discourse to London was intended to implant in
the minds of his former fellow citizens that they be wary of the Yanks. In other
words, he worked to modify the exigencies of harmony and cooperation:
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The United States Government is intent only upon the speediest
acquisition of a maximum number of British possessions. . . There is
only one thing worse than standing alone, and that is to rely on
support which will not be made effective. America will fight to the
last Englishman . . . Germany, as the Führer has said a dozen times,
has never coveted the Empire. She has even offered to guarantee
its defense.

Not Germany, but your so-called friend the United

States, is the real enemy. (Rolo, 1942, p. 20)

Strategy of Paralysis
Prior to Pearl Harbor, the United States had officially been a neutral
country, which was the preference of the Nazi Party. German radio was given the
assignment of preventing a reoccurrence of 1917, when the United States entered
the First World War, turned the tide in favor of the Allies, and contributed to the
complete collapse of German morale. This time, radio would do all it could to
prevent U.S. military intervention and prevent vast stores of American aid from
reaching the shores of Great Britain and Russia.
discrediting

the

Roosevelt

administration

and

the

This strategy included
press,

smearing

the

interventionists, and praising the isolationists (Rolo, pp. 20-21).
German shortwave broadcasts to the U.S. reminded the Americans that the
Germans had not started the war, the sea blockade, or were interfering in any way
with American commerce.

Even when the Germans were rolling through the

French countryside with their Panzer columns heading towards Paris in mid-1940,
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Berlin radio assured the Americans that there was no German territorial interest in
the Western Hemisphere. In addressing his remarks to U.S. Senator Key Pittman
of Nevada, American turncoat propagandist Fred W. Kaltenbach, who began
broadcasting across the Atlantic before the war, was adamantly defensive:
I challenge you to produce one iota of evidence that Germany has
any designs on any territory covered by the Monroe Doctrine! Both
the German government and the German people have only the
friendliest of feelings for the government of the United States, the
home of so many American citizens of German descent. (Graves,
1941, p. 35)
The Americans were also reminded that Germany would be a lucrative market for
the exportation of consumer goods after a Nazi victory and staying on good terms
with the winners would be a wise and profitable decision (Rolo, 1942, p. 21).
German leaders were portrayed in terms the Americans could understand.
Listeners were told that Germany’s leaders were fighting the same type of fight
that George Washington had fought. In the spring of 1941, a new radio program
series traced the roots of American development that had been initiated by those
“patriots of German birth” (Graves, 1941, p. 36).

Strategy of Confusion
Borrowing a term from the Spanish Civil War, German propagandists began
referring to a “Fifth Column” of subversives operating in America. Broadcasts
claimed that the FBI was wasting time going after loyal German-Americans.
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Instead, the focus should be on the British propagandists operating within the
country, “darkly plotting Uncle Sam’s ruin” (Rolo, 1942, p. 22).
No sooner had the Germans stated their case than the propaganda tactic
switched to a Fifth Column scare of those holding conflicting opinions with the
Administration.

However, it was portrayed as typical “Rooseveltian duplicity”

meant to justify containment of those citizens opposing FDR’s “insane war policy.”
The “real” Fifth Column was actually composed of “highly placed persons in the
White House.” The merry-go-round of confusion next assailed the newest “real”
Fifth Column, “Jews, Free Masons, and international financiers.” Finally, Berlin
proclaimed that there was no Fifth Column at all; it had been a hoax, a figment of
the American imagination.

This was attributed to the “hysterical war fever”

sweeping the country and was cleverly contrasted to the “calm sanity of a warring
Germany” (p. 23).
The Nazis were also well versed at broadcasting conflicting news reports of
the same event.

The BBC announced on September 2, 1940 that a British

steamer with refugee children bound for America had been deliberately torpedoed
without notice and sunk with significant loss of life. This incident was noted the
following morning in the minutes of the Reich “ministerial conference” which
included Goebbels and his closest propaganda associates. Not certain of the
report’s authenticity, the Nazis nonetheless decided on broadcast retaliation
through their foreign language service. The emphasis and blame would eventually
be placed on the irresponsibility of the British for exposing children to the dangers
of sailing through hostile waters (Boelcke, 1970, p. 84). The Germans replied
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quickly through a progression of confusing statements. Initially, they claimed the
British were lying. Next, it was said to be British propaganda aimed at American
interests. Third, it was actually an “atrocity fame-up” since the British themselves
had sunk this ship in much the same manner as the sinking of the Athenia. Their
fourth reply was that the German Naval forces had not sunk any ships on the date
in question. Finally, Berlin admitted the action but, as planned, scolded the British
for immorally playing with the lives of their orphaned children (Rolo, 1942, p. 23).
In reality, Churchill had voiced concerns about such an event occurring just
months before. The evacuation of children by sea was suspended for the war’s
duration after September 17, 1940 (Boelcke, 1970, p.84).
The dissemination of false news through foreign media was another tactic
employed by the Nazis. For instance, news of a serious disagreement between
Hitler and one of his subordinates would be leaked to innocent reporters by
“trustworthy” German agents. Eventually the BBC would pick up the story second
hand and broadcast their account while Berlin, backed with the indisputable facts
of the matter, waited in anticipation for the opportunity to accuse the British of lying
(Rolo, 1942, p. 24).

Strategy of Alternatives
The “thoroughness” of the Nazis manifested itself with the spreading of a
widespread assortment of arguments.
please all who heard the message:

This “shotgun principle” was meant to
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For Nazi sympathizers abroad, admirers of strength and efficiency,
and fascist-minded listeners in general, as well as for pacifists and
defeatists, German broadcasts depict the Reich as all-powerful,
ruthless, irresistible, a country of iron men and women, inhumanly
selfless in their devotion to the Führer’s ideals. (Rolo, p. 25)
Other individuals, for whom the propagandists had specific message construction
in mind, were those growing weary of anti-Nazi messages, the credulous, and
those hanging onto a “business as usual attitude.” For these folks, Germany was
depicted as a land of art and culture with peace-loving citizens devoted to family.
Nostalgic references were made to Goethe and Schiller, walks in the Black Forest,
easy-going scholarly life at Munich and Heidelberg, and foaming steins of Lager
beer. In addition, there was another group siding with underdogs in all cases, the
“incurable sympathizers.” These listeners were the recipients of Berlin’s grand
version of a “martyred Germany,” a nation that had been forced to endure
centuries of English aggression and “encirclement” (p. 25).

Strategy of Diversion
As in the Winter Clothing Drive at the beginning of 1941, the Germans
earlier employed the diversion strategy against the British during the period of
World War II known as the “phoney war,” the months of inactivity in the West after
the surrender of Poland.

In anticipation of military action, the British were

portrayed as having the desire to extend the war to wherever the Germans knew
they themselves had no plans of conquest in the spring of 1940.

British
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aggression was reportedly imminent in the Balkans, Scandinavia, and the Low
Countries (Kris & Speier, p. 298). This approach created uncertainty as Berlin
diverted attention from the intended targets. Three days before the Nazi invasion
of Belgium and Holland did come, the German foreign radio broadcasts were
flooded with reports of impending doom for the Balkans at the hands of the British:
Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania are being mentioned as
objectives of the Western powers, although the possibility is
prominently brought to the fore that these measures may be
deceptive and designed to throw a cloak over the real intentions of
England and France. (Kris & Speier, p. 298)
Three hours after German troops had crossed the border into Holland, the German
home network radio, the Deutschlandssender, specified that no demands or
ultimatums were delivered to the Dutch.

Again, the British were accused of

conjuring up another lying maneuver by which unrest could be wickedly spread
among Germany’s neighbors (Rolo, 1942, p. 26).

Strategy of Terror
This method of radio warfare is most valuable during moments of crisis
such as the engagement of large armies in major battles, and before and during
aerial bombardment. During their invasion, the Nazis set-up radio stations that
appeared to be operating within Poland. These “fake” stations broadcast reports
of panic and indiscriminate destruction to the Polish people during the course of
Hitler’s first Blitzkrieg action. The technique was also used against the British
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when the Luftwaffe air attacks were at their height. German broadcasts in English
were deliberately garbled in an attempt to add realism to the transmission of “code
instructions” to subversive elements operating within the country (pp. 26-27).
The terror tactics directed at England came on strong in the summer
following the capitulation of France.

Here is an example of the broadcast

discourse aimed at British and American listeners by the famous Lord Haw-Haw,
William Joyce:
The psychological tension resulting from the imminence of the
German

avalanche

is

becoming

almost

unbearable…The

atmosphere is one of depression and despair…There is panic and
the worst kind of panic, too…The British Isles are pervaded by a
mad, deep fear. (p. 27)
In the darkest hours of the Battle of Britain, Joyce once again proceeded to “chill
his listeners’ spines,” as London and other major British cities were ablaze from
violent and indiscriminate air bombardment. A favorite tactic was to cite a neutral
observer:
A Swedish correspondent, still under the influence of what he has
experienced, writes, “Once sulphur and fire poured on Sodom and
Gomorrah until only 77 just people remained. Now sulphur and fire
are raining down on London, but one does not know whether 77 just
people will remain this time.” (p. 27)
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Another account of the terror and chaos in London was credited to an American
reporter. Broadcast on August 19, 1940, these are the words of Joyce quoting the
correspondent:
Ghostlike figures wander about the streets of London, shrieking
fanatically at the mere sight of a plane. Britain is lying awake in long,
sleepless nights and thinking of nothing but one thing-how to get rid
of the pain. (p. 27)
Simultaneously, Berlin, through the North American radio service, was relating
similar details to their uneasy listeners abroad:
England’s capital is being buried under a veritable cloudburst of fire
and iron. As if to add insult to injury, German sky-writer planes,
using smoke as a medium, paint huge swastika crosses in the skies
above the city . . . Panic is reigning among the population of
Scotland. There is a veritable stampede . . . The inhabitants are
fleeing from city to city, head over heels. (p. 27)
Joyce categorized the actions of the Luftwaffe in the skies over Britain as
“scientific work to be carried out with deadly precision.” He reminded listeners that
“The Channel is merely a moat…Dover is practically German territory” (p. 28), and
that Britain was alone and defenseless against the invincible German onslaught.
Even though verbal terror tactics were most effective during the crisis stage,
they were also used by Nazi broadcasters in times of comparative peace or lulls in
the fighting as a means of sending a message to neutral countries. The neutral
country of greatest concern to them was obviously the United States. Shortly after
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the fall of France, a Berlin radio reporter allegedly conducted a walking tour of field
hospitals in the conquered territories of the Low Countries and France where he
described the experience for his American listeners whose first-hand experiences
of war were limited to those witnessed during 1917-1918:
What impressed me was the nearness of Death. One could see
evidences of his passing everywhere.

That relentless mower of

youth in his prime played no favorites. He was as quick to stretch
out his long, bony fingers and snatch away the heir to riches, as he
was to call to himself the humble product of a tumbledown shack.
He was as eager to seize in his clammy embrace the proud scion of
a noble house, as he was to rob a widow of her only son. (p. 29)
His uninterrupted remarks then originated from a French hospital:
…a number of men had thick bandages around their heads. “Blind,”
said the hospital orderly. I thought, “God! What a tragedy!” Other
men were lying there with ghastly wounds . . . The place smelled
unbearably with strong antiseptic. Many of the poor fellows had had
an arm or a leg amputated. Some of them will never walk again. (p.
29)
Terror can also result from the impression of enemy omniscience. This
situation presented itself to the French infantry units stationed in the Maginot Line
during the winter of 1939-1940. German loudspeakers located across the former
“No Man’s Land” of the first war, broadcast everything there was to know about the
French units including their strength, place of origin, even the names and
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information on all the officers. These troops were completely demoralized and
were subsequently removed from these front line positions. On a more whimsical
note, it happened again during a VIP visit by Churchill.

Just as he and his

distinguished guests were sitting down for a luncheon, the German loudspeakers
correctly named all menu items to the last detail (p. 30).

Domestic Radio Programming
Goebbels and the National Socialists saw the potential for radio in
spreading their gospel.

However, the directness of Nazi propaganda was

necessarily limited and had to co-exist in conjunction with other critical elements of
German life such as the progress of the war, forms of entertainment, and the
redevelopment of a strong sense of nationalism. Goebbels’ task was to justify the
Nazi policy as one of peace and defense.

His presentation of the National

Socialist interpretation of the war to the 80 million people of Deutschland was his
priority.

German victories and enemy losses were given special emphasis.

Morale had to be kept high; workers had to be productive, and the future of a
better world after emerging victorious in war had to be promised (Herzstein, 1987,
pp. 15-16). Numerous references to Goebbels characterize him as a “genius” in
his field. He undoubtedly was the best educated of the Nazi elite and understood
the German psyche. This talent for interpretation and the analysis of audiences
contributed greatly to his success in the majority of his propaganda endeavors.
We will now examine how propaganda was interwoven into the presentation of
radio programs broadcast to the German domestic audiences.
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Everything heard on the air was planned to give the listener a sense of
living through great moments of history, and radio was the vehicle by which the
German people became witnesses to these exciting events (Gombrich, 1970, p.
5). Early in the war, such events as major German military victories were framed
by the dramatic Special Announcement or Sondermeldung (Herzstein, p. 179).
Prior to its debut, Goebbels took a personal interest in this technique and
conducted his own listener research, with stopwatch in hand, and waylaid whoever
was available at the time. He gathered opinions from such diverse sources as his
own family members, actors and actresses, and office secretaries.

The

Propaganda Minister’s attention to detail is evident in these sample questions
posed to his research subjects:
How long should the interval between the preliminary “Attention!” and
the first fanfares be?

How many seconds would it take for the

mother to rush out of the kitchen to the radio? What was to be the
interval between the first fanfares and the actual announcement?
How much time would pass before the mother called the father and
children? Should the fanfares be blown once, twice, or three times?
(Riess, p. 185)
Goebbels even found the music for the fanfare, his own composition based on a
variation of a Liszt composition, Les Preludes.

From his palace on the

Wilhemsplatz in the presence of Prince von Schaumberg-Lippe, Goebbels stood
up from his piano, drew a deep breath and said, “Thank God -- I have found the
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best. This is it and this it will remain! What do you think?” (Baird, 1974, pp. 2425)
From time to time listeners were alerted that a Special Announcement was
forthcoming. The suspense would build, as marching music would be punctuated
with orders to stand by. All broadcast transmissions were interrupted, the fanfare
of trumpets was heard, the Special Announcement was read, and a specially
written campaign or theme song was played:
If the victory was scored against England or the United States, the
tune played is “We Sail against England”; if the victory was scored in
the East…the tune was “From Finland to the Black Sea, Onward,
Onward.” When the victory is one of outstanding importance, these
songs are preceded by the national anthem and the Horst Wessel
song, and are followed by the solemn announcement: “We shall now
have a total air silence.” (Kris & Speier, p. 60)
Also, the seriousness of the Sixth Army’s defeat in Russia could not be
ignored. The situation required a dignified approach. The news of course was the
topic of discussion in the media for several days as the heroic “defensive” struggle
to hold back the Bolsheviks, was elevated to mythic proportions.

The clever

Goebbels had organized national mourning into a “Wagnerian celebration”;
another misdirection technique applied to fend off public scrutiny of a fatal flaw in
Hitler’s wartime planning (Kris & Speier, p. 432).
The ringing of the ‘Lutine Bell’ invited audience participation.

Nazi

broadcasters used this method to inform the public of new Allied ships that had
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been sunk. The bell’s somber tone was heard once for each recent torpedoed
fatality. The “real” bell from the H.M.S. Lutine, sunk in a storm off the Dutch coast
in 1799, was later salvaged and is actually housed in the boardroom at Lloyd’s of
London. The ship’s bell was never utilized for any type of propaganda (p. 61).
News programs were an important feature of daily listening. Starting at
5:30 AM and ending at midnight, nine news bulletins were broadcast each day
over German radio. The lengths were between 5 and 20 minutes and contained
about 15 to 20 newsworthy items. The 8:00 p.m. bulletin had the largest audience
and was often longer and more complete (p. 61). It must be noted that the content
of the German news bulletins were not concerned with the latest happenings;
instead, the people were directed to subjects that the propagandist deemed
important.

This type of reporting would then be augmented with additional

comments on the same subject by neutral or Axis leaders in an attempt to magnify
the importance of the propagandists’ chosen topic. Stories were presented in a
sequence that served the propagandist and had little to do with their importance as
news. Reports on military news during the timeframe of the Battle of Crete, were
interspersed with other news stories on eleven of the thirteen days. This afforded
the propagandist the opportunity to combine all of the news content in a desired
sequential manner to manipulate the listener’s attention toward a more inclusive,
self-serving narrative (p. 66).
This method and the majority of other presentations of Nazi propaganda,
fall under the category of what Walter Fisher called “manipulative rhetoric” in his
discussion of narrative fidelity. All rhetoric, especially propaganda discourse, has
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manipulative elements as a means of making the best case for one’s position.
Message design and composition are definitely such elements. However, Fisher’s
conception of manipulative rhetoric supposes evidence that a communicator is
using the audience for his or her own ends. One such category of evidence is that
which exposes the communicator’s motives to serve personal ambition, rather
than allowing for an audience’s unimpeded transition to self-discovery, public
action or social knowledge (Fisher, 1987, pp. 117-118).
A few elements of manipulative rhetoric were incorporated into the radio
program, Front Report. This program extolled the virtues of the German soldier at
the sharp edge of combat and can best be described as a “verbal newsreel” that
attempted to bridge the gap between the home front and those serving abroad
(Kris & Speier, pp. 66-67). The manipulative elements included the use of audio
editing and scripting of answers to interview questions, therefore actuality
programming was out of the question. On a contrived occasion, listeners were led
to believe that Herman Goering had just happened to be passing by the
microphone. Different pieces of the show were transitioned with war and military
marches contributing to a total program length of about twenty minutes. Front
Reports aired nightly at approximately 7:15 p.m., which was suppertime for the
German worker. On the weekend, a “best of” show for that week aired Sundays at
10:00 p.m. (pp. 66-67).
Front Reports was produced by Propaganda Companies attached to
military units. These correspondents and technicians were also Party members
who were under the ultimate supervision of Goebbels and, more immediately,
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exposed to discipline from the unit’s commanding officer. Their battle casualties
were as high as 10% and naturally spotlighted for propaganda purposes (p. 67).
Front Reports was a shining jewel in the crown of Nazi propaganda. Hans
Fritzsche was among those who praised the program for its quality: “I believe there
is no German who will ever forget those broadcast reports sent to the homeland
from German planes during attacks on English cities.”

The following is an

example of what the public heard from Propaganda Ministry official, Eugen
Hadamovsky, who allegedly recorded this dramatic description directly from a
Luftwaffe bomber over London on September 11, 1940:
We can see an endless chain of lights, in fact, it looks as if London
were lit up by one gigantic system of illumination, but it is not an
illumination ordered by Churchill. Unheard by us, without respite, the
most ghastly scenes must be occurring down there, beneath our
machine…We see the blazing metropolis of England, the centre of
plutocrats and slave holders, the capital of world enemy number
one…Here go the bombs, they have found their mark but we still
circle over the city a few times, so that those below should hear that
we are here. (Gombrich, 1970 p. 9)
This program was also contrasted with the dull, lifeless interviews conducted by
the BBC and praised for the speed in which records and tapes were rushed to
transmitting stations enabling timely accounts of victory to be shared with the
listeners (Kris & Speier, p. 67).
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Potential elements for a program were determined by their capacity for
touching emotions and dulling rational thinking.

Imagination and vicarious

involvement were most desirable in this union between civilian and soldier. In the
spring of 1940, the German Battleship Bluecher met its fate off the Norwegian
coastline. Front Reports correspondent Heinz Laubenthal broadcast the story of
the ship’s final descent to its watery resting place as he had heard it from an
alleged German Lieutenant Colonel:
Suddenly the stern reared up, seven to nine metres straight into the
air, and we see it clearly, there stands a man, upright and erect, his
armed lifted in the German salute. I have seen statues, medieval
knights of shining metal, carved figureheads of legendary fame, but I
shall never forget this living symbol of a German soldier standing like
this in his hour of death…we on our island were thrilled to the
marrow, a German soldier who knows how to die, a hurrah broke
loose, and our fervent hearts welled over in the song “Deutschland,
Deutschland über alles.” (Gombrich, 1970, pp. 7-8)
Terse military communiqués read on news programs from the German
High Command were given a personal feel from eyewitnesses to these same
events only days later on Front Reports. After towns were occupied by German
troops, civilians allegedly greeted them with flowers.

Sometimes townspeople

were paraded to the microphone to thank their liberators. Troops capturing enemy
soldiers reported that their foes were glad to be taken prisoner (Kris & Speier, pp.
67-68). All program elements were consistent with National Socialist ideology.
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The war was dramatized but never given a description in its entirety because Front
Reports associated with only small groups of soldiers or individuals in action. The
program served as a manipulative propaganda instrument to create the preferred
image of the German fighting man (p. 68).
The style, however, of the program changed after Stalingrad.

Since

glorious victories were no longer prominent, the propagandists aligned the show
with Goebbels’ new philosophy of realism. Thus, the themes of endurance and
sacrifice embodied in the very existence of the frontline soldier, now served as the
exemplar for the civilians and their ever-increasing hardships cropping up at home.
In June of 1943, the Propaganda Ministry lifted the ban on descriptions of
devastation caused by air raids that had taken place in the western cities of
Germany. Propaganda Companies were dispatched to interview the inhabitants.
As they told their stories, these ordinary citizens became instant heroic figures in
the Rhineland (pp. 68-69).
An extremely popular diversion from political and military programming was
the Wunschkonzert or Request Concert, (Michael & Doerr, 2002, p. 447), which
aired from 1936 to 1939. Listeners were asked to request a song and accompany
their letter with a donation for the Winterhillswerk or social program for the poor
(Bathrick, 1997, p. 116).

Shortly before the war in 1939, the program had

collected in excess of one-quarter million marks. The popularity of the program
prompted the inclusion of soldiers listening on the front lines and was simulcast
twice a week before a live audience in a concert hall (pp. 116-117).
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The ideological implication of this program was the inclusion of high and low
culture bringing the war front and the home front together in a feel-good translation
of the Third Reich as a national family (p.117).

The mood was one of

sentimentality and domestication invoking a deeper type of Volksgemeinschaft, or
People’s community, the central concept of National Socialist thought according to
Michael & Doerr (p. 423). In 1940, a film based on the radio show enjoyed similar
success in German movie theatres:
And like the radio program which is so central to its plot-line, this film
also participated in a discourse which claimed to overcome the
separations between home front and war front, private and public, by
an assertion of the healing powers of a benevolent, all domesticating
Nazi public sphere. (Bathrick, 1997, p. 119)
Voice of the Soldier was the forerunner of an ethical appeal to German
audiences but only aired between January 28, 1940 and August 23, 1942. The
program’s themes were national unity and an adherence to a sense of duty, both
suitable ideals espoused by the National Socialist government. Perhaps as some
strange substitute for a religious broadcast, Voice of the Soldier was permitted to
discuss usually taboo subjects.

Interviewees spoke of pity, anxiety, and fear.

Moreover, this was occurring at a time prior to Stalingrad when the Russian
campaign’s privations were rarely mentioned in other broadcasts (Kris & Speier,
pp. 69-70).
The descriptions and justifications of government actions were discussed
on Mirror of the Times. This half hour show regularly aired at 6:30 p.m. on the
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national radio network.

Its simplified production of explanations was deemed

necessary for the mass audiences and intended to prepare them for changes in
action or policy. Home front achievements were privileged and attempts were
made to unite these realizations with traditional German culture.

As the war

progressed, political commentary was eventually replaced with travel discussions,
descriptions of the “New Europe,” images of idyllic scenery, and lyrical
monologues. It seemed that Mirror of the Times was losing its political focus in
favor of segments aimed at entertainment (p. 70).
All programming discussed up to this point was broadcast on the national
level.

There were also approximately thirteen regional stations serving local

interests by varying their broadcasts for provincial, less political tastes. Morning
farm reports were common as well as talks targeted towards women.

These

programs appealed to feminine interests of the period, which included household
advice, childcare, health, social conditions of women, professions for women, and
fashion discussions. However, the fashion conversations were increasingly
concerned with mending worn clothing due to material shortages. In January of
1941, a Leipzig station warned future mothers of the chances of becoming sterile
by using tobacco (p. 77).
When women were drafted for wartime production duties, the topic of
motherhood became less noticeable on the air.

The morale of the German

homemaker turned factory worker was of special concern to Nazi broadcasters.
Therefore, a new radio program, Here Starts Another Week, was originally aired
on Monday mornings and its popularity eventually dictated a move to Monday at
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6:00 p.m. to reach a larger audience. With the exception of a nationally broadcast
fairy tale read on Sunday afternoons, programs for children were entirely in the
hands of the administrators at the regional level (p. 78).

Rhetorical Music
One must not lose sight of the fact that for every hour of radio programming
involving news, talk, and other features, there were approximately seven hours of
music. Light music was prominent as well as Italian, Finnish, and occasionally
Japanese selections, obviously all initially allied with the German cause. Other
specially written war songs included the March of the Germans in Poland for that
particular campaign, and Bombs on England or Bomben auf Engelland played
during the Battle of Britain. Other campaigns in the Balkans and North Africa
produced the Balkanlied and the Afrikalied. However, the most popular by far was
the march mentioned earlier, We sail against England, or Wir fahren gen
Engelland, written by famed bandleader Herms Niel (Herzstein, p. 180).

The

Propaganda Ministry, under the guise of giving the tune official status, actually
prohibited the song from being played or sung in public except on suitable
occasions as determined by the Reich (Kris & Speier, p. 80).
In the opening phases of the Russian offensive in the summer of 1941,
martial music was broadcast against the background of booming artillery and the
frightening drones of Stuka dive-bombers. These symbolic representations were
well received by fanatical Nazis and members of the impressionable Hitler Youth
organizations (Herzstein, pp. 180-181).
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The music of the great German composers was also incorporated on the
radio, but only if these artists fit the propagandist’s profile. They had to be of
legitimate German racial stock, in support of Nazi principles in some interpretive
manner, and creators of powerfully inspirational music applicable to pageantry
(Dennis, 2002, pp. 275-276). Wagner was considered the central composer and
embodied National Socialism to the fullest. Associated with the Romantic phase
of music history, his views on culture, society, race, economics, and the military
resulted in the “nazification” of his hometown of Bayreuth (p. 276). None other
than Adolph Hitler had a personal fascination for Wagner and his music.
As the starting point of great German musical development, the Nazis
praised Bach as the greatest German musician and the first master of the canon.
All aspects of his classical work contained “Germanic sensibility and perception”
and above all, his music expressed a “volkish feeling for life.” Wagner greatly
admired Bach for his music’s richness, sublimity, and universal significance.
Metaphorically, it was noted that Bach was the German composer who “stands
guard over the Reich of music” (p. 278).
Beethoven was said to have represented National Socialist virtues that
included Hitler’s scrutiny of qualifications. He had the will to greatness, the will to
conquer his deafness, plus the “imputed desire” to fight against alien Frenchmen
and for German unity. Beethoven was also blessed with aesthetic excellence. His
music was the archetype of nineteenth century Romanticism on which all Nazi
composers based their second-rate works in defiance of atonality or the formats of
the Second Vienna School (Kanter, 1997).
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The Nazis had a slight problem with the “Germaness” of Handel due to his
permanent relocation to London in 1712. The strategy of reclamation was the
launching of a polemic to disassociate his life with English art and culture. Handel
had remained a “consciously nationalistic artist” and was the “earliest and most
effective champion of German music in foreign lands.” He was still referred to as
“the great Saxon” despite his half-century spent on English soil.

The Party

intensively tried “to wrench Handel’s Messiah from its ostensibly British origins and
transform it into a German nationalistic instrument.” Of course, they claimed that
such a masterful composition was made possible by Handel’s spiritual return to his
artistic roots in the Fatherland (Dennis, p. 283).
The National Socialists believed that fate chose Haydn, in 1796, to write the
melody for what was to become the German national anthem. The Nazis called it
a “spiritual weapon against Napoleon’s triumphant advance.” However, as the
French occupied Vienna for the second time in 1809, Haydn called his servants
into his room, was taken to the piano, and banged out his Volk hymn three times
with such expressive force, that all who witnessed the event were utterly shocked.
He died five days later and the Nazis subsequently ignored over one thousand
other Haydn compositions (pp. 285-286).
Discrepancies had to be addressed concerning even Mozart’s “blood
heritage.” Both parents were German, but they originated from diverse regions
making Mozart a racial Blutmischung, or “blend.” Therefore, the Nazis considered
this uniqueness a prelude to his life of creativity.

His relevance to National

Socialist culture was grounded in his music’s simplicity or “underlying volkish
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quality.” Mozart was also credited with writing the first German opera, performed
in 1791. To the Nazi Party, he was considered positive for overall morale because
he “fulfilled the great mission of art: to raise the spirits of a tormented humanity
and remove it to a better world” (pp. 286-291).
The Nazi examination of music for broadcast, or any other purpose, was
inclined to minimize formal or constructive aspects and dwell on the less tangible
features of spirituality, passion, and mysticism. The last stop on the converging
paths of German musical development was the formulation of music drama, so
clearly expressed in Wagner’s “Iron Romanticism.” From this cultural base, the
National Socialists thought it possible to unite the community and strengthen the
volk for the upcoming struggles they were certain to face (p. 273).
A discussion of music on German home radio would not be complete
without mentioning American jazz.

The Nazis did employ it considerably for

propaganda purposes in their foreign broadcasts. However, Kanter illustrates four
fundamental reasons that jazz was at odds with National Socialism. First, the
improvisational nature of the genre represented musical freedom. This concept
was an abomination in the eyes of a totalitarian system intent on squelching free
will while manipulating subjects for outcomes desired by the state. Of course,
when the Nazis look at the originators of jazz, their racial biases saw degenerate
blacks and Jews. On the European continent, this view was extended to include
licentious Gypsies. Also at odds with the Party was the syncopation of jazz. One
could not march to it, nor was it the type of music that was useful for the
dissemination of a repetitive propaganda message, which required measured
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regularity. The Nazis also trivialized jazz due to its individualistic structure. For
this reason, the racial, communal, nationalistic, and otherwise lofty objectives of
the Nazi elite were also theoretically incompatible (Kanter, p. 13).

Finally,

Goebbels summed it up for the public in discussing German radio policy in March
of 1942:
We want to speak openly about the question of whether the German
radio should broadcast so-called jazz music. We can flatly reject
jazz if by it one understands a kind of music that entirely ignores or
mocks melody and depends only on rhythm, and in which the rhythm
is carried primarily by unpleasant sounding instrumental squawks
that pain the ear. (Goebbels, 1942)
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Chapter 3-The Nazi Speaker: Linking Rhetoric to Ideology

German Oratory
Before the emergence of Hitler, one might experience difficulty in locating
a tradition of notable oration in German history. Goebbels admitted in 1939 that
the Germans never had the oratorical eloquence of the Latin countries. He wrote
that Germany, “produced many statesman, poets, and scientists, but at all times
lacked great oratorical talent” (Bosmajian, 1960, p. 365).
The Managing Director of the Hanse Press, Dr. G. Kurt Johannsen
believed that there was an abject neglect of public speaking inside Germany
during the 19th century, particularly the persuasive element of a speech resulting
in minimal effect on the audiences. In his book Germany Speaks published in
1938, he asserts there was no “Gladstone, no Joseph Chamberlain to arouse the
people at election times” (Bosmajian, p. 366).
In his 1936 dissertation written at Heidelberg on the political propaganda
of the NSDAP, Franz Six stated that all of the great revolutions such as the
French, the Russian, and those attributed to the Fascists, were led by great
speakers capable of driving the people to action:
Danton, Marat, Lenin, and Mussolini…have ruled the masses
through the hate in their words and the passion in their criticism.
Germany has in its more recent history no speakers who stepped
out of the drawing room or club or later the parliament toward the
masses of the Volk. The emergence of Hitler and the spoken word
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was raised to a valued and feared weapon of politics. (Bosmajian,
p. 366)
As the Nazis continued to make up for lost time, they recommended books
for those who wished to submit for training as Party speakers. In 1935, Hans
Krebs wrote Redner-Fibel, considered a speech handbook of sorts, echoed the
thoughts of those citing the lack of German oratorical tradition:
The art of speaking was rarely found among us Germans. Only few
commanded the language and its means of expression to such an
unlimited degree that it would have influence.

Only with the

National Socialist revolution did great orators and statesmen
appear. (Bosmajian, p. 366)
Rede und Redner was written by Emil Dovifat in 1937 and was
recommended by the Nazi periodical Der Hoheitstraeger “to political leaders who
already have gathered the practical experiences of a speaker” (Bosmajian, p.
366). From the chapter entitled “Speech and Speakers in Germany,” Dovifat
recognized that no German talked to the times of the historical moment, again
that of the 19th century:
The revolution of 1848 brought forth in Germany no speaker of
political power like Mirabeau, no speaker of suggestive power like
Danton, and no speaker of such natural behavior and effect as the
Irish freedom fighter O’Connel (p. 366).
Dovifat also cites the lack of an effective speaker, “when Germany was thrown in
1914 into the most perilous struggle for existence in her history, even in that most
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fateful hour, no speaker appeared” (p. 366).

He compares the enemies’

speaking skills of Clemenceau and Lloyd-George to the void found in Germany.
The subsequent emergence of the new young speakers after the war
concentrated on moving from parliamentary speech to that of the Führerstaat or
Führer state, where parliament and opposition parties were eliminated. Dovifat
explains why these speakers were more effective than their predecessors were:
From the beginning, they spoke to all the Volk, and while doing this
they molded a new form of speech; they created terror and
rejection among those who up to now had cultivated speech only
for certain groups, circles, and parties. (p. 367)
Although plenty of discourse was present in the 19th century, Hitler
believed it was mainly of the parliamentary variety, for discussion and
explanation, not intent on moving men to action. In his first visit to the Austrian
Parliament at the age of twenty, he was amused at the exhibition before him:
It was a gesticulating mass, shrieking in all keys, wildly stirred,
presided over by a good-natured old uncle who, by the sweat of his
brow, tried to re-establish the dignity of the House by violently
ringing a bell and by alternately kind and earnest remonstrances.
(Hitler, 1939, p. 98)
There was no pretense on the part of the Nazis to rhetorical scholarship;
in fact, it seemed to matter very little to them.

While speakers received

enormous measures of advice and instruction, as evidenced by the eventual
development of formal speaker training, rhetorical theories or oratorical
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achievements were seldom studied.

However, Hans Krebs did acknowledge

speaker training provided by the Roman Catholic Church for their priests. He
suggested Nazi speakers study sermonic techniques as an example of what
could be gleaned from formal training. Moreover, Catholic treatises on rhetoric
were of no use or consequence to the Party. “If the ages had gathered and
refined a wisdom about persuasion in speech, that was a matter of no concern to
the Nazi rhetorician” (Scanlan, 1951, p. 431). These specialized speakers who
spread the Nazi ideology, always operated within the basic guidelines
established early on by the Führer who believed in delivering a simply
constructed and understandable message with energetic frequency.

Hitler’s Belief in the Spoken Word
In Mein Kampf, an entire chapter is devoted to the power and
effectiveness of the spoken word. Hitler was criticized by those he considered
members of the “bourgeois intelligentsia” for ranking speech over the written
word in the context of political movements. Of course, in his own mind, these
critics did not share his energy or talent for mass influence through his chosen
communicative vehicle and were therefore jealous of his natural abilities.
Hitler explained that those who were forced to rely on writing as a means
of persuasive discourse were lacking a fundamental psychological understanding
of mass effect and mass influence. [his italics] The Führer had great contempt
for the masses, looking upon them as sluggish and unmotivated. While holding
this conviction, he obviously felt that people would only read what they already
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believed and therefore the political pamphlet would be dispensed with as soon as
it was understood to be at odds with the reader’s viewpoint. This also applied to
intelligentsia-inspired written media:
The whole flood of newspapers and books that intellectualism
produces year by year run off from the millions of the lowest
classes like water from oiled leather.

This can prove only two

things: either the incorrectness of the contents of this entire written
produce of our bourgeois world or the impossibility of penetrating to
the heart of the masses merely by literature. True, especially in
cases when this very literature is so little psychologically oriented
as is the case here. (Hitler, 1939, p. 707)
Journalists and writers were referred to by derogatory expressions such as
“knights of the pen,” “the average sparrow-brain of a German scribbler,”
“intellectual babble,” and “bourgeois simpletons.” (pp. 704-716)
Much of Hitler’s orientation to the value of public speaking came from what
he witnessed in the Marxist movement in Germany. His grudging admiration for
the Communist modus operandi is reflected in his reference to “the colossal
wave of propaganda that took possession of the masses in the course of the
years.” (p. 707) The Communist technique of agitation taught Hitler and other
influential Nazi propagandists that the speaker was the supreme weapon in the
arsenal of persuasion:
What has won millions of laborers for Marxism is less the literary
work of Marxist patriotic writers, but rather the untiring and truly
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enormous propaganda work of tens of thousands of untiring
agitators, beginning with the great apostle of harassment down to
the smallest labor union official and the confidant and discussion
orator; these are the hundreds of thousands of meetings where
these popular speakers, standing upon the table in a smoky tavern,
drummed upon the masses and thus knew how to obtain an
unsurpassed knowledge of this human material, something that put
them all the more in the position to choose the most correct
weapons for the attack against the fortress of public opinion. (p.
708)

British and American Propaganda Influences
The success of Allied propaganda in World War I was acknowledged by
Hitler and more closely scrutinized by authors such as Dietz, author of
Redekunst als Kampfmittel beim Engländer or The Art of Speaking as a Weapon
among the English, Stuttgart, 1938. Wolfgang Schmidt’s essay “The Political
Speech in the Decisive Hours of the British Nation” found its way into the journal
Neusprachlicher Unterricht, 38 (1939). Also praiseworthy in this categorization is
Friedrich Schönemann’s Die Kunst der Massenbeeinflussung in den Vereinigten
Staaten or The Art of Influencing the Masses in the United States, Stuttgart, 1926
(Scanlan, 1949, p. 85).
Eugene Hadamovsky was considered a leading Nazi theorist in the field of
propaganda and held the title of Reichssendeleiter or programming head for
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German radio. His book, Propaganda und nationale Macht or Propaganda and
National Power, Oldenburg, 1933, examines the major role of the speakersystem in America. He claimed that until the emergence of Hitler, the American
pool of speakers was unmatched in spite of the political press and all of the
influences brought to bear by churches, schools, and universities. Citing the
American prominence of publicity, Hadamovsky believed a plethora of
professional, political speakers developed in the U.S. that successfully carried
out all great political action. He specifically speaks to the effort that manifested
itself in the American reaction to the First World War:
The vast floods of propaganda mechanisms (brochures, handbills,
placards, newspaper articles, etc., such as would be used here)
were more than topped by the elaborate speaker system.

This

speaker-system

itself

quickly

found

a

unique

place

for

corresponding to American proportions and ability. (p. 85)
This close, personal contact between the speaker and the people was regarded
as one of the mainstays of American propaganda.

Hadamovsky also cited

volunteerism in the form of the seventy-five thousand member “four-minute-men”
and believed this movement to have been a major contribution in exciting the
public’s war spirit, leading to American entry into the three year old European
conflict in 1917 (pp. 85-86).
The Nazis learned from their enemies that a certain psychological element
could not be ignored in addressing the mass audiences in the twentieth century.
They considered this element to be the persuasive speaker, with Hitler acting as
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the standard by which all would be measured. Although rhetorical elements were
largely ignored, they performed an unsuspecting, yet crucial role in the important
link to Nazi ideology.

McGee’s Link between Rhetoric and Ideology
The Burkean preference to “philosophy of myth” in describing mass
consciousness led others in the Dewey, Mead, and Lippmann traditions to the
development of alternative ideas used to explain the concept of ideology.
“Symbolic” and “dramatistic” references of mid-twentieth century contemporary
writers have challenged raw political definitions such as “dogma” and “doctrine.”
It has even been sarcastically suggested that the word ideology “is widely
perceived as being encrusted with the ‘intellectual baggage’ of orthodox
Marxism” (McGee, 1980, pp. 1-2).
Despite the camouflage created by one’s theoretical inclination, there is an
undeniable certainty that people massed into group settings conduct themselves
and begin to think differently than they would in isolation. Collective identity has
a mind of its own. Marxist philosophy would argue that the only possibility of
“mind” lies within the individual. When we behave, act, or think like the group, we
have been duped and manipulated into a subsequent recognition of “public
opinion,” “public mind,” or “public philosophy” (p. 2).
McGee, in the introduction to his theory of the “ideograph” as a link
between rhetoric and ideology, explains how this “trick” is perceived by various
orientations. The symbolists, where he situates Hitler and the Nazis, believe that
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the trick is not a trick at all. Instead, this phenomenon is a type of transcendence
or intentional conformity of participating and believing in a myth such as the
appealing infallibility of the National Socialists:
Nazi propaganda was ingenious enough to transform anti-Semitism
into a principle of self-definition, and thus to eliminate it from the
fluctuations of mere opinion.

It used the persuasion of mass

demagogy only as a preparatory step and never overestimated its
lasting influence, whether in oratory or in print.

This gave the

masses of atomized, undefinable, unstable and futile individuals a
means of self-definition and identification which not only restored
some of the self respect they had formerly derived from their
function in society, but it also created a kind of spurious stability
which made them better candidates for an organization. Through
this kind of propaganda, the movement could set itself up as an
artificial extension of the mass meeting and rationalize the
essentially futile feelings of self-importance and hysterical security
that it offered to the isolated individuals of an atomized society.
(Arendt, 1966, pp. 356-357)
Materialists, particularly Marxists, see the deception as a reified form of a
lie, eventually becoming interpretations directed at the people and emanating
from the voice of the ruling class. The people’s task involves the location of the
dialectical tension between reality/truth and ideology/falsehoods.

Burkeans

would be more concerned with motive structures than the consequences of the
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imposed state of affairs placed upon those searching for a political
consciousness (McGee, p. 2).
It is useful at this point to look at McGee’s emphasis on falsity as it applies
to myth and ideology. Both subscribe to a hollowness pertaining to the actual
existence of a social organism but the difference lies in their respective
exposures of the falsity. Ideologies take the position that exposure of falsity is a
moral act. Philosophers may argue the existence of a “true consciousness”;
however, it is theoretically accessible.

Therefore, McGee contends, “we are

morally remiss if we do not discard the false and approach the true.” On the
other hand, the falsity presupposed by the myth is amoral since there is a type of
legitimate poetic license at work in the form of a “suspension of disbelief.” The
symbolist calls for great objectivity in the move toward denying that a myth is a
substitute for a lie and indulges in such fabrication where a peculiarly redemptive
value is felt.
The Nazi radio broadcasts of the great Nuremberg Party rallies of the
thirties involved vicarious participation that ignited the spirit of nationalism. The
“suspension of disbelief” became even more amenable when the new technology
of radio removed the visual element, which by necessity was subliminally
reconstructed by the imagination (Kris & Speier, p. 11).
McGee argues that we have long ignored a crucial component of
symbolism.

We have viewed it as an alternative explanation of political

consciousness instead of a supplemental description.

When “philosophy of

myth” is used as an alternative to “ideology,” the Marxists become alarmed over
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the state’s power and control of the proletariat. However, the symbolists can look
at those particular politics as “a wonderfully convenient formula which mistakes
commitment for ‘historically scientific truth’ ” (p. 4).
McGee is in agreement with Marx that the problem found in
consciousness is its concern for unfolding and assessing the legitimacy of public
motives. He believes that this consciousness is always false “because truth in
politics, no matter how firmly we believe, is always an illusion.”

Ideological

falsities are highly rhetorical since the mental manifestations of truth and falsity
that come to the foreground in the act of making a commitment, are products of
persuasion. McGee sees discourse as a key ingredient:
Since the clearest access to persuasion (and hence to ideology) is
through the discourse used to produce it, I will suggest that
ideology in practice is a political language, preserved in rhetorical
documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and control public
belief and behavior.

Further, the political language, which

manifests ideology, seems characterized by slogans, a vocabulary
of ‘ideographs’ easily mistaken for the technical terminology of
political philosophy. An analysis of ideographic usages in political
rhetoric, I believe, reveals interpenetrating systems or “structures”
of public motives. (pp. 4-5)
McGee expands on the characteristics of the ideograph by analyzing his
idea of social control, suggesting its essence as control over consciousness,
which

incidentally

preoccupied

the

disciples

of

Goebbels.

Learned
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predispositions exist as a priori influence on human agents, regardless of that
particular person’s role as one of “power” or as “people” in a political
communicative process (pp. 5-6).
Eric Hoffer in The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass
Movements substantiates McGee’s “control over consciousness” claim by
arguing the limitations of propaganda:
The truth seems to be that propaganda on its own cannot force its
way into unwilling minds; neither can it inculcate something wholly
new; nor can it keep people persuaded once they have ceased to
believe. It penetrates only into minds already open, and rather than
instill opinion it articulates and justifies opinions already present in
the minds of its recipients. The gifted propagandist brings to boil
ideas and passions already simmering in the minds of his hearers.
He echoes their innermost feelings. Where opinion is not coerced,
people can be made to believe only in what they already “know” (p.
105).
Feelings of anti-Semitism existed in German society before the emergence of the
Nazi Party (Michael & Doerr, p. 1). These “ideas and passions” found in the
minds of the masses are thought of or articulated through a vocabulary of
concepts that become the rationale for behavior and belief, narrowing the notion
of McGee’s ideograph. He argues that the state’s insistence of some type of
conformity of behavior is a rhetoric of control, presumed effective on the whole of
society.

A war rhetoric aims to instill war’s necessity, although negativity
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expressed towards it (the rhetoric) is usually viewed as unpatriotic (McGee, p. 6).
Words and phrases such as “liberty,” “freedom of speech,” and “rule of law” have
what McGee refers to as conditioned meaning that becomes obvious as well as
behaviorally directive and self-evident:
They are the basic structural elements, the building blocks, of
ideology. Thus they may be thought of as “ideographs,” for, like
Chinese symbols, they signify and “contain” a unique ideological
commitment; further, they presumptuously suggest that each
member of a community will see as a gestalt every complex nuance
in them…The important fact about ideographs is that they exist in
real discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of
political consciousness (p. 7).
It is in the social function of terminologies or vocabularies where ideographs are
found, not the rational or ethical function. The Nazis were fond of proclaiming
themselves as the “New Order” and “National Socialists.” Words or phrases that
fall under the category of ideographs within the human social condition of one
culture may take on a different meaning in another.

McGee cites the word

“equality” as an example that takes on different meanings in different countries
around the world. Essentially, meanings found in ideographs are culture-bound
and draw significance from their diachronic usages, not from their supposed idea
content (pp. 8-10).
Over time, ideographic meanings may expand or contract depending on
the circumstances, but they always retain their formal, foundational meaning
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found in history. Contrast the Nazi use of the word Kampfzeit or time of struggle
(Michael & Doerr, p. 235) in relation to the early years of the Party. When used
after Hitler’s ascension to power in 1933, it expanded and contracted depending
upon Goebbel’s vision of the overall political situation. When the picture was
bleak, the German propagandists were fond of reveling in past efforts and
triumphs.
The element of time or the evolution of meaning makes the ideographic
structuring vertical.
history.

Significant records are found in our popular chronologic

These “records” include novels, books, plays, and music; however,

McGee argues that the most influential historical record that one may have is that
of grammar school, where our first contact with community was made (McGee, p.
11).
Vertical structuring of ideographs allows for a diachronic and etymological
understanding but does not help our understanding of how ideographs function in
the present. McGee references Ortega’s work on language, to define key usages
in real discourse and in public consciousness as forces. Ortega is mindful of
diachronism acting as the externality of language, but feels the need for an
internal conception where meaningful operating forces are found (p. 12).
If one considers ideographs as rhetorical forces, they appear to be
ordered horizontally, conflicting with other ideographs and subsequently acquiring
a meaning through the synchronic confrontation:
Synchronic structural changes in the relative standing of an
ideograph are “horizontal” because of the presumed consonance of
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an ideology; that is, ideographs such as “rule of law” are meant to
be taken together, as a working unit, with “public trust,” “freedom of
speech,” “trial by jury,” and any other slogan characteristic of the
collective life (p. 13).
Despite new usages, ideographs themselves remain unchanged but their
relationships with other ideographs will change when we make use of them in
ideological arguments. A political crisis may temporarily bring an ideograph to
center-stage in the form of what Burke would call a “god-term.” McGee also cites
Hitler’s campaign against “decadent democracies” as an “alien force” frontally
assailing an ideographic structure with the capacity to change the “present”
ideology, “…in this sense, an ideology is dynamic and a force, always resilient,
always keeping itself in some consonance and unity, but not always the same
consonance and unity” (pp. 13-14).
McGee’s argument theoretically uncovers two ideologies existing in a
particular culture at any given moment.

The first is a diachronic grammar,

historically defined with intensifying and constricting ideographic meanings
beginning with the initiation of the society to the present. The other ideology is a
rhetoric with synchronic structures of ideographic clusters maintaining elemental
consonance and unity. These clusters are continually reorganizing to provide
accommodation for specific situations inherent in the realm of political discourse
(p. 14).
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Illustrations of Nazi Ideographs
What was heard on the radio, seen in print, and eventually used by all
Germans was a language that was intended to win support for a long-range Nazi
worldview or ideology known as Weltanschauung. The pillars of this overarching
value system intended for the German people were race, character, and destiny
(Michael & Doerr, p. 438). The language became known as Nazi-Deutsch or Nazi
German and clearly reflected the Party’s thought and action on levels of
discourse that permeated even ordinary printed matter such as “dictionaries,
grammar books, and common literature” (p. 28).
A Goebbels-inspired propaganda campaign, framed in ethnocentric world
historical importance, centered upon Germany’s spread of its racial principles to
the rest of humanity weltgeschichtliche Mission (p. 438). The war being waged
by the German Wehrmacht against racial enemies of the Reich was called
Weltanschauug or ideological war (p. 438). There was even a name given to an
approved ideological education for students, weltanschauliche Schulung (p. 438).
An inevitable destiny of the Aryan race and the ideological rationale for Nazi
actions was enveloped in the word Schicksal or fate (p. 361).
The superiority of the German race Herrenrasse was a dominant
component of a freely structured Nazi ideology, which reflected a type of Social
Darwinism. This worldview system excluded anything that was considered nonGerman or foreign--artfremd, a “counter-race”--Gegenrasse, or damaging to the
German population--Volksschädling (p. 29).
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Another essential part of Hitler’s ideology dealt with living space or
Lebensraum. Expansionist views in Germany actually pre-dated World War I
when the anxiety of overpopulation and lack of natural resources produced an
urgent need for more territory and colonies (p. 260). The Nazis looked to the
East for the living space they so desired and launched “Operation Barbarossa”
against the Soviets on June 22, 1941 (Steinert, 1977, p. 117).
Months later, the topic of Lebensraum was addressed on the radio after
the Fall of Singapore in February of 1942. The Nazi and Japanese views of
expansion were discussed and delineated along the lines of living space and
world domination. The radio program Political Review broadcast “Lebensraum or
Imperialism” which prompted the following from the German commentator:
On the occasion of the great Japanese victory celebrations for
Singapore, Tojo announced yesterday that the conquest of the
island fortress marked the birth of a New Asia, and a turning point
in the history of the world. In itself, this idea is not new to us, since
it is expressed in the Tri-Partite Pact…Japan is a powerful spiritual
motor driving the old East Asiatic people to a new fruition…Never
before in its thousand-year old history has Japan led other nations.
Only during the last few years Japan has entered victoriously into
competition with other world powers, not only because Japan is
technically the most developed nation in East Asia, but mainly
because her own spiritual values combined modern technique and
old Asiatic cultural tradition (Kris & Speier, p. 264).
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The rhetorical implication averts a “domination” argument in favor of the
Japanese taking their rightful place in history. The language suggests the Axis
mutual intent of international leadership through their “values” and “technology.”
This “collective commitment” is supportive of McGee’s practical definition of
ideology as a form of political language (McGee, p. 15).
Nazi conceived anti-Semitic words and phrases are voluminous and
represent an unmitigated racial policy with many of the words based on the
centuries old derogatory Jude, or the more contemptuous version, Jud (Michael
& Doerr, p. 222).

The Nazi German word Verjudung can be translated

“jewification” or “judiazation” (p. 31). Those who favored Jews were considered
to be anti-Nazi and referred to as Judenbegünstigung (p. 223).
After the radical and anti-Semitic Nuremberg Laws of 1935 were passed,
those wishing to choose a marriage partner were required to prove their Aryan
descent, Ariernachweis. If SS elite Nazis wished to marry, the state found a
suitable marriage partner, provided a proof of ancestry pass Ahnenpaß was
furnished (p. 29). Applicants wishing to join the SS were required to trace their
ancestry back to the year 1750 (Arendt, p. 356).
Newspaper bins of the Nazi weekly publication, Der Stürmer, contained
the following hate slogan (Wer den) Juden nicht kennt, kennt den Teufel nicht”!
“He who doesn’t know the Jew, doesn’t know the devil” (Michael & Doerr, p.
225)! This paper was published in Nuremberg between 1923 and 1945 and was
considered Hitler’s favorite in terms of reading material (Michael & Doerr, p. 391).
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The National Socialists were fond of using words that represented a
community as socialized and conditioned; (p. 28) consequently, many Nazi
German words began with Volk, the people. The spirit of the German people and
their way of thinking and feeling became Volksgeist (p. 423). Hitler’s idealized
Germany was known as the Volksreich or people’s Reich (p. 426). A central
concept “which dominated all other beliefs, classes, parties, individuals, and
group interests” was known as Volksgemeinschaft or people’s community. This
racially inspired concept of blood-race unity took on mythic proportions as the
German people severed ties with the old Weimar Republic and the humiliation of
defeat in World War I (p. 423).

As the fighting progressed and defeat drew

nearer, Goebbel’s job became increasingly difficult. Towards the war’s end a
nickname developed for German radios in general, Volksverdummer or people’s
brainwasher (p. 427).

The Nazi Speaker and Intellectualism
According to Goebbels, the intellectual speaker was ineffective since he
could only reach those who had the capacity to make sense of complex
information, “We must speak the language which people understand. Whoever
wants to speak to the people must, as Luther says, pay heed to folk speech”
(Scrase & Mieder, 1996, p. 94). The Nazis assumed the outcome of intellectual
speech to be strictly educational, lacking the ability to arouse people to action,
mobilize them, and persuade them to accept danger or death for a cause. In a
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public address of January 9, 1928, Goebbels related the following to his audience
on the convictions of one’s beliefs:
…propaganda should not be intellectual, but popular. It is not the
task of propaganda to discover spiritual revelations…I do not go
into the meeting hall to find intellectual revelations, but in order to
transmit to others what I have realized to be right (Bosmajian, 1960,
p. 368).
Intellectuals were often viewed as functioning against the spirit and needs of the
masses.

Nazi radio expert and Reichssendeleiter or national programming

director, Eugene Hadamovsky, in his book on propaganda theory, also echoed
the Party’s attitude on the need for simple faith as opposed to intellectual doubt:
Political propaganda preaches faith; nothing else could be its
nature. Our people long for an inward grasp of political life, for a
political philosophy, and they are ready to take it up eagerly. But
here in the midst of the people stands the German intellectual, the
leaders of German intellectuality, and even today [1936] they are
critically examining premises and counter-premises, the pros and
the cons, without coming to any conclusion.

The German

intellectual, however, will not be able to keep aloof much longer.
He will have to place himself in the service of nationalization, at the
vanguard of the masses, first and above all, in the service of the
Faith. (Scanlan, 1949, p. 88)
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By 1942, speakers were still being warned that they should avoid intellectual
posturing. The propaganda director of Gau, or district, Kassel was fine-tuned to
the Party’s uneasiness on the subject:
A great danger is to be observed, in so far as we have fallen into a
bookish knowledge of National Socialism, in which the speaker
believes that his task is to publicize some wisdom gained from
reading (p. 88).
Goebbels saw a distinct advantage in terms of the capabilities of the emotional
speaker as opposed to the intellectual speaker:
…clearness of expression, simplicity of arrangement, the guidance
of instinct, poetic vision and grandeur of ideas, a knowledge of the
innermost corners of the human soul, and power of delivery. Hitler
is the model (p. 89).
The official monthly propaganda journal, Unser Willie und Weg or Our Will
and Way (Michael & Doerr, p. 407), was first published in March of 1931 and was
discontinued after a ten year run by the pressures of the war in June of 1941
(Scanlan, 1950, p. 137). This journal, intended as a guide for propagandists,
helped the Propaganda Ministry maintain a sense of uniformity over the widely
dispersed Nazi speaker system. A.E. Frauenfeld, the Gauleiter or political head
of the regional district of Berlin (Michael & Doerr, p. 176), outlines terms for
audience acceptance of the speaker’s message in the journal’s September
edition of 1937:
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Especially noteworthy for the speaker is the undeniable fact that the
listeners will test the correctness of his utterances, not according to
logical and philosophical principles, but they will judge according to
emotion, Leidenschaft, and emphasis, Eindringlichkeit, along with
clearness and understandability (Scanlan, 1949, pp. 89-90).
Convincing the German Volk that the Nazi worldview, Weltanschauung,
was right for Germany was an important function of the speaker and would
supposedly be accomplished by appealing to the good instincts of the people.
An audience’s inner sense of conviction was sought by the speakers while
transmitting enthusiasm and faith in Weltanschauung to them. It was thought
that this style of oratory would mold the masses into faithful National Socialists
(Bosmajian, 1960, pp. 368-369).
Emil Dovifat’s instructional book, Rede und Redner, told Nazi speakers of
their one goal, “to be a political power and to lead to action.” The “action” or
“deed” was the highest goal of the speech (p. 369).

After the speech was

delivered, the degree of its effectiveness was measurable to the extent that the
listener moved in the direction of the deed. The means to this movement were
seen as the communication of reassurance and the awakening of the faith within
the audience. Dovifat placed the following demands on the political speaker:
(1) he has to recognize the fate of his people; (2) he has to stand
always behind his word, ready for action; (3) he has to subject his
own being and oratorical success to the welfare of the community
(p. 369).
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These demands were grounded in the historical example of Demosthenes who
Dovifat categorized as having a “prophet-like” clear view of what was right for his
people. This orientation came from a “statesman-like sense of reality” (p. 369),
far from the trappings of intellectualism, which was intent on examining all sides
of every issue.
Speakers were to represent the movement at all times and remain the
most active propagandists of the Idee or Idea by sacrificing time, wellbeing, vigor,
and material values.
discussion.

Simplification was privileged over long, drawn out

Furthermore, speakers were expected to unselfishly reassign

personal success or accolades through oratory to the interests of the National
Socialist movement and Germany (p. 369).

The Nazi Party Speaker System (Rednerwesen der NSDAP)
“It is safe to say that no political party in the world’s history ever had a
more elaborate speaker system than that introduced into Germany by the Nazis”
(Scanlan, 1950, p. 134).

The indifferences to oratory in previous periods of

German culture and politics were seen as damaging and would never be
repeated under the National Socialists; therefore, an organized system with at
least three distinct divisions came into being in 1935 (p. 134).
The first division was formatted by geographic considerations. One of the
most prestigious was the Reichsredner or National Speaker of which only 60
were certified as of 1936. The Gau or province was the domain of the Gauredner
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and the smaller component of the Gau or Kreis was reserved for the Kreisredner
(p. 134).
Purpose and subject were the delineations of the next division. Redner
was used to signify those who spoke on political matters and Fachredner was
the name given to the speaker who professed knowledge in a specific area, for
example agriculture or industry. Hence, a political speaker could exist on three
levels as well as a technical speaker, which brought the total to six categories. A
seventh was added to serve as an apprentice program, Stosstruppredner or
“Shock-Troop Speakers” (p. 134).
The speaker system structure became problematic for Goebbels who
insisted on thorough control of all propaganda matters. Not only did the system
of speakers grow into a bureaucracy, the lines of control became blurred by the
interference originating with local political leaders who regarded all activity in
their areas as falling under their authority.

Constant reminders were given

concerning the relationship of political leaders within certain regions to
propagandistic activity, in which it was clearly stated that propaganda is
subordinate to political leadership only at the very highest levels of Party
organization (p. 135).
The specifics of the Nazi Party structure and rules were outlined by Dr.
Robert Ley in the publication of Organisationsbuch der NSDAP in 1936. There
would be a Main Office of the Speaker System, and two subordinate divisionsThe Office of Speaker Service, and The Office for Speaker Training where one
would find the “Reich-Speaker School.” These offices demanded the use of the
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appropriate title earned by a speaker in all publicity announcements (pp. 135136).
Early on, speaker selection was based on skill and efficiency along with
having attained a “veteran of the Kampfzeit” status. This term referred to the
early Nazi Party’s “time of struggle,” prior to Hitler taking office in January of 1933
(p. 136).

The Kampfzeit-era speaker’s method was mainly an attack on the

opposition. He could explain Hitler’s doctrines in the broad, vague terminology
that was invented to do so, yet the majority of his speeches centered on
negativity directed at “misled movements” such as the KPD (German Communist
Party) or the SPD (German Socialist Party). Kampfzeit speakers were told by
their propaganda chiefs that their weapon was the assault and that they should
never have to defend themselves. This directive extended to a literal sense
when the early National Socialists made it clear that the “Party wanted a speaker
who could handle his fists when he could not handle his audience” (p. 143).
Less than six months after the Nazis came to power, all political opposition
was outlawed because of Hitler being granted extraordinary political authority by
the Reichstag. This period of Nazi history was known as Machtübernahme or
taking power (Michael & Doerr, p. 269) and had an important impact on the
speaker system that had been so accustomed to being on the offensive in
predictable settings of antagonistic controversy.

The New York Times ran a

front-page article on December 4, 1934 in which Germany had been declared a
“public speaker’s paradise” as a result of an anti-heckling decree by Dr. Wilhelm
Frick, Minister of the Interior, “Dr. Frick ordered that only non-controversial
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questions could be asked after lectures. Audiences, he said, would be expected
to cease all interruptions that were provocative of controversy” (Bosmajian, 1960,
p. 370).
Kampfzeit-era speakers could now look back nostalgically on the days
when a well-behaved audience was far from guaranteed. The following is from
an article written by Eugene Wiesenborn for the October 1934 edition of the
propaganda journal Unser Wille und Weg:
It is glorious, indeed, it is a joy to live…To the battle-tested speaker
it seems like a paradise. Instead of enduring injury and insults, he
is conducted into the auditorium by well-disciplined SA men and
heartily welcomed by the political leader…no concert of whistles, no
catcalls-peace and order over everything (Scanlan, 1950, p. 138).
New accomplishments were accompanied by new problems within the
Reich’s speaker system. The Machtübernahme opened the floodgates for the
overflow of new Party members who became speakers without the “benefit” of
oratorical struggle and experience from the early years. These non-Kampfzeit
era speakers caused concern among the propaganda directors, including Hugo
Ringler, editor-in-chief of a publication designed for speakers, Rednerinformation
(p. 136). He expressed his trepidation over the emerging course of events in a
June 1935 article in Unser Wille und Weg:
In the majority of cases this new party comrade would be able to
base his presentation only on an academic study of National
Socialist doctrine. Now, especially since it has become the doctrine
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of the German people, the National Socialist philosophy is a fighting
philosophy.

Only that party-comrade can speak in this fighting

spirit, who himself has experienced the fight and won with it (pp.
137-138).
Early in 1933, within weeks of taking office as the new Chancellor of
Germany, Hitler ordered a propaganda campaign directed at the citizens of the
Reich with the intent of shaking loose any signs of “political lethargy” and
instilling assurance in his vision of the future (pp. 138-139). Even though rival
political parties were gone, the Nazis knew they had to put their philosophy on
the market for the entire Volk. The speakers were reminded of this point in
another article from Ringler in Unser Wille und Weg in August 1934:
But for him, as for all other units of the Party, this day of victory was
not the end of the battle; the place won has turned into a point of
departure for new battles and for new effort…In the hour of victory
the National Socialist Speaker recognized his task, which the hour
imposed upon him: to fight on, with redoubled effort, for the entire
conversion of the German people to the National Socialist doctrine.
In place of the fight with hostile political parties and their tactics
came the fight for complete possession of the German soul (p.
139).
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Hans Krebs, Nazi Rhetorician
The holder of Nazi Party membership card 86, Hitler being number 7, was
Hans Krebs. Scanlan believes that Krebs was the true Nazi rhetorician when
one examines what the he said about the education of the speaker (Scanlan,
1951, p. 435). In his book, Redner-Fibel, Krebs outlines the necessary topics
that the aspiring speaker should study in building a solid background of
Germanic knowledge. Familiarization with the great German classics is deemed
essential for acquiring a storehouse of useful forms of expression so beautifully
used by the poets. In the literary field, Krebs suggested the study of classic
German writers such as Goethe, Schiller, and Grillparzer.

Philosophic ideas

were to be found in the works of Fichte and Schleiermacher (p. 436). The study
of German history was also considered complementary to the Party speaker’s
efforts.
There was a school of thought among experts of Nazi propaganda
centered on a homemade type of psychology, Volksseele or boiling soul of the
people.

The

term

was

used

during

the

November

1938

Pogrom,

Reichskristallnacht, or Night of Broken Glass, to justify attacks against the Jews
as retaliation for the assassination of Party official, Ernst vom Rath (Michael &
Doerr, p. 339). Later in the war, the media seized the expression to convey the
people’s outrage over Allied air bombings that had eventually reached western
German cities (p. 426). Volksseele was used since the Romantic period and
communicated a concrete unity of mind and heart (Scanlan, 1951, p. 436).

126
Party speakers were instructed to concentrate on understanding this aspect of
the German people, a comprehension that could not be gleaned from any book
on social psychology. Krebs elaborates on this theme in Redner-Fibel:
The speaker’s effectiveness will depend basically on a knowledge
of the Volksseele … Only the speaker who constantly studies the
mind of the people will have that inner contact that is so necessary
to effective speaking.

Only one who knows the sufferings and

struggles of the people will know how to coin expressions that are
right for the people. The careful observer can get his clearest view
into the soul of the people when a party campaign, a national
upheaval, an election, a plebiscite, or some other significant
movement in the development of the people is taking place…At
every meeting the speaker should make note of especially effective
expressions that he hears and should observe what arguments
make the deepest impression on the audience. At such meetings
one must closely study the psychological reactions of the audience,
if he is himself to achieve the greatest effect (Scanlan, 1951, p.
437).
The speaker’s political indoctrination in the form of a “firm National
Socialist philosophy” was found in the Krebs list of required reading: of course,
the Nazi Bible, Mein Kampf, Alfred Rosenberg’s Nature, Principles and Purposes
of the NSDAP, Blood and Honor, and his Structure of the [National Socialist]
Concept; Fritsch’s Handbook of the Jewish Problem; Gregor Schwartz-

127
Bostunitsch’s Jewish Imperialism; Dr. Robert Ley’s Germany has Become More
Beautiful, and The Upsurge of Social Integrity; Dr. Goebbels’ Signs of the New
Era, and issues of Der Angriff; Dr. Frick’s We Build the Third Reich; agronomist
Richard Darré’s Peasantry as the Life Source of the Nordic Race; and various
other volumes on Judaism, Catholicism, and Free-Masonry (p. 437).
Krebs also warned speakers to be wary of books written by “PseudoNational Socialists.”

As a precautionary measure, the Nazis organized “an

official Party Testing Commission for the Integrity of National Socialist Literature.”
If

the

publication

was

acceptable,

the

Unbedenklichkeitsvermerk or no objection.

flyleaf

displayed

the

notation

This same entry was used in

documents for safe passage (Michael & Doerr, p. 406). Krebs insisted that the
speaker owned the above-mentioned books and had them available at all times.
An obvious knowledge of current political events was considered vital for a
speaker’s success. Therefore, the individual was required to read at least one of
the many available Nazi newspapers on a daily basis.

Krebs strongly

recommended collecting pertinent newspaper clippings and arranging them
topically in color-coded folders. Among the headings suggested were; “Winter
Relief Work”; “Race Questions”; “Social Politics”; “Jewry”; “The German Labor
Front” and “Marxism” (Scanlan, 1951, p. 438).
Krebs’ book not only looked at the education of the speaker but also at
standard public speaking themes found in any textbook. However, these themes
were complicated by a certain Nazi slant. His distinction of major speech forms
were the descriptive and persuasive. Exposition or Vortrag is explained as:
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…the exclusively factual exposition of a carefully limited subject.
Here the speaker must follow a closely constructed outline. The
speech must hold itself strictly to the subject in hand and be
addressed primarily to the faculty of understanding. The speaker
will avoid large gestures and other forms of emotional excitation.
The Vortrag is brief and to the point (p. 438).
Persuasive speaking was dealt with in a more zealous manner. Known as Rede,
Krebs describes the approach:
It must be spontaneous, without manuscript. At most, the speaker
permits himself only a few notes, keywords…that indicate his main
thoughts. If the Rede is to achieve its purpose, it must be delivered
in a stirring manner…it must reach beyond understanding to the
feelings of the listeners (p. 438).
As for the components of the speech itself, the Nazi technique for the
introduction called for an appropriate salutation such as “Honored Assembly”,
“Comrades of the People”, “German Men and Women”, or “Dear Labor
Comrades.”

A proper introduction was said to gain a sense of absolute

assurance as the speaker scanned the audience searching for visual cues. It
was forbidden under all circumstances to begin a speech with an apology of any
type (pp. 438-439).
Evidence and support material, accessible through the speaker’s
collection of newspaper clippings, were considered essential to the body of the
speech. The discreet use of statistical data was also stressed by Krebs. The
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attack stratagem against opponents of National Socialist ideology was to twist
and apply their own statements against them. Regardless of the purpose for the
speech, the speaker was instructed to develop it so that “the most impressive
part comes at the end” (p. 439).
“The conclusion is often the deciding part of the speech…it must aim not
only at understanding but even more at the emotions…it must call up the will and
action” (p. 439).

The Nazi formula called for a peroration and cites Hitler’s

example of “an overwhelming conclusion” in a Munich courtroom at the end of his
1924 trial after the failed beer hall putsch. Krebs even expressed concern over a
“serious and dignified” exit from the podium or stage, “the speaker should never
respond to applause by bowing; rather he should turn away with his head erect
and a firm step.

Inwardly and outwardly his behavior should be courteous,

straightforward, upright, and manly” (p. 439).
On the subject of style, Krebs alluded to four distinct forms. Even though
Hitler and Goebbels expressed their distain for the intellectual approach, Krebs
believed it highly effective via the power of logic and thought. He added that this
was the comportment of professors and scholars. The splendor and loftiness of
language in a style guided by the imagination was another effective speaking
category.

This correlated the manner employed by clergymen and epidictic

speakers. The true Volksredner was said to have a style that was “ruled by the
will and by a strong sense of urgency.” According to Krebs, when the intellect,
imagination, and emotions were combined the result was the Führer, a speaker
of unmatched skill (p. 439).
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As Scanlan points out, Kreb’s book Redner-Fibel amounts to little more
than practical advice and does not attempt the philosophical analysis of any
specific discourse. However, it is important due to the prestige of the author and
its extensive use by Party speakers. Above all, its approval by the National
Socialists gives us a clearer picture of the unorthodox manner in which Nazi
rhetoric was employed (p. 440).

Transition: From Podium to Microphone
As mentioned earlier, Hitler’s first speech made from a broadcast facility
caused him to avoid the radio booth as much as possible throughout the
remainder of his dominance over the German people.

It did not take the

resultant large quantity of mail for one to discern that he was the type of speaker
who fed off the emotions and feedback provided by the visible audience. He was
not alone in this regard since the relatively new medium of radio offered
challenges to the most accomplished public speakers.
One could openly make the logical connection that there were instances of
the Nazi speaker, trained in public oratory, stepping behind the microphone of a
broadcast studio to promote the cause of National Socialism.

The following

examples of transitional difficulties and “finding one’s way” in the new
communicative world of broadcasting are purposely discussed to gain a succinct
historical perspective that parallels the period of the Nazi movement in Germany.
In 1922, H. V. Kaltenborn, an American news reporter, became one of the
earliest radio reporters and commentators with his first radio experience
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emanating from an experimental broadcast facility in Newark, New Jersey. He
began regular broadcasts on CBS in 1930 and traveled the world covering the
major news events of the day (Kaltenborn, 1950, p. 109). Incidentally, in 1932
shortly before taking power Hitler met with Kaltenborn at Berchtesgaden in the
Bavarian Alps near the Austrian border (interview details, pp. 186-188).
As was the case with Hitler, Kaltenborn also cited the lack of an audience
as one of the toughest hurdles to overcome. The unresponsive microphone and
the indifference of the technicians on the other side of the window in the
adjoining room were additional sources of self-consciousness. After finishing a
half hour extemporaneous talk, he was drenched with perspiration (p. 109). In
reference to preparation and notes, Kaltenborn used only brief written remarks at
the podium. He soon found that radio required an indescribable type of new
mental concentration that far exceeded the attentiveness necessary before the
live audiences that he had grown accustomed to in his early career (pp. 109110). Even though immediate audience reaction, both good and bad, came in
the form of the blinking telephone switchboard lights, Kaltenborn described a:
…panicky feeling that no one could be listening or that something
had gone wrong with the mechanism. Even when fan mail began
coming in it was still hard to visualize that I was really talking to
tens of thousands (p. 110).
Radio did not afford the luxury of the dramatic pause for effect or the
recess of a few steps to think through a remark. The broadcast equivalent was
nothing but the silence of dead air. For this reason, Kaltenborn delivered most
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broadcasts standing up to avoid the temptation to relax while sitting in front of the
microphone.

While standing and even gesticulating in the familiar speaking

position native to a live audience, he was able to liberate emotion and tension,
often to the amusement of fellow employees (p. 110).
Other issues associated with the transition to radio involved early
inadequacies in microphone sensitivity.

Any slight turn of the head while

speaking resulted in inaudible words. Kaltenborn resorted to having his head
placed in a brace, albeit for a short time, similar to those used by photographers
to curtail movement. Chalk marks on the floor indicated the boundaries of his
foot movement. Heavy curtains in the studio absorbed unwanted sound and
likewise contributed to unbearable heat in the pre-air conditioned days of modern
studios (pp. 110-111).

As time progressed, Kaltenborn realized that being

natural on the air was much more important than “meticulous exactitude” (p.
111).
An article on influential factors in radio speech from the April 1944 issue of
the Quarterly Journal of Speech situates us in a similar historical moment. A few
generalizations include the avoidance of localisms in the speaker’s voice
inflection or vocabulary so as not to alienate part of the listening audience.
Clarity was stressed using repetition and “concrete illustrations” due to the
assumption that the “listener’s mind is not acting as creatively as in the face-toface situation” (Townsend, 1944, p. 189).
Simplicity in radio speech was also highly regarded, with the successful
fireside chats of Franklin Roosevelt used as the high profile example of the
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period. Concision was regarded as an effective tool of radio speaking since it
was assumed that the audience, at least in the evening, was comfortably at
home and tired from a long workday. Brevity was apparently seen as the correct
approach to a gradually diminishing attention span (p. 189).
As a substitute for the inability of the audience to see facial expressions
and gestures, it was suggested that radio speakers build their repertoire of tonal
variety and inflection. The technique of the emotional appeal was associated
with radio demagogues who had abandoned “traditional tricks of platform
demagoguery” and invented new varieties of expressive pleas to accommodate
the technology. Overall, it was thought that radio speaking was turning toward
an appeal to the logic of the audience, more so than popular oratory (p. 189).
Radio was cited at the time for a renewal in the interest of politics. It was
suggested that Herbert Hoover lost thousands of votes one fateful evening in
1932 for going over his allotted airtime and talking through a popular programfeaturing comedian Ed Wynn.

Mothers faced with the consequences of the

President’s action put their crying children to bed that night second guessing Mr.
Hoover’s chances for re-election:
The listener always tends to lose interest in long talks.

The

optimum length of time for ordinary educational, political, factual, or
news broadcasts is probably from ten to twenty minutes. Even so
popular and persuasive a radio speaker as President Roosevelt,
chooses, probably wisely so, to confine his fireside chats on
political topics to approximately twenty minutes (p. 189).
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According to A.L. Barnard of NBC, one of the most common mistakes in
the move from public speaking to broadcasting was that of the radio novice
imitating the style of the “old-fashioned and rather loud-mouthed politician.” This
forceful delivery, characterized by the attempt to “pound the message across,”
was ample evidence of the beginner’s disregard for and ignorance of radio’s
inherent intimacy between the speaker and the listener. The suggestion was
made to envision the audience as two or three people relaxing in a living room, in
spite of the fact that this scene may be replicated hundreds or thousands of times
over when an accurate account of the listening audience is revealed (p. 189).
For reasons of intimacy and invisibility, the radio speaker of the 1940’s
was being told to speak more rapidly since a pause, if long enough, may give the
listeners the impression that the station had gone off the air. The personality of
voice was seen as the key to stirring an audience member’s sense of
participation. Again, FDR was used as the example when he referred to his
audience as “My friends,” along with Louisiana Senator Huey Long, who initially
asked listeners to phone five people and invite them to “participate” by listening
to his broadcast (p. 190).
At the time, Townsend believed that the U.S. was in need of the influence
of radio as never before. His belief was grounded in the functionality of political
democracies and upon the interest and intelligence of the voting public coupled
with their ability to connect with elected executives. Those who would not leave
home to attend a political rally might listen in to a broadcast of the same meeting
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or similar talks on politics.

Townsend concludes his article with a 1944

prescription for the future of effective radio:
We need to replace blatant commercial propaganda with
propaganda of deeper value to the citizen and to the nation,
educational propaganda, patriotic propaganda, better means of
living propaganda, and we must learn how to present it in such a
manner that the public will want it as a steady diet in addition to, if
not in place of, light entertainment (p. 190).
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Chapter 4-The Rhetorical Language of National Socialism

Establishing the Necessity of Nazi-German
In order to determine why a new type of language was deemed necessary
and subsequently cultivated by the National Socialists, it would be wise to
discuss fundamental opinions that Hitler and the other Nazi elites had about
those they wished to control. It is evident that Hitler held a low opinion of the
masses. There are ample indications from Mein Kampf, including a passage in
which he equates the human qualities of speed, toughness, and hardness to
greyhounds, leather, and Krupp’s steel, respectively (pp. 493-494). The Führer’s
denigrating views on the mental strength of the populace are further illustrated in
other revealing remarks, “The people, in an overwhelming majority, are so
feminine in their nature and attitude that their activities and thoughts are
motivated less by sober consideration than by feeling and sentiment” (p. 237).
These personal judgments of society are among the factors not to be overlooked
in considering the implementation of the Nazi German language.
Nazi speeches and spectacles were constructed in an attempt to appeal to
Hitler’s perceived public.

This prevailing, and consequently official, National

Socialist attitude aligned itself with those who conceived the idea of a “crowd
mentality.” In the event that a “crowd mentality” was missing, efforts were made
to construct one (Bosmajian, 1965, p. 68). Evidently, Hitler’s assessment of the
volk, the German listening audiences, coincided with Freud’s (1960), description
of crowd behavior taken from Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego:
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It might be said that the intense emotional ties which we observe in
groups [crowds] are quite sufficient to explain one of their
characteristics-the lack of independence and initiative in their
members, the similarity in the reactions of all of them, their
reduction, so to speak, to the level of group individuals. But if we
look at it as a whole, a group shows us more than this. Some of its
features-weakness of intellectual ability, the lack of emotional
restraint, the incapacity for moderation and delay, the inclination to
exceed every limit in the expression of emotion and to work it off
completely in the form of action-these and similar features, which
we find so impressively described by LeBon, show an unmistakable
picture of a regression of mental activity to an earlier stage such as
we are not surprised to find among savages or children.

(in

Bosmajian, p. 69).
Reduced to this analytical level, the Nazis thought the ideal candidate for
indoctrination to National Socialism were those who were foreign to the concept
of thinking for themselves and making their own decisions. If we accept the fact
that Hitler regarded domination as the sole purpose of politics, then we must
agree that, “it is far easier to dominate the unreflecting and unreasoning person
than the person given to thinking matters through for himself” (Young, 1991, p.
67). This view becomes further solidified when we make note of Hitler’s wellknown distrust of those on the other end of the spectrum, intellectuals:
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The so-called ‘intelligentsia’ at any rate looks down with really
infinite condescension on everyone who has not been pulled
through the obligatory schools in order to have the necessary
knowledge pumped into his brains. Actually, the question is never,
What can this man do, but what has he learned?

To these

‘educated’ ones, the greatest empty-head, provided he is only
wrapped in a sufficient number of certificates, is worth more than
even the most clever boy who does not possess these priceless
paper bags.” (Hitler, 1939, pp. 300-301)
Intellectuals had opinions and were capable of “impressive argument” against the
regime. In a radio address of October 11, 1942, Goebbels described them as
having “too much knowledge to allow of instinctive faith and too little knowledge
to allow of faith by conviction” (Kris & Speier, p. 196).
With this peculiar delineation of the ordinary masses and the suspicious
intellectuals in place, the Nazis set out on a course of action in which the concept
of “blind obedience” would become the means to their ends of complete
domination of the German people.

The descriptor “peculiar” is used here

because apparently, the National Socialists seemed to lump the entire
community either into the “crowd mentality” grouping or into the “so-called
intelligentsia” camp. The mass meetings were the settings for the elimination of
thought “thus sealing the psychic gulf between intellectuals and workers and
producing an undifferentiated and manipulatable crowd (Young, p. 68).
Nevertheless, what if that “psychic gulf” contained sizable members of a mid-
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range, yet silent, partition in the perceived all-encompassing strata of awareness
and intellect that the Nazis overlooked in their exercise of thought control? Quite
possibly it is this group that Steiner alludes to in his controversial essay, “The
Hollow Miracle,” written some fourteen years after the war, “Millions of Germans
began saying to themselves and to any foreigner gullible enough to listen that the
past had somehow not happened, that the horrors had been grossly exaggerated
by Allied propaganda and sensation-mongering journalists” (Steiner, pp. 106107).
If the short-term answer to restricting thought was possible through the
mass meeting and the vicariousness of listening to major events by radio, the
long-term answer had to permeate all aspects of the educational system of the
Reich. Party officials were quickly set up in the schools and universities to insure
that, “indoctrination in national socialism replaced rational inquiry and openness
to ideas in the classroom” (Young, p. 69). By 1936, about 1,500 professors had
been dismissed, mostly due to their racial background (Weinreich, 1999, p. 19).
However, a small number were eliminated for political reasons and conceivably
may have been sent to concentration camps wearing the “red” winkel or triangle,
indicative of a political prisoner (Michael & Doerr, p. 466). At the University of
Freiburg, historian Gerhard Ritter formed the “Freiburg Circle” which took a
middle stance against the Nazi character and teachings but felt they could not
betray their country in a time of war. No bona fide action was ever taken by
these professors (Wires, 1985, p. 22).
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Academic subjects were redefined and contorted to fit neatly packaged
Nazi parameters. Students were told of the advantage of pure “Aryan blood” and
Teutonic superiority.

They struggled with courses of study like “German”

mathematics and “Aryan” physics (Young, p. 69). The following poem was found
in the form of a prayer from a 1936 school primer for children:
Prayer
Protect, God, with your hand
Our dear fatherland.
Give strength and power to our Führer,
And help him in his difficult task.
Turn away our nation’s sorrow,
Give all of us work and bread this morrow.
H. Sommer, 1936 (Michael & Doerr, p. 475).
A similar schoolbook example for children containing Hitler’s own axioms:
The Führer speaks:
Learn to make sacrifices for your fatherland.
All of us will have to die but Germany will live.
In your folk community lies your strength.
You must be faithful, you must be courageous, you must be heroic,
And you must create with each other one big
Glorious comradeship.
Adolf Hitler, 1936 (Michael & Doerr, pp. 475-476).
Plans were also being formulated as to the level of education that the
conquered Slavs in the East would receive. Hitler believed these “sub-humans”
should be given training in recognizing pictured road signs but not be taught to
read. Therefore, books were out of the question and the radio would act as chief
provider of sufficient information. In short, they were to be a slave-class and not
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trusted with any work requiring the slightest mental exertion (Young, p. 69).
Similarly, Himmler’s SS-inspired plan for primary-level education, presented in a
memorandum in May of 1940, was to teach children from “inferior” races to write
their name and count to 500 adding, “that it is God’s command that he should be
obedient to Germans, honourable, industrious and brave” (p. 69).
In reality, the rhetoric was intended to produce an entire nation, and later
the conquered territories, to remain focused on National Socialist thought and
deed. The Party literature pointed to the ideal Nazi as one who acted on instinct,
blindly believing in the movement with no desire to search for the logic in Hitler’s
decisions. The principles the ideal Nazi adhered to included Aryan superiority,
anti-Semitism, Lebensraum, and mystical references to “blood and soil” (p. 72).
By assimilation into a collective body, the Nazis had individuals prepared for selfsacrifice, the ideal situation in the quest for domination and power.
The ordinary man or woman did not exist on German radio. Broadcasters
referred to “the German people” or simply “Germany.”

The individual was

swallowed into the group and was expected to think, sense, and operate like
every other constituent of his race:
The propagandist hopes that the listener, plain Herr Schmidt, will
believe what he is told about the ‘German people,’ and begin to
think, feel, and behave as the propagandist says he does…If Herr
Schmidt believed in it, he could be proud, and nobody would object,
for he was then of no further trouble to Dr. Goebbels (Kris & Speier,
pp. 163-164).

142
The Party member considered himself nothing without the Party. All joys
and sorrows were found through association with the group and never through
individual action. Identification with the collective whole is essential to successful
propaganda:
Above all, he must never feel alone. Though stranded on a desert
island, he must still feel that he is under the eyes of the group. To
be cast out from the group should be the equivalent to being cut off
from life…This is undoubtedly a primitive state of being, and its
most perfect examples are found among primitive tribes.

Mass

movements strive to approximate this primitive perfection, and we
are not imagining things when the anti-individualist bias of
contemporary mass movements strikes us as a throwback to the
primitive (Hoffer, 1951, p. 63).
The ideology marched past the people was overtly racial but also elastic to
changing circumstances, “Hitler modified the National Socialist ideology several
times according to the requirements of propaganda” (Ellul, 1965, p. 96). A sharp
change in the radio propaganda line occurred during the Russian phase of the
war, when the Germans were no longer fighting for the “New Order” or the “New
Europe,” instead the fight became one for the old European culture, tradition, and
civilization. Conversely, the Russians were “subhuman” and “Asiatic,” while the
English were geographically detached from the mainland. On June 27, 1941, a
German news broadcast proclaimed, “The whole of Europe has recognized that
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Germany’s fight against Moscow is in the nature of a crusade of the European
nations against Bolshevism” (Kris & Speier, p. 308).
Nazi teachings were “more like vapor, evoking in men and women an
emotional response but almost no reflection” (Young, p. 72). However, there was
no pretense to scholarship on the part of the Party. There were no ideas, no
thinking, nothing left to reason. It seemed to be an “either-or” situation that one
accepted through rhetorically influenced emotion or rejected on the basis of
rationality:
National Socialism cannot be grasped intellectually. Whoever does
not feel that the National Socialist idea is correct will never
comprehend it.

But on the other hand, he who has become a

National Socialist in his heart will also come to understand by
himself in the course of time the intellectual basis of the National
Socialist world of ideas, Gedankenwelt. (p. 73)
This naming of a group of ideas further demonstrates the inherent transparency
and hollowness of a vague ideology, but the “either-or” presentation has great
strength. Its definiteness appeals to a crowd mentality, the target populace, by
showing decision and action; there is no weakness or compromise. The “eitheror” straightforward honesty and direction could easily be juxtaposed with the
“double-talk” of the Jews and the “palaver” of the Parliamentarians (Bosmajian,
1965, p. 74).
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Marcuse on Nazi Language
Written in California in June of 1942, Herbert Marcuse produced a study
on what was then perceived as “The New German Mentality” (Marcuse, 1998, p.
141). He had escaped with his family from Germany years earlier and was now
working for the U.S. in the Office of War Information.

As a member of the

Marxist-inspired “Frankfort School,” he continued his work in a tradition that was
renowned for the development of Critical Theory. “The New German Mentality”
was part of an internal theoretical study to achieve a more insightful look at the
German people and National Socialism’s effect upon them (p. 140).
He begins with the hypothesis that National Socialism has changed
behavior and the thought process to a degree that renders usual counterpropaganda and education useless.

Germans are possessed with different

values, using a language not only foreign to Westerners but to their own former
culture. Marcuse describes a two-tiered mentality wherein the pragmatic layer
contains

the

elements

of

matter-of-factness,

mechanization, and rationalization (p. 141).

efficiency

and

success,

This was demonstrated by a

Goebbels broadcast on May 29, 1941, attempting a rationalized re-interpretation
of the war against the Soviets:
German peasant lads marched as soldiers through the Ukraine and
on their way took up handfuls of black fertile soil-and at home there
was no butter and not enough bread because too little rain had
fallen in April…This is no war for throne and altar. This is a war for
grain and bread, a plentiful breakfast, lunch, and dinner table…a
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war for raw materials, for rubber and oil, iron and ore (Kris &
Speier, pp. 382-383).
Marcuse next describes the German mythological layer of language that
includes paganism, social naturalism, and racism (Marcuse, p. 141).

The

following is a portion of the radio program Topics of the Day, broadcast days
after the attack on Pearl Harbor. On December 10, 1941, the Party propagandist
used the notion of “racial purity” as a substitute for “Aryanism” which would have
been impossible in linking Germany’s new Japanese partner in the war against
the United States:
In reality, Hawaii is Japanese by virtue of the fact that 40 per cent
of the population of 420,000 are Japanese, who, by their unity and
success dominate the remainder of the population, which is a
mixture of the scum of the earth…Because the Japanese kept their
race pure and did not permit America to absorb them, they were
persecuted, and in the name of a pure American race! This was
impudence, as millions of Negroes and Jews, and other races were
mixed in the American melting pot (Kris & Speier, p. 263).
German society was pervaded by Party politics in the public and private
spheres as well as in work and leisure activities. There was an absence of the
conventional barriers between individual and society and between society and
the government.

Marcuse likens the Nazi politicalization to a terroristic

politicalization found in middle class revolutions in Western Europe where the
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“bourgeois” became known as the citizen “whose life was business, and whose
business is a political affair” (Marcuse, p. 142).
The German people are warned about ideological excesses presented
without a factual basis. The enemy uses these tricks as camouflage for the real
dangers ahead.

The Nazi’s own philosophy could easily be interchangeable

here, yet its ever-present cynicism had taken hold of those who are supposed to
accept as true, what had been told to them by their leaders:
The German people believe in the National Socialist philosophy
insofar as this philosophy proves to be an efficient weapon for
defense and aggression-but not farther…those who believe in the
Nazi ideology are conscious of the fact that he believes in an
ideology. (p. 142)
In mobilizing the population for war, rationality had developed, that
evaluated everything in terms of competence, achievement, and convenience.
Marcuse speaks of a new German “pragmatist” whose support for the
establishment is weighed against his own “immediate material advantage” while
altering his thinking, approach, and behavior to a dangerous technological
rationalization, “…the most formidable weapon of conquest.

He thinks in

quantities: in terms of speed, skill, energy, organization, mass…This matter-offactness is the very center of the National Socialist mentality and the
psychological ferment of the National Socialist system” (p. 143).
Marcuse also cites a revolt against the basic values found in Christian
civilization, values last seen in the Weimar Republic and in the Labor movement.
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The National Socialists fostered the belief that the Labor movement was part of
the then current democratic culture due to its strong ties to principles of
Christianity.

Once the democratic Weimar Republic collapsed, the Labor

movement followed suite.

Opportunistically, the Nazis exploited the Weimar

government’s unfulfilled promises by associating them with their high regard for
“the supreme ideals of Christian civilization” (p. 143).

These anti-Christian

sentiments were bubbling up in many citizens and had already become “deeply
rooted” in other individuals. Ellul explains the progression of propaganda from
this point:
Public opinion does not derive from individual opinions: here we are
faced with two heterogeneous problems. One cannot speak of a
crystallization of individual opinions. Rather, a vague, inconsistent,
unformulated, latent opinion, which one might call ‘raw opinion’ is
transformed by propaganda through a true process of crystallization
into explicit opinion (Ellul, 1965, p. 204).
The point of crystallization was timed to coincide with the German citizen’s latest
disappointment in another failed government, therefore; the insurgency against
Christian culture, manifested in “anti-Semitism, terrorism, social Darwinism, antiintellectualism, and naturalism” is attributable to the a new spirit of matter-offactness, an essential factor strongly pointed out by Marcuse. It should also be
noted that these types of revolts bear the seal of Germanic heritage, starting with
Luther’s Protestantism up until Nietzsche, although the metaphysical component
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of the rebellion under discussion was ruined by the National Socialists “and
transformed into an instrument of totalitarian efficiency” (Marcuse, pp. 143-144).
Equal care was devoted to avoiding religious and anti-religious remarks on
German radio. Prior to the traditional Christian holidays, broadcasts referred to
them in terms of the holiday’s Teutonic mythological meaning.

Comparisons

were made between Teutonic and Christian interpretations, “When the Church
introduced fasting for 40 days, it was destined to drive all the joy of living out of
Shrovetide celebrations” (Kris & Speier, p. 79).
For the rebellion to be realized, the Party continued its assault on
Christian civilization by relaxing some of their traditional taboos, both private and
social. Marcuse singles out sexuality, the family, and the moral code. He also
contends that a mere transfer occurred, not abolition, making the unrestraint
illusionary.

In this manner, the taboos were fortified on other and better-

protected relations and institutions (Marcuse, p. 144). Here is what Hitler had to
say about the world’s oldest profession in Mein Kampf:
Prostitution is a disgrace to mankind, but one cannot abolish it by
moral lectures, pious intentions, etc., but its limitation and its final
elimination warrant the abolition of quite a number of preliminary
conditions.

But the first is and remains the creation of the

possibility of early marriage, according to human nature, above all
for the man; because the woman is here only the passive part,
anyhow (p. 342).
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Marcuse explains that one of the strongest ties between the people and
the Party is the fear of extermination or “catastrophic fatalism.” The Germans
sense that the capitulation of National Socialism will lead to the loss of the
German state, their personal security, and a return to a lower standard of living
than had been the case prior to the war (Marcuse, p. 144).
Since fear, anxiety, and insecurity all contribute to sustaining the crowd
mentality, the Nazis perpetuated or manufactured a crisis whenever it suited their
needs because “a secure, individualistic citizenry was of no use to Hitler”
(Bosmajian, 1965, p. 74). The Nazis stirred fear, aroused indignation, and incited
hate, all of which became emotionally charged ingredients of National Socialist
rhetoric.
The Party also knew when to avoid the introduction of bad news,
especially military defeats, the first of which occurred in late 1940 during the
“Battle of Britain” when the Germans lost 2,375 planes in three months (Kris &
Speier, p. 389). Large-scale setbacks, when not attributable to another entity,
went largely unreported. In this instance, the Nazi defeat was never admitted:
…they never reported their losses and denied after the event that
the Battle of Britain had ever taken place. Finally, in the spring of
1941, a special denial campaign was conducted by Fritzsche and
other

commentators

in

response

to

claims

of

the

BBC.

Counterpropaganda tried to ‘relegate the British drivel about the
alleged German air battle over England into the realm of fantasies
told by British firesides’ and declared that the story was invented by
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the British in an attempt ‘to conceal the failure of the RAF from last
autumn up till now’ (Kris & Speier, pp. 389-390).
Hoffer elaborates on the active phases of mass movements and contends
that Hitler’s objective of a “warrior state” had no automatic end. The normal
functioning of Nazi-dominated society called for unity and self-sacrifice in order
for it to function. With no end in sight, the everyday life of the people may be
what Hoffer refers to as “religiofied,” where the common task becomes an
exaggerated holy cause or quite simply, the everyday lives of the people become
militarized (pp. 157-158). In the case of the National Socialists, we can clearly
find both outcomes.
Marcuse asserts that the language and philosophy of the Party becomes
perfectly rational when placed in the context of its policy and organization,
otherwise one is faced with “nothing but illogical abstrusities.” He corrects the
critics of the day who identified two co-existing mentalities, logics and languages.
The National Socialist philosophy, ideology, and propaganda were all illogical,
but the language mentality of administration, organization, and everyday
communication, of which radio played such as vital role, were all utterly rational
and technical (Marcuse, p. 148).

The only way to understand this apparent

contradiction was to view them as one mentality. Marcuse claimed their different
“forms of manifestation were determined, pervaded and unified by one and the
same rationality” (p. 149).
To understand the language, Marcuse looked at it as the means to the
ends of “large scale imperialist expansion.” German society heard a language
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that told them private and social relationships came second to the standards of
mechanized and rationalized war production. No concepts or values impeding
this effort would be tolerated. Hence, the Nazi language is strictly technical with
“pragmatic” or matter-of-fact goals while all aspects of society are absorbed in
their operational function within the Party system. This attitude was expressed
by Goebbels on December 26, 1941 when discussing the unnecessary appeal
for civilian sacrifice, since the volk are born into a race and linked to its destiny,
“The word sacrifice must be reserved for the soldier” (Kris & Speier, p. 165).
Likewise, the word “heroism” was not to be associated with the civilian
population:
In August 1941, Flannery, the American radio reporter, wanted to
interview a heroine of the home front, but could not convince
Goebbels’ office that the human interest story would make good
propaganda.

‘Calls on the women’s organization, Frauenschaft

[Women’s League], were met…with the statement that it was the
duty of the German people to be heroic and that they deserved no
publicity for being so.’ (p. 165)
At this point, Marcuse argues that language loses it’s “universality” and
membership in civilization and succumbs to a singular, totalitarian content
determined by utilization (Marcuse, p. 149). Therefore, this technical structure of
language inexorably enters the bureaucracy of National Socialism and cannot
help but eventually situate itself in the everyday lives of its citizens.

This

technical language, in order to extend itself and serve as “an all-embracing
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medium of intersubjective understanding,” presupposes a “supra-technical”
language community from which it draws strength and familiarity.

Marcuse

categorizes this language community as one of “sentiment, emotion, subjective
desires, and impulses” and furthermore identifies it in the previously mentioned
mythological layer of German mentality (p. 149).
Within this layer, the Nazis tap into “the reservoir for the German protest
against Christian civilization” but they purposely destroy the mythological and
metaphysical contents, thus turning them into nothing more than parts of the
technique of domination.

This critical accomplishment helps to foster the

pragmatic goals of the Party and perpetuate totalitarian operational control.
Marcuse identifies three areas where the completed process comes to life: in the
syntactical from of the language, its vocabulary, and in a National Socialist
pattern of “argumentation” (pp. 149-150).
Marcuse, through examining Nazi German’s syntactical form, is able to
link selected features to make obvious an adaptation to technological rationality
as outlined by Gerr (1942), (p. 150). We see a prevalence of verbalizations of
nouns, a shortening of synthetical sentence structures, and the conversion of the
personal into the impersonal.
Alluding to the irrationality of ideas expressed in National Socialist
language such as blood and soil, folk, race, and Reich, Marcuse explains that
although they are in the form of universals, they exclude universality. Therefore,
folk, race, and blood are exclusively German and individualistic.

The words

indicate “singular facts” wherein standards and values are found. Furthermore,
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the “facts,” which are designated by these words, are natural or “by nature.”
Under this assumption, these “facts” transcend the “universal context of human
civilization” and find residence in a higher order, “In this order, the ‘natural’
inequality of men is more than their ‘artificial’ equalization, the body more than
the mind, health more than morality, force more than law, strong hatred more
than feeble sympathy (p. 150). Hoffer describes hatred as “the most accessible
and comprehensive of all unifying agents” (p. 91).
The psychological preparation of the German people for “imperialist world
conquest,” which Marcuse sees as an ultimate goal, has an empirical basis upon
which the entire mythology rests. Universal laws and principles no longer apply
to the people since these standards add up to a context of international
civilization, not German. In essence, Marcuse translates the irrationality of the
National Socialist mythology as becoming very rational for the purposes of
domination. The Nazis also realized that in order for the people to accept,
subliminally of course, totalitarian rule and reject the already beleaguered idea of
democracy, they had to improve on the conditions left behind by the Weimar
Republic. This was done through full employment, benefits from in the spoils of
conquest in the form of Lebensraum, and the loosening of traditional taboos.
The spirit of the Nazi mythology was an education to the cynical matter-offactness where “natural,” or tangible supersedes social or theoretical.

For

instance, examine these word substitutions-folk for society, race for class, blood
and soil for property rights, and Reich for state. Words such as folk and race are
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concrete facts; class, equality, and humanity are much more conceptual
(Marcuse, p. 151).
Finally, Marcuse somberly warns us not to look at the relationship of the
people and the Nazi Party in simplistic terms such as totalitarian rule in exchange
for material benefits found nowhere else.

It is much more complicated and

involves the appeal to forces within the strongest traits of the German character:
These forces have been released in the mobilization of the
mythological layer. They had been tamed and restrained by the
process of Christian civilization, but they had continued to live
under its cover, and their National Socialist emancipation
constitutes the greatest threat to Western civilization (p. 152).

Perspectives on the Rhetoric in Mein Kampf
Historically, what was intended to be the “Bible of National Socialism” was
not well received by the buying public until Hitler assumed power in January of
1933. Total sales up until that time had amounted to 287,000 copies. By 1939,
the total reached close to 5.5 million and four years later the figure was
approaching 10 million (Mieder, 1997, p. 14). It should be noted that the book
was “expected” to be on the bookshelf of everyone from civil servants to
newlyweds who may have received a copy as a gift of the state. As Mieder
indicates, the book was, however, not necessarily read, “This is unfortunate
indeed, for it contains in black and white what Hitler was planning for Germany
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and Europe and in what brutal manner he intended to construct his Thousand
Year Reich (p. 14).
Ordinarily, without a connection to its infamous author, the book would
have been largely ignored as the rantings of a megalomaniac. On the surface,
those who have reviewed its contents for whatever reason have had great
difficulty in maintaining their objectivity:
If the reviewer but knocks off a few adverse attitudinizings and calls
it a day, with a guaranty in advance that his article will have a
favorable reception among the decent members of our population,
he is contributing more to our gratification than to our enlightenment
(Burke, 1973, p. 191).
Yet, even those who have seriously studied Hitler’s work are prone to an “outer
layer” or preliminary evaluation. Young calls Mein Kampf “a rhetorical crazy quilt,
it fuses biological terms, bureaucratese, pseudo-religious blather, bad grammar,
and stupid bombast into an almost unreadable whole” (Young, p. 117). Winston
Churchill called it “turgid, verbose, shapeless” (McGuire, 1977, p. 1). William
Shirer, of Berlin Diary fame believed that it “would strike a normal mind of the
twentieth century as a grotesque hodgepodge concocted by a half-baked,
uneducated neurotic” (McGuire, p. 1). Hitler’s biographer Konrad Heiden belittled
the book but not the person, “Even Hitler’s best friends said: Yes, he is an
amazing speaker, probably a great leader, perhaps even a political genius-but it’s
a pity he had to write this stupid book……Mein Kampf did little to establish
Hitler’s intellectual authority in his party” (p. 1).
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Critical methods that have been used against the book are what Burke
has categorized as “vandalistic” and incomplete.

He also called the weighty

book, “exasperating, even nauseating” (Burke, p. 191). In spite of these common
judgments, this “rhetorical crazy quilt” was an effective source of maintaining the
consistent basis of propaganda construction that found a home in all German
media of the day, especially radio.

With the origins of Nazi propaganda

grounded in Mein Kampf, it is important to understand how the text functions
persuasively.
As we have previously discovered, there was a certain mythological layer
of German mentality which, according to Marcuse, the Nazis exploited as a
means of control and domination. It is within this mythological realm of language
that much of the discourse in Mein Kampf is found, or better yet, scattered due to
its incoherent structure and shape. McGuire’s close textual analysis found a
sense of rhythmic congruency among the mythic themes, which he grouped into
four categories requiring chronologic ordering: Birth and re-birth, finding a
mission in life and doing the will of the gods, stagnation and decay, and a
metamorphosis of death to new birth (McGuire, p. 4). For example, the first two
sentences of the book mention Fate playing a hand in Hitler’s place of birth and
its Fateful geographical location between two nations that must be reunited,
Austria and Germany. A mythic-tense is established as vaguely past, applicable
to the present, and significant to the future (p. 4). Next, Hitler laments on his five
years of wretchedness in Vienna and that Providence and the Goddess of Misery
forced an education on him that centered on the politics, economics, and habits
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of the worker, a foundational learning experience for a future life of politics,
especially when seeking the needed support of the masses. The stagnation and
decay enter as living in Vienna as a failed art student becomes unbearable and
in the final phase; the Jews and Marxists are exposed as plotting against his
German Austria (p. 4).
The pattern resumes throughout the book as we witness another birth
years later in the form of the Nazis’ first mass meeting. Hitler then finds his
mission and takes over the Party’s arm of propaganda. In phase three, there is
decadent opposition in the form of riots instigated by the Jews and Marxists, and
finally Hitler is imprisoned following the failed Putsch and afterward the Nazi
Party is outlawed (p. 4).
Adding to this mythic structure orchestrated by Hitler, we find another
stylistically strong characteristic seen in the presence of various gods:
…although they are not personative gods…they provide revelations,
assistance, and direction to Hitler. He in turn relates to the audience
of his myth as a divinely inspired prophet or oracle with answers to
disturbing questions and solutions to difficult problems.

These

features contribute to the rhetorical dimensions of all myths from all
cultures (p. 13).
Mein Kampf, when reconstructed by McGuire, presents personal events
and conditions as contradictions of good and evil, or two opposing wills at work
that represents the dialectical tension in Hitler’s myth (p. 7).

Although the
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narrative form is significant, meaning is also created by “deliberately repeating
mythic structures within the encyclopaedic form” (p. 13).
Hitler liberally employed the use of metaphorical language from colloquial
or folk speech in order to clarify or disguise his arguments. Mieder points out the
use of twin formulas whose “alliteration, rhyme, formulaic structure, and
metaphors add expressive color and emotion to his otherwise tedious and
lengthy sentences or paragraphs” (p. 15). These twin formulas are shown within
the following passages from Mein Kampf:
Morally poisoned, physically undernourished, his poor little head full
of lice, the young “citizen” goes off to public school. After many fits
and starts he may learn to read and write, but that’s about all
(Hitler, 1943, p. 32). Everywhere these organizations sprang up
out of the ground, only to vanish unheralded and unsung (p. 218).
Unfortunately, it was raining in the morning, and the fear seemed
founded that under such circumstances many people would prefer
to stay home, instead of hurrying through the rain and snow to a
meeting at which there might possibly be mayhem and murder (p.
499). I made it clear to the lads [the SA] that today probably for the
first time they would have to show themselves loyal to the
movement through thick and thin, and that not a man of us must
leave the hall unless we were carried out dead (p. 504).
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An aggressive style based on the same folk speech developed into a potent
weapon used by Hitler in singling out the stupidity and folly of his opponents
during the rise of National Socialism:
The art of propaganda lies in understanding the emotional ideas of
the great masses….The fact that our bright boys do not understand
this merely shows how mentally lazy and conceited they are (Hitler,
1943, p. 180). For the cursing and “beefing” you could hear at the
front [during World War I] were never an incitement to shirk duty or
a glorification of the coward. No! The coward still passed as a
coward and nothing else (p. 192). Only a bourgeois simpleton is
capable of imagining that Bolshevism has been exorcised (p. 661).
The “stupidity” of those in political opposition to Hitler is further
strengthened by the proverbial expression “not to have the faintest [foggiest]
idea” which appears five times in the book (Mieder, p. 16). Another expression
“with one blow [stroke]” appears seven times, perhaps indicating Hitler’s bubbling
explosiveness and future fits of temper (p. 17). Appearing six times in Mein
Kampf is the philosophical quote from Hamlet “to be or not to be” and was
repeated in fatalistic speeches later in the war when the Third Reich’s eventual
outcome was coming into focus (p. 19).
Proverbial expressions referring to parts of the body were an effective type
of somatic rhetoric used in Mein Kampf, and helped accentuate Hitler’s
aggressive traits and violent thought processes (p. 20):
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When I recognized the Jew as the leader of the Social Democracy,
the scales dropped from my eyes (Hitler, 1943, p. 60). I, too, was
determined to leap into this new world, with both feet, and fight my
way through (p. 25). Only the board fences around the brains of all
so-called “experts” were preserved for posterity (p. 214). You felt
like dashing your head against the wall in despair over such people
(p. 464)! It [the state] must keep a sharp eye on the fingers of the
press (p. 242). Again and again, I begged them [certain politicians]
to give free rein to fate, and give our movement an opportunity for a
reckoning with Marxism; but I preached to deaf ears (p. 681).
In accordance with Hitler’s philosophy of keeping the message simple for
the masses, he used many human to animal metaphors that clearly
demonstrated his rhetorical intent:
The sly fox knows perfectly well that this has nothing to do with
religion (Hitler, 1943, p. 115). By entrusting the fate of his war on
the Marxists to the well wishing of bourgeois democracy, the Iron
Chancellor set the wolf to mind the sheep (pp. 172-173).

The

parliamentary rats leave the party ship (p. 104). With the result that
the previous speaker, even before I was finished, left the hall like a
wet poodle (p. 219).
The didactic function of the proverb is rhetorically significant in Hitler’s
message construction since they [proverbs], “contain the knowledge, experience,
and observation of generations of people, and this distilled wisdom gives them
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their generally valid character and claim of authority” (Mieder, p. 32). However,
Hitler’s method was to manipulate folk proverbs for his own purposes. Such an
adjustment occurs with the proverb “what people wish they hope for” to the
Nazified version “what people want they hope for and believe.” In this instance,
“wish” is replaced by the more forceful “want.” Together with the additional verb
“believe,” the re-constructed proverb suggests Hitler’s fanatical pursuit of blind
devotion and conformity from the masses.

By explaining to them what they

ought to desire, they will consequently have faith in its operational undertaking
(pp. 32-33).
Burke’s analysis of the rhetoric in Mein Kampf includes a centralization or
“hub of ideas” reference in the form of a geographically situated area as the final
destination for followers of National Socialism. In the religious/cultural spirit of
Mecca and Rome, Hitler chose the Bavarian city of Munich to give the movement
its force and internal unanimity (Burke, pp. 192-193).
Also abundantly accessible in the pages of Mein Kampf are the
demonizations of Jews and Marxists as a symbol of the common enemy. Hitler
wrote that the masses should be presented with centralized adversaries or
devils, otherwise objectivity plays too large of a role in assessment (p. 193).
Burke sees this as a unification device among those who can agree on nothing
else, “…as unifying step No. 1, the international devil materialized, in the visible,
point-to-able form of people with a certain kind of ‘blood,’ a burlesque of
contemporary neo-positivism’s ideal of meaning, which insists upon a material
reference” (p. 194).
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Burke also notes the abundance of sexual symbolism in Mein Kampf. The
“feminine masses” are to be led by Hitler, the dominating male who woos them,
wins them, and commands them. This is contrasted to the rival male, or the Jew
who delights in “seducing” them and poisoning their blood by intermingling. By
an “associative connection of ideas,” the reader is led to vehement criticisms on
syphilis, prostitution, and incest related to “blood poisoning” through racial
mélange (p. 195).
In referring to the pre-war days spent in Vienna observing the chaotic
environment of the Habsburg Empire’s Parliament, Burke equates this political
organization as representative of everything from which Hitler chose to remove
himself. Parliament was a concoction of fragmented voices from many political
entities characterized by separatist movements that were so alien to Hitler’s
longing for a united German Austria:
…by the method of associative mergers, using ideas as imagery, it
became tied up, in Hitler rhetoric, with ‘Babylon,’ Vienna as the city
of poverty, prostitution, immorality, coalitions, half-measures,
incest, democracy (i.e., majority rule leading to ‘lack of personal
responsibility’), death, internationalism, seduction, and anything
else of thumbs-down sort the associative enterprise cared to add
on this side of the balance (pp. 200-201).
The important components, stressed by Burke that comprised Hitler’s
unification device included an “inborn dignity,” yet the theories of race and nation
manipulated these ideas innately privileging the “Aryan” over inferior races such
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as Jews and Negroes. Because of Germany’s defeat in the first war, espousing
ideas of “inborn dignity” to a country in dire emotional need was a rhetoric of
extreme value (p. 202). Dignity had to come before economic stability. Another
unification measure in Mein Kampf was referred to by Burke as a “projection
device” whereby the ills of society could be handed over to the Jewish
scapegoat. This “purification by dissociation” helped maintain the middle-class
businessman’s normal way of thinking, while also serving as elimination of a
“race” of competitive merchants (pp. 202-203). A third unifier was the symbolic
re-birth or change of lineage with Hitler as the group’s spiritualist leader:
Here, above all, we see Hitler giving a malign twist to a benign
aspect of Christian thought. For whereas the Pope, in the familistic
pattern of thought basic to the Church, stated that the Hebrew
prophets were the spiritual ancestors of Christianity, Hitler uses this
same mode of thinking in reverse. He renounces this “ancestry” in
a “materialistic” way by voting himself and the members of his
lodge a different “blood stream” from that of the Jews (p. 203).
Another unifier for Hitler was, according to Burke, a type of
commercialization or selling of National Socialism to financiers in order to obtain
backing for the movement. Attacks on “Jewish finance” amounted to a sleight of
hand to divert attention from the acquisition of necessary economic strength for
modern conflict and the rebuilding of the German military. Hence, Burke sees
this as “a noneconomic interpretation of economic ills” (p. 204).
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Why did Mein Kampf refuse to treat economics as a cause of the
predicament of the post World War I German nation? Again, Hitler sees the
rhetorical opportunity to turn to reasons of blood and race associated with the
German lack of self-preservation and moral decay that started years ago on the
home front. Germany’s military defeat is not undeserved, but attributable to the
intermingling of races that weaken the national character. Therefore, as Burke
points out, all the evils besetting society, from poor housing to poor health, are
again transferred to the Jewish scapegoat (pp. 204-205).
In the chapter entitled the “Strong Man is Mightiest Alone,” Burke sees
Hitler at his strongest in reference to demagogic effectiveness.

The chapter

illustrates a “spontaneous identification between leader and people,” without an
overt mention of Hitler, but instead, an implication that his leadership is normal
and has already manifested itself:
There is no “philosophy of the superman,” in Nietzchean cast.
Instead, Hitler’s blandishments so integrate leader and people,
commingling them so inextricably, that the politician does not even
present himself as candidate. Somehow, the battle is over already,
the decision has been made.

“German democracy” has

chosen…He says what he thought in terms of what parties did. (p.
210)
Burke believes that Mein Kampf “to a very disturbing degree,” is an
excellent example of the power of incessant repetition.

By example, at the

bottom of each flyer or handbill announcing a Nazi mass meeting, were the
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slogans “Jews not admitted” and “War victims free.”

It was these two

“complementary” premises upon which Burke believed the substance of Nazi
propaganda was built (p. 217).
Mein Kampf provided a worldview for those who had no basis for
comparison. What troubled Burke was Hitler’s reliance on:
…a bastardization of fundamentally religious patterns of thought. In
this, if properly presented, there is no slight to religion. There is
nothing in religion proper that requires a fascist state. There is
much in religion, when misused, that does lead to a fascist state.
There is a Latin proverb, Corruptio optimi pessima, “the corruption
of the best is the worst.” And it is the corruptors of religion who are
a major menace to the world today, in giving the profound patterns
of religious thought a crude and sinister distortion. (p. 219)

Sprachregelung: Language Regulation of the Media
In the ongoing struggle to reduce the consciousness of the masses, the
Nazis took action that severely regulated public, and to an obvious lesser degree,
private discourse within the German nation. Ironically, the word pressefreiheit or
freedom of the press, was banned from German dictionaries by 1942 (Young, p.
112). In limiting “the flow of certain words,” Goebbels and his associates in the
Propaganda Ministry unintentionally produced undesirable results by handcuffing
journalists to the language restrictions of the Party line. His criticisms of the
press included references to the abundance of clichés and “boring, flat phrases”

166
(p. 114). With an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 directives (Townson, 1992, p.
140) issued to the media on the subject of word usage, one can hardly imagine a
different consequence of this ubiquitous Nazi censorship.
Officially, the term used by the National Socialists was Sprachregelung or
language regulation. Not only was it a usage guideline for government officials
and the press, it also implied code language to disguise government action and
German military operations (Michael & Doerr, p. 382). These regulations were in
place within six weeks of Hitler taking control of the government and within
twenty-four hours of the selection of the new Minister of Propaganda:
On 15 March 1933,…Goebbels appeared at the meeting of the
Reichspressekonferenz [Reich press conference] in Berlin to inform
the assembled journalists that ‘things were going to change’. One
of the ways in which they were going to change was that the
Reichspressekonferenz was re-functioned so that it served not only
as a forum for the exchange of information but also as an
instrument for issuing detailed instructions to the press not only on
which subjects or topics were to be treated, but also on the words
and phrases to be used-or not to be used, as the case may be
(Townson, p. 140).
Every German newspaper was obligated to send a representative to these daily
conferences chaired by Goebbels.

Deviations from these explicit directives

resulted in “severe fines” levied against the newspaper in question (Michael &
Doerr, p. 342).
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Townson’s study shows discernible categories relating to the guidelines of
terminology use, the first of which involves protection of key terms highly
regarded in Party ideology. These terms were to be eliminated from rival or nonideological contexts. An example is Sozialismus [Nazi-defined form of socialism]
contrasted with Marxismus [Bolshevik version].

The term Rasse [race] or

derivatives thereof were forbidden in newspaper advertisements beginning in
1937. Pimpfendivision [Kids Division], an implied derogatory term referring to the
SS-Panzerdivision Hitler-Jugend was banned in 1944 (Townson, p. 141).
The second category was comprised of words reserved or copyrighted for
the Party’s use. Propaganda was a positive term in the Germany of 1937 and
was not to be employed in descriptions of enemy efforts at persuasion. Instead,
the word Hetze [agitation] would apply to these circumstances (p. 141).
Townson’s next category deals with adaptation to changing perceptions of
historical development where we find the term Angelsachsen [Anglo-Saxon].
Apparently, at some time, the Nazis had unsuccessfully tried to remind the
English of their Germanic roots, therefore; as the topic of six directives between
1941 and 1943 prohibiting its application to British and Americans, Angelsachsen
was no longer used (p. 142). Another term in this category that had outlasted its
effectiveness was Drittes Reich [Third Reich]. Starting in mid-1939, numerous
instructions explained that Drittes Reich had served a “programmatic function” in
bringing the Nazis to power. It was “suggested” that Deutsches Reich [German
Reich] or the expanded version, Großdeutsches Reich [Greater German Reich]
be substituted, however; Großdeutsches Weltreich [Greater German World
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Reich] was not to be used, “as its time had not yet come” (p. 142). A related
term, Anschluß [German-Austrian Union] was banned for promoting, or perhaps
delaying, similar “expansionist” images to the world community (Young, p. 112).
A fourth category of regulation was relevant to the presentation of the
enemy during the war.

Depending on the intent, words and phrases were

carefully chosen, as was the case shortly after the invasion of Poland, when the
media was instructed not to use the term tapfer [brave] in describing the Poles
(Townson, p. 142). “Red” was another word that could not be used in reference
to the communists; it was first banned during the Spanish Civil War in 1937.
“Bolshevik ruling power” was preferred over the “Red government in Valencia”
(Young, p. 113). In the ensuing battles against the Soviets a few years later, the
reason for not using “red” assumed a political posture:
In Mein Kampf, Hitler had stressed the importance of red as a color
in propaganda posters, armbands, emblems, and flags.

The

adoption of red by the Nazi Party not only infuriated leftists, Hitler
wrote, but also symbolized “the social idea of the movement.” But
“the social idea” was lost in the purges of June 1934, if not earlier.
In smashing the free trade unions, freezing worker’s wages,
restricting their freedom of movement, establishing conscript labor,
and liquidating much of the Strasser wing of the Party, the Nazis
betrayed the revolutionary ideals and promises that had quickened
so many of the Movement’s early adherents. Given this legacy of
suppression, the word “red” could only revive memories and
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emotions that more cynical Nazis would as soon let sleep. With
good cause, therefore, did Goebbels attempt to banish it from the
printed page. (Young, p. 114)
Another early war example of language manipulation was a directive to the press
that the British Central Office of Information be referred to as Lüge-und ReklameMinisterium [Ministry of Lies and Advertising]. Late in 1941, instructions were
issued stating that British pilots of the Royal Air Force were to no longer be
accused of “cowardice” since “otherwise people might start asking why RAF
pilots were still flying if they were so cowardly (and the German Air Force so
good)” (Townson, p. 142).
Language regulations also took into account the relationship of Germany
with her few allies or nations considered friendly. In spite of the overtly racial
policies of the Nazis, there was sensitivity to the term Anti-Semitsch [AntiSemitism] since certain Semitic groups of Arabs were considered prospective
allies in a region of the world rich in a vital component of all military
infrastructures, oil. As a result, the press was told to narrow its descriptions to
judenfeindlich [Jewish enemy] or Judengegnerschaft [opponent of Jews] (pp.
142-143). In light of Japan’s position in the war as an Axis power, derogatory
terms such as Asiatisch [Asiatic] were banned. Prior to this alliance, German
propagandists suggested the likelihood of “Asiatic hordes” driving in on their
country from the east. Late in 1933, another related term that was to be avoided
was Gelbe Gefahr [Yellow Peril] (Young, p. 112). In addition, as various pseudogovernments emerged during the Spanish Civil War, the press was told that the
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term Regierung [head of state] was to be preserved in distinct acknowledgment
of Generalissimo Franco (Townson, p. 143).
Townson’s next grouping involves words used in describing the progress
of the war. Certain terms were deemed dangerous to the people and it was from
them that Goebbels said, “we should shrink as the devil does from Holy Water”
(Young, p. 113). On the first day of World War II, the word “war” itself was not to
be utilized by the press, “In all news items, commentaries etc., the word ‘war’
must be avoided. Germany is repelling a Polish attack. That is the slogan” (p.
113). The Czech Press was issued the following directive on September 25,
1939:
The word ‘war’ must be used as sparingly as possible, especially in
headlines; preferably the expression ‘state of war’ is to be used. In
relation to Poland, it is neither a ‘war’ nor a ‘state of war,’ but
‘reprisals for Polish attacks and provocations’ (Kris & Speier, p. 33).
When the German offensive against the Soviets was stopped in late 1942 at
Stalingrad (another word that would disappear from the German media),
newsmen were warned by Goebbels not to use the word “defensive” as a means
of describing the resultant Sixth Army troop positions:
The term, he pointed out, had a “defeatist ring,” was “reminiscent of
1914,” and called to mind “dangerous parallels” with the Great War.
In its place he proposed euphemistic substitutes, such as “we are
digesting the conquered territories” (Young, p. 113).
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Frontbegradigung [straightening the front line] was, of course, preferred over
“retreat” (Townson, p. 143).

In March of 1940 and shortly before the fall of

France, the word “peace” was banned in an effort to ward off public perceptions
of the possibility of a quickly won war (Young, p. 113). Evakuierte [evacuate]
was replaced by the term Umquartierte [rehoused]. Air-raid “cellar” became airraid “shelter,” Luftschutzkeller to Luftschutzraum. Goebbels also fought off the
negative connotation associated with Katastrophe [catastrophe] by banning it
early in 1944 as a descriptive word in reports on Allied air bombings of western
cities (Townson, p. 143).

The substitute term was Großnotstand [major

emergency] (Young, p. 113).
As the war’s end drew near, Townson saw an effort made to restrict the
use of language invented by or regularly associated with the Allies.

This

rationale rested on the belief that adopting the enemy’s language would lead to
adaptation of their ideology. Therefore, Alliierte [Allies] and Vereinigte Nationen
[United Nations], both reminders of defeat in the prior war, were terms disallowed
beginning in 1940 (Townson, p. 144).

The replacements were, “the more

controllable and mind-contracting phrases ‘our enemies’ and ‘the enemy side,’
while ‘French Foreign Legion under British direction’ took the place of ‘Free
French fighting forces’” (Young, p. 113). “Positively loaded” terms such as RAF
were withdrawn as well as menacing references to the enemy’s military
hardware, “Flying Fortresses” and “Liberty Ships.” The German media was also
warned against mentioning the prophetic phrase “Battle for Berlin,” contained in
Allied reports reaching the homeland in late 1943 (Townson, p. 144).
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The Language of Defeat: The Rhetoric of Stalingrad
The ultimate test of the “Thousand Year Reich” was whether the National
Socialist Party could successfully guide the German nation through the war that it
had created and long prepared for prior to the invasion of Poland in 1939.
Initially, the success of the military was indisputable. Victories in the eastern and
western theatres of operation provided the Nazi propagandists with a wealth of
exploitable material that found its way to the welcoming public by way of the
press and radio on a consistent basis, however, the charmed life that Goebbels
seemed to be living was about to change. Realistically, we can only assume that
his preparations for a major military disaster were far from formulated during
these triumphant moments in the brief history of the Third Reich. In spite of its
extreme utility, the military achievements nourishing the propaganda line would
prove to be a brittle underpinning. “In times of war, Nazi propaganda rests upon
the success of Germany’s armed might. While it is difficult for any propagandist
to handle setbacks, Nazi propaganda faces an insuperable obstacle if the
German soldier is defeated” (Kris & Speier, p. 50).
An accurate account of the reporting on Stalingrad is rightly capsulated by
Bramsted (1965) as “A Saga instead of Truth” (p. 259).

A boastful Hitler

complicated matters for Goebbels during a speech on September 30, 1942 by
declaring, “The capture of Stalingrad will be completed, and you may be sure that
no one will ever drive us out of this place again” (p. 259).
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In spite of the reality of the dire situation of the thousands of soldiers in
the German Sixth Army, the boundaries of accuracy were once again utterly
overstepped a few weeks later:
Indeed, Hitler himself said on 8 November, “The fact is that we
have got it.” And on 16 November, Lieutenant General Dittmar
added: “The real objective of our offensive from its very beginning
was to gain this point [Stalingrad]; to have gained it-for it has been
gained-crowned the operations of this summer and autumn (Kris &
Speier, p. 113).
What caused Hitler to make such predictions and pre-mature statements
about a major turning point in the war are of no concern here, but their effect on
Goebbels’ course of propaganda cannot be ignored. Among the complications, a
re-definition of Hitler’s prediction was considered mandatory (p. 113). It may be
helpful to sketch some of the developments leading up to the crisis in order to
focus on the propagandists’ language of defeat.
Hitler ordered General von Paulus’ Sixth Army to attack Stalingrad on
August 19, 1942. The minutes of Goebbels’ secret propaganda conference five
days later indicate that a Russian pessimism is present but should not be used in
the German press as of yet, and British comments on the importance of
Stalingrad are being collected to be used against them once the city has fallen
(Boelcke, p. 271).
In the period covering September 11-13, the discussions centered on the
attitude of the home news reports as being too optimistic. The toughness and
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complexity of the fighting was to be stressed.

Again, Russian pessimism is

downplayed. Reports on the consequences of the Soviets losing Stalingrad were
publishable, but “fixed-date” predictions, i.e. Stalingrad will fall in 48 hours, were
not allowed (p. 275). Goebbels also severely admonished a Berlin newspaper
for references to heroic Russian defenders and the publishing of some
nationalistic Bolshevik slogans. Although no disciplinary action was taken, the
article would be used as an example by the German Press Department in a
subsequent press conference, to criticize and rebuke that type of reporting in fear
of arousing sympathy for the enemy (p. 275).
On September 15, the Reichspressechef’s [Head of Reich Publication,
Otto Dietrich] (Michael & Doerr, p. 342) Slogan of the Day, indicated a growing
optimism on the eventual outcome of the battle:
The struggle for Stalingrad is nearing its successful conclusion.
Important announcements by the OKW [Armed Forces High
Command] about the successes achieved so far are to be expected
in the course of today or tomorrow. The German Press will have to
make preparations for featuring in the most effective way the
victorious outcome of this vast struggle for Stalin’s city - if
necessary by the publication of special editions (Boelcke, p. 278).
In the days that followed, nothing of major importance came through from the
OKW, leading to a Goebbels directive to the press on September 21 not to
highlight Stalingrad as vigorously since keeping people in a state of high
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expectation could not be maintained indefinitely (p. 279). This elevated state of
anticipation found in the German people was documented at the time:
In short order Stalingrad took on an almost magical significanceevery subsequent SD [Security Service] report underlined this, and
on September 28 one even stated that most listened “as if
hypnotized” to reports of developments there; one is thus tempted
to believe in a heightened consciousness which made Stalingrad a
symbolic turning point in more than a military sense (Steinert, p.
168).
The OKW did report on the 22nd that the terrain around Stalingrad was “ideally
suited to defence” and the oncoming weather will cause operational supply
problems. Conversely, the report indicated Russian supplies were transportable
across the Volga and up to their front on any scale desirable (Boelcke, p. 280).
Goebbels believed that victory was still a few days away on October 19,
and alluded to staying within the guidelines of the OKW communiqué of two days
earlier.

The Wehrmacht’s propaganda plans being finalized for the fall of

Stalingrad included all bearers of the Knight’s Cross being brought back to Berlin
for interviews in the press, on the radio, and on film newsreels (p. 288). The
inflated Russian reports of German casualties in the Stalingrad conflict were the
topics of the propaganda conference on the 24th.

There were earlier

unsuccessful attempts by Goebbels urging the repudiation of these figures by the
OKW (p. 291).
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On November 19, the Russians commenced a counter-offensive that
eventually encircled and sealed the fate of approximately 300,000 soldiers of
General von Paulus’s Sixth Army. A few days later, Hitler personally ordered
them to hold hedgehog [a well-fortified military position] and wait for help from the
outside (p. 301). The propaganda meeting of the 23rd discussed an offensive
news strategy to ignore enemy propaganda concerning recent forced
advantages, “Now is the time to counter enemy propaganda with impertinent,
overbearing, and sovereign unconcern” (p. 300). Therefore, it was in this manner
that Stalingrad seemed to simply disappear from the media:
Throughout the next two months, or very nearly, the Wehrmacht
communiqué edited by Hitler was an illustration of ‘the art of noninformation’.

In so much as the Wehrmacht communiqué

mentioned the Stalingrad front at all, it was not until January 16,
1943, that it was evident that a German army was encircled there
and awaiting annihilation. (p. 301)
A Goebbels personal diary entry on December 17, 1942 makes mention of
about four to six hundred postcards arriving from Russia, intended for the
families of German prisoners of war. They were delivered with an ‘explanatory
covering-letter’, but he wrote a repeat of the procedure should be banned for fear
of opening “a gate for bolshevik propaganda to pour into Germany” (p. 310).
Families seeking further information on the status of their loved ones serving at
the Stalingrad front, illegally tuned to the German Service of the Soviet Radio
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where the names and addresses of many of the estimated 90,000 prisoners of
war were read over the air (Bramsted, p. 261).
The propaganda conference of December 22 cautioned against the use of
the phrases “serious” or “critical situation,” since the foreign press would elevate
the language to “catastrophical” (Boelcke, p. 310).

Incidentally, the planned

evacuation of the Sixth Army from the Stalingrad sector, while still possible, was
scheduled for the 22nd and 23rd but Hitler refused authorization (p. 311).
The German public was permitted to hear the Soviet claim of the recapture of Velikie Luki on January 1, 1943 but no additional news on the event
was broadcast until the 13th when Front Report aired a story on a German
garrison holding out against a Russian assault with a ten to one numerical
superiority over the Wehrmacht soldiers. The listeners were led to believe their
troops were being re-supplied by air (Kris & Speier, pp. 429-430). Velikie Luki
was declared a loss by the OKW communiqué of January 17, or as it was
phrased, “the garrison had fought its way through to the German relief force
according to order” (p. 430). General Dittmar’s talk the next day referenced the
town, “‘One name in particular has become known to the German public: Velikie
Luki.

This name already resounds like a song of heroes.’

And he added

ominously, ‘The same applies to Stalingrad’” (p. 430). On the 25th, the solemn
tone of Dittmar’s broadcast was hinting at the gravity of the Russian counteroffensive:
We would not be doing the German people any favor if we were to
dispute the fact that the situation has grown very serious for the
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time being, and even today when we are giving you this interim
statement it shows many troubling aspects. (p. 430)
A mythic rhetoric blossomed during the same broadcast when “the fighting men
of Stalingrad” were compared to Leonidas at Thermopylae and the Nibelungen
[Burgundian Kings] in King Etzel’s [actually Attila’s] burning banquet hall. When
Luftwaffe chief Goering repeated this heroic theme in a speech five days later, he
swelled the rhetorical effect by adding that the Nibelungen “quenched their thirst
by their own blood” (p. 430).

Defeat was finally acknowledged, though not

publicly, in the minutes of the Goebbels’ propaganda meeting on January 27,
1943:
Reports from Stalingrad indicate that the heroic struggle of our
soldiers is nearing its end. This unique event in German military
history…must be exploited psychologically for the strengthening of
our people. He [the Minister] urges the press to remember that
every word about this heroic struggle will go down in history. The
OKW communiqué must be drafted that it will rank equal with
Caesar’s address to his troops, Frederick the Great’s appeal to his
generals before the Battle of Leuthen, and Napoleon’s appeals to
his guards. The few sentences about the heroic epic of Stalingrad
must be simple, direct and modest, as if engraved in bronze.
(Boelcke, p. 324)
The OKW communiqué on February 1, 1943 indicated von Paulus’ Sixth
Army had been “overwhelmed in battle by the superiority of the enemy, after
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more than two months of heroic defense.” On the 2nd, the German people heard
a radio report of how “during the heroic fighting every man, up to the General,
fought in the most advanced line with fixed bayonets” (Kris & Speier, p. 431).
Clearly, the situation dictated a propaganda line conveying a “heroic” last stand
during the final days of Stalingrad, yet nothing was mentioned in the German
media of the enormous casualties. Goebbels had been warning the press about
inflated figures coming from the Russians throughout the six months of the
campaign.

Unofficial estimates from a Soviet communiqué of February 2,

reported the total Axis troop loses at 503,650 (Boelcke, p. 328).
Reichspressechef Otto Dietrich’s office issued a lengthy, tone-setting
Slogan of the Day on February 3 in an attempt to guide the media through this
delicate and novel subject in the short military history of the Third Reich. Defeat
would somehow emerge as a positive, or at least meaningful, occurrence in the
mind of the German public:
The heroic fighting for Stalingrad has come to an end. In several
days of mourning the German people will remember its gallant sons
who did their duty to their last breath and to their last round, and
thereby broke the main force of the bolshevik onslaught against the
Eastern Front. The heroic struggle for Stalingrad will now become
the greatest heroic epic of German history. This faces the German
press with one of its greatest tasks. In line with and in the spirit of
the OKW special announcement expected today, the German press
must pay tribute to the moving event which outshines the greatest
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feats of military heroism in world history; it must hold up this exalted
example of supreme heroic bearing and ultimate self-sacrifice for
the sake of victory as a sacred torch before the eyes of the German
people. From immortal heroism of the men of Stalingrad there will
unfold within the German nation, more strongly than ever before,
the spirit and the forces which will ensure the victory which is now
more than ever fanatically determined to achieve. (p. 328)
Taking their cue from this press directive, the radio news report of the
Stalingrad defeat was issued to the public by way of the Special Announcement.
The actual news itself was preceded “by slow marches and followed by muffled
drum rolls and three stanzas of I Once Had a Comrade” (Kris & Speier p. 431).
The international nature of the Axis coalition was respected by not only playing
the German national anthem, but also those of Rumania and Croatia. This was
followed by three minutes of radio silence. Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony and
solemn martial music was played before and after the announcement “that all
theatres, cinemas, and variety halls in the Reich were to close for three days”
(pp. 431-432). The public reaction to the news in the capital city of Berlin was
described on the radio, “…people in the street stopped awhile and listened, and
their expressions became serious and determined. In public restaurants they
stood up and, their hands raised in the German salute, sang the National
Anthem” (p. 432).
It was now time for the Goebbels propaganda machine to accelerate their
efforts at deflecting the reality of the defeat. Between February 3 and 6, talks on
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Stalingrad were aired featuring Hans Fritzche, General Dittmar, and Goebbels.
Perhaps due to the immense scale of casualties and subsequent changes in
family structures, there was also a special talk devoted to women who
conceivably found themselves newly widowed or victims of their husband’s
prisoner of war status (p. 432). On the evening of February 4, three wounded
Stalingrad soldiers were featured in an interview report on the final days of
combat. The following night, a historical perspective described as the “Road of
the Sixth Army” was presented through a series of Front Reports. The fiftyminute program chronicled their successful exploits in Poland, France, and preStalingrad Russia. The presentation confidently concluded with the following,
“The Sixth Army is not dead; long live the Sixth Army” (p. 432).
Further reports were imbued with stereotypical themes of victory emerging
from defeat such as, “triumph of fortitude over bestiality…a condition imposed by
fate…town of destiny…fighters in fact for western civilization and culture” (p.
432).
It was apparent that the genius of Goebbels had triumphed once again. In
the face of a catastrophic defeat that eventually turned the tide of war against
Germany, Hitler’s Propaganda Minister had “organized Germany’s mourning of
the defeat at Stalingrad into a Wagnerian celebration, comparable only to the
victory celebration of June 1940, hoping in this way to evade a realistic appraisal
of the defeat” (p. 432).
In the next chapter, we will study the foremost American radio
personalities who served Germany during the war as shortwave propagandists,
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broadcasting the Nazi ideology to North America.

The English language

broadcasting directed at Great Britain however, was immediately identifiable by
the voice of the popular William Joyce, otherwise known as Lord Haw-Haw. His
“rhetorical flourish” on the battle for Stalingrad ended with the following:
The lesson that Germany’s enemies will have to learn and shall
learn is that if Germany was strong before, she will be doubly
strong in the future, and as the shades of the heroes of Stalingrad
march side by side with their living comrades, they will march to a
glorious victory which will redeem their sacrifice and stamp upon
the tablets of history the proud legend: Thanks to these men and
their like Europe lives in freedom and in peace. (Doherty, 2000, p.
155)
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Chapter 5-Rhetoric on the Shortwave:
Nazi Broadcasts to America

Germany’s International Broadcasting
There were attempts at interpreting the methods used and the intended
audiences sought by German broadcasts around the world via shortwave.
Strategies were studied in both America and Great Britain but an official Nazi
version was supplied by the then head of the Broadcasting Division of the
Propaganda Ministry, Hans Kriegler, “Our broadcasts are addressed to all people
who believe in the German language and German culture wherever they may
live” (Childs & Whitton, 1942, p. 63).

Nationalistic, Germanic themes were

inherent in programs communicating with nationals living abroad. Estimates at
the time indicated a range of 10 to 12 million Germans living outside their country
with 8.5 million in North America and 1 million in South America (p. 65). Political,
cultural, and spiritual ties were meant to be re-established with the fatherland,
inviting vicarious participation in great events at home and overseas. Goebbels
wanted the shortwave broadcasts to reach a type of audience comprised of those
who were somewhat sophisticated, possessing average intelligence, unlike the
audience sought through the general rule of Nazi propaganda, those with the
lowest intelligence levels, i.e. found in the masses (p. 66).
As Kriegler saw it, his “racial comrades” living abroad were an audience
which the Nazis had to maintain, “Our broadcasters have always realized that
they should adapt their programs to the spiritual needs of Germans abroad, thus
assisting them in their fight for the maintenance of their national character by
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furnishing them with spiritual weapons” (p. 63).

Of paramount concern was

providing an understanding of the refreshing new revolutionary spirit brought to
the fore by National Socialism and its ideology.
Kriegler was thankful that shortwave radio could be used as a countermeasure against lies being maliciously spread about Germany and National
Socialism by broadcast outlets in other countries. He believed these slanderous
stations were, “entirely under the influence of Free Masons, clergymen or
Marxists” (p. 64). Kriegler’s predecessor, Horst Dressler-Andress envisioned the
shortwave radio transmissions as a means of communicating the achievements
and the spirited determination of the National Socialist movement beyond the
borders of the Reich by carrying:
…a piece of the German soul and German thought to all those who
follow their professions and duties outside of the boundaries of their
homeland…The radio became the great awakener of the mother
tongue, in addition to its use as a medium for news and the
messenger of the political and cultural life of the homeland. (p. 65)
Radio commentator Hans Fritzsche asserted that the ideology of the Nazis was
not an export item; it was not simply offered to other people. In a sense, the
radio acted as a public relations instrument offering a view of contrasting
approaches to government:
Our greatest political goal has always been to spread the truth
about our fatherland and to make others see the difference: over
there blissful Jewish democracy, desirous to burn people holding
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different political views, alive with medieval intolerance and here a
people who want nothing but to work and erect its house according
to its own taste. (p. 64)
The Nazis claimed the shortwave broadcasts began in the interests of
peace and truth and of course, as a defense mechanism against lies that were
being spread by the enemies of the Reich. However, Fritzsche was quick to
point out that this “semi-passive” stance did not lead to “impartiality” or political
neutrality. Some things could not be ignored:
No one must complain that today we no longer go on telling the
world merely about the work in our country but that we express
frankly our opinion on political events. Even now we refuse to send
purely polemic broadcasts such as the English and French have
adopted in their programs following the Communist pattern. We do
not want to produce explosions in foreign countries through
shortwave broadcasts. But we cannot miss the fact that there is
plenty of explosive material in foreign countries. And whenever we
have to uncover a lie we no longer restrict ourselves to the simple
statement of the truth but we try to tell the world who invented the
lie, why he did it and whom the liar wanted to deceive besides us.
(p. 64)
Despite the cultural and political agendas of the broadcasts, their
foundational contents were of the entertainment variety with a full seventy per
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cent of the programming schedule consisting of light music by 1939.

“Light

music and entertainment serve as the bait of the political radio” (pp. 67-68).

Shortwave Strategy for North America
The analysis of radio propaganda contains an element of evidence, which
may become obvious as a commentator’s exacting procedure unveils itself
through his or her own discourse. An approach may also be uncovered by an
opponent intent on exposing a rival’s rhetorical strategy. These methods must
be viewed critically and skeptically since they rely on additional sources of proof
to attain a safe degree of validity (pp. 74-75).
Internal evidence is much clearer when the intention is shown prior to the
announcer’s statement.

By expressing the obvious implications in a line of

discourse, a desirable audience reaction is made possible. “Usually, however,
internal evidence appears in the relationship of a particular incident or theme to
other themes which the propagandist is developing” (p. 75).
The strategy of German propaganda broadcast to North America was
analyzed in a relational context. Evidence was found in the relationship of the
subject matter or argument to specific military or diplomatic episodes or to the
personal views of the intended audience (p. 75). An important caveat to be
considered was reading more into a piece of evidence than it deserved. Analysts
were told to search for “broad lines of policy” and for those parts of an enemy
broadcast not consciously planned with regard to that policy. As is the case
today, when programs are running short, a commentator is forced to ad-lib and
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produce “filler” material.

It was an accepted practice among wartime

broadcasters to use atrocity stories in filling the time void, although these types of
stories were sensitive subjects in the mind of the German propagandist (p. 75).
After the outbreak of war in 1939, the Nazis main objective in shortwave
broadcasts to North America was to keep the United States neutral and dissuade
Americans from supplying aid in any form to the Allies already engaged in the
fighting, namely Britain and Russia (p. 76).

Securing American support for

Germany was deemed unrealistic and unnecessary by the National Socialists,
yet efforts aimed at the neutrality issue seemed worthwhile for many reasons:
The odds on the surface seemed to favor their campaign. The
deep-rooted isolationist tradition in the United States, reinforced by
twenty years of disillusionment with Europe’s politics following the
first World War, had found legal expression in the series of
Neutrality Acts designed to keep the country out of another war.
The seeds of skepticism, which still germinated regarding Allied
appeasement policies at the beginning of the war, kept American
public

opinion

definitely

opposed

to

military

and

financial

intervention. (p. 76)
By 1939, the vast majority of the American public opposed the principles
of National Socialism and hoped for an Allied victory.

The U.S. was clearly

opposed to Hitler and all he stood for, even to the point of opposing an arms
embargo provision in the Neutrality Act, which was considered a potentially
explosive situation for the German propagandists (p. 76).

It was noted that
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American support for the Allied effort was proportional to the ebb and flow of the
perceived military situations, “Whenever the security of the Allies visibly
deteriorated, Americans tended to throw over their commitment to neutrality” (p.
77).
Therefore, prior to the U.S. entry into World War II, the Germans were
faced with a unique problem in their shortwave strategy for North America. Care
had to be taken not to destabilize American perceptions of Allied success. The
Germans knew that doing so would seriously jeopardize the main objective of
their shortwave efforts, that of perpetuating U.S. neutrality (p. 77). However, the
Nazis’ policy, of course, was also ultimately based on winning the war so the
difficult broadcast mission became an integration of policy with American public
opinion (p. 77).

Patterns of Argument
From the beginning of the war until the summer of 1941, American efforts
were made at monitoring, transcribing, translating, and analyzing shortwave
propaganda. This activity took place in an inconspicuous white frame house on a
quiet street in Princeton, New Jersey (p. vii). Linguists, scholars, engineers, and
stenographers combined their unique abilities in comprising America’s systematic
shortwave eavesdropping apparatus that became known as the Princeton
Listening Center (p. vii).
It is from this body of research that five main patterns of argument were
identified and found to remain consistent from the first stages of the war until the
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Princeton group was disbanded. The Nazis did not favor one particular category
of argument, but instead choose to mix them in combinations that would suit the
interests of the propagandist’s course of action being pursued at the moment (p.
80).
In coordination with the main objective of maintaining the neutrality of the
United States, the Nazis employed the argumentative blueprint of division on a
consistent basis. The view of a strictly European war was brought to bear on
North American audiences. The rogue nation was, of course, Great Britain who
had started the war and was doing everything conceivable to prolong the misery
caused by the conflict (pp. 80-81). The British government was to blame for
everything from violating the rights of neutrals to bombing civilian and nonmilitary targets:
The language and arguments used differ according to the
supposed cultural level of the listening audience, but the underlying
strategy remains the same. It consists broadly in vilifying every
aspect of British policy and British institutions, while praising
German policy and National Socialist way of life. Britain is depicted
as America’s “hereditary enemy,” Germany as America’s “oldest
friend.” (Rolo, 1940, p. 27)
Listeners were told that Germany had not started the war, begun the blockade,
interfered with American mail, plundered American commerce, or ignored
American protests.

These antagonistic actions were taken by the British

government (Graves, 1940, p. 604). In order to justify the invasion of Poland,
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Great Britain was blamed for inciting the Poles to commit atrocities against
minority German civilians. The following characterization was broadcast on April
7, 1940:
Unable to defeat Germany on land, on water or in the air, England
has settled down to her old game of making war on those who can’t
defend themselves, on helpless infants and mothers, on the old,
infirm, the sick and the maimed. (Childs & Whitton, p. 81)
On July 11, 1940, the Nazis used a clever historical item from 1775 recalling how
George Washington’s Virginia militia had been abandoned by the British and left
to battle a French and Indian force single-handedly.

Projecting this into the

future, the commentator told audiences of Britain’s plans to drag America into
another conflict without guaranteed cooperation (Graves, 1940, p. 611).
Americans were told on February 17, 1940 that the war aims of Britain were
couched in the solidification of her imperial status throughout the world and her
continuation of European dominance:
While other countries have been satisfied with moderation, England
methodically set about dominating the world. When a nation in any
part of the world became powerful and threatened to follow a
course of action which did not conform to the interests of British
imperialism, then England made war on that country. (Childs &
Whitton, p. 81)
Other charges against the British centered upon their fight “for the well-being of
her plutocracy” since the war was being waged because “a few plutocrats were
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afraid to lose their power, and saw no other way out than to make war on the
new idea” (pp. 81-82). The National Socialists were quick to remind American
audiences of these British plutocrats and their Jewish influences. “The tycoons
of British finance and journalism, who manipulate the strings of British politics,
are almost all Jews” (p. 82). Conversely, the dubious British politicians were
categorized as expert double-crossers who had promised a “Jewish National
Homeland” after the First World War that never came to pass (p. 82).
The divisive argument also called on Americans to realize differences of
opinions leading to obvious conflicts of interest with the English. An attempt to
exploit this point was made in the series of talks entitled “British Disregard for
American Neutral Rights” (p. 82).

The program chronicled the diplomatic

differences between the two nations from 1784 until the First World War. Any
trace of evidence was manipulated to fit the argumentative paradigm of
“disaffection in the United States from the Allied cause” (p. 82).
The second pattern of argumentation noted by the Princeton Listening
Center was that of Berlin’s reassurance to the United States of nothing but
honorable intentions as a participant in the current global conflict. Germany was
framed as “upright, heroic, and progressive” country intent on ridding Europe of
its social and political ills. Americans were told that the German nation had done
much in the past and with National Socialist leadership, had much to offer for the
future:
At every opportunity, Germany’s cultural heritage was recalled, its
industrial and scientific achievements, its glorious natural scenery,
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the health, vigor and honesty of its people. National Socialism had
rescued this fine country from the same kind of greedy, plutocratic
oppression under which Britain had suffered and established in its
place the reign of social justice, releasing the full creative energy of
the German people (p. 82).
Berlin commentators pointed out the indifferences of the German
government in American affairs, both political and military.

Listeners were

reminded of Germany’s respect for the defensive posture of the Monroe Doctrine
of 1823. From a shortwave broadcast of March 28, 1940: “You have proclaimed
your Monroe Doctrine, so Germany declares itself against potentially hostile
alliances within Central Europe” (p. 84). In a further effort to allay U.S. fears of
German aggression directed at the North American continent, remarks such as
the following were heard on June 17, 1940, “a German attack against the United
States is just about as feasible as an attack from Mars” (p. 84). A few weeks
later on July 29, Air Marshall Göring was quoted by an American journalist:
…if anyone in Europe-Germany in the least- thinks or dreams of a
possible invasion of North or South America, he was certainly
suffering from strange hallucinations. Mind you, Germany intends
to cultivate political and economic relations with the United States
(Graves, 1940, p. 612).
Americans were also placated through invitations to share in the spoils of
war.

By appealing to the American sense of materialism and capitalism,

broadcasters explained that after a German victory, it would be wise to be on
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friendly terms with the dominant power as an inroad to profiting from the
available commercial opportunities in post-war Europe (Childs & Whitton, p. 84).
Reassurance even appeared in the form of flattery on January 26, 1940
over America’s tradition of neutrality, “President Washington’s advice that
Americans should steer clear of all entangling alliances was the law of Realpolitik for America and it was a good law.” On March 7, 1940: “We cannot help
congratulating the American people on their steadfast, neutral attitude” (p. 85).
Another argumentative pattern detected by the researchers at Princeton
was that of convincing Americans of the sheer futility found in the military efforts
of England and her Allies. Britain was characterized as “desperately weak and
thoroughly demoralized” (p. 86). Allusions were made to the lack of air power
found in the arsenals of France and Britain. Their aircraft were of inferior quality
to the technically superb German machinery.

Even Britain’s acknowledged

superiority in naval power was discounted due to the demonstrated tactical
advantages of the airplane (p. 86). Aside from these military matters, Berlin told
of the vulnerable geography of the British homeland especially after the German
conquest of Denmark and the Low Countries. From these positions, Luftwaffe air
bases were within reach of important industrial targets forcing British reliance on
“extracontinental sources for both war materials and food” (p. 86).
Shortwave radio propaganda looked at the British army as hopelessly
engaged in repeated “glorious retreats” while the British navy could do no more
than attempt a blockade against a “self-sufficient Germany” while Nazi submarine
warfare took a dramatic toll on Allied shipping (p. 86). The pilots of the Royal Air

194
Force were incapable of hitting military targets and could do nothing against the
powerful onslaught of the Luftwaffe while their planes pounded British
communications and industrial production (pp. 86-87).
Americans were also told of a critical morale problem among the people of
England. Relentless attacks were having a devastating effect on the material lot
of the average British citizen. The situation was described on July 15, 1940 as
one of “depression and despair…unrest and ill-concealed panic” (p. 87). Adding
to the misery were inept military and political leaders who, according to a
broadcast on August 26, 1940, “have always believed and even now believe that
the stoutest weapon in the world is bluff” (p. 87). Audiences in North America
were asked why any nation would want to support such a lost cause. Berlin
cautioned the Americans to beware of British propaganda putting forth the
“illusion of victory” as a means of clinging to any hope of American support, be it
commercial or military (p. 87).
Life in Germany, according to the shortwave, was unhindered by the
meager British war effort. Food, industrial production, raw materials, trade, and
home front morale were all in good order (p. 87). From a transmission monitored
on October 13, 1940, it was said the German people were “thoroughly convinced
that under the present leadership they will bring this war to a successful end and
that Germany will acquire that place to which she is entitled” (p. 87). In regard to
other countries closely associated with German war aims, the “strength and
cordiality” of Italy was highlighted as well as the short lived non-aggression pact
that was in effect, at that time, with the Russians. The implication for the U.S.
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concerning the Nazi-Soviet alliance was the removal of a second front possibility
and a subsequent repeat of the hunger blockade of the First World War, both of
which would have a devastating effect on the survival of the National Socialist
government (pp. 87-88).
A fourth pattern of argument uncovered through the work of the Princeton
Listening Center was the intentional stirring of dissension among the ranks of
isolationists and interventionists. Those of the pro-war persuasion were said to
be “tools of London,” forcing the U.S. into a European war to foster an AngloSaxon-type of world domination while dangerously whipping “the American public
into a war hysteria” (p. 88). On April 7, 1940, American Ambassadors Kennedy
(Great Britain) and Bullitt (France) were said to have reassured and promised the
Allies that the U.S. “would soon join in” and on June 22 and 23, 1940, Americans
heard several “interventionist” political leaders mentioned by name, Senators
Pepper (Florida) and Pittman (Nevada) and two members of Roosevelt’s cabinet,
Secretaries Knox and Stimson (p. 88).

Also mentioned by Berlin radio on

September 4, 1940, were “the war-mongering William Allen White Committee”
and “that German-hating Amazon…that queen of wishful thinkers, Dorothy
Thompson” (p. 88). An argument was made on September 20, 1940, that invited
the comparison of Poland and Germany to that of England and the United States:
Willing, apparently, to attempt an appeal even to those whose
sympathies were completely identified with the Allies, the Nazis
ingeniously argued that interventionist leaders were actually
scheming,

cold-blooded

imperialists

who

realized

that

the
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exhaustion of Britain and Germany in a long war would pave the
road for American world domination. England was ‘the Poland of
United States interventionism.” (p. 88)
As one might expect, the Nazi propagandists could not refrain from
exploiting a biased position of the Jewish population in the U.S. The arguments
were the same as those directed against the Jews in Europe, including secret
plotting behind the scenes to take over control of various organizations such as
the press (p. 89).

Americans were stoutly reminded that Jewish-controlled

newspapers drew them into war in 1917 and that history could very easily repeat
itself, “Class against class, race against race, isolationist against interventionist,
and everyone against the press-this was Berlin’s pattern of dissension within the
United States” (p. 90).

The Propaganda Ministry’s North American service

borrowed “Sinister Sam” from his announcing duties usually directed at British
audiences, to talk about Jews and their American agenda on September 22,
1940:
Maybe you think that Jews do not aspire to political rule…Read
their books and those publications which are meant for their own
race, and in which they speak freely. You would be astonished and
probably alarmed about their dreams of world power.

(Graves,

1940, p. 616)
Only as a last alternative did the German broadcasters resort to the use of
intimidation.

Even when this was the case, the threats did not take on the

“unadulterated terror tactics adopted in many of the broadcasts to Britain and
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hostile European countries” (Childs & Whitton p. 90). Instead of being overtly
presented, the warnings were somewhat implied. Americans were reminded that
war was not an agreeable state of affairs and that “baiting the German war
machine” would result in similar devastation bestowed upon Poland and
Rotterdam (p. 90).

A shortwave broadcast from May 18, 1940 stated that

Germany “was using new and terrible weapons, the nature of which you
(America) cannot know, which revolutionize the conditions of warfare” (pp. 9091).
As the Nazis looked into the future, they reminded the United States about
the economic post-war world where “friendly contact with the important nations”
may not materialize due to America’s continued belligerence against Germany.
Eventual economic sanctions were threatened unless the U.S. decided on “a
more cordial attitude towards the powers to be in Europe” (p. 91).
German propagandists noticed that elements of the American national
defense program were easily identifiable with totalitarian systems of government
and used an alleged letter from a shortwave listener in Dallas, Texas during an
August 29, 1940 broadcast:
…the joker in the defense bill permits the government to take over
industries

and

plants,

lock,

stock

and

barrel,

even

in

peacetime…our government, with the approval of the legislators, if
not of the people, enacts laws that are identical, if not more
dictatorial, than those of dictator nations. (p. 91)
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One day later, Americans were warned that all political opposition might become
illegal in their country due to the interpretation of a statement made by
Roosevelt’s Attorney General Jackson. His alleged remarks defined “criticism of
a nation’s leaders as a type of fifth columnist activity” (p. 90).
The intimidation method of persuasion took on a different dimension when
a new program entitled “Hot Shots from the Front” was instituted a few weeks
before the German-Italian-Japanese pact was signed. On October 13, 1940, a
German air raid was conducted against the English port city of Hull.

The

following description was broadcast by a German radio announcer who put
himself in the place of the bomber pilot participating in the air raid:
A hail of a hundred bombs-of thousands of incendiary bombs of all
sizes-goes down carrying disaster and destruction. Then from the
harbor of Hull, an inferno of flames shoots up. Fires flicker in the
night…Yellow and red, it is burning down there.

Greenish-blue

flames lick between the piers…A gigantic, apparently growing
conflagration rolls on far below us…The whole suggests a
disturbed ant-hill…The claws of the German eagle are sharp.
(Graves, 1940, p. 616)
All of the persuasive methods examined here were meant to keep the
Americans neutral during World War II. However, as we know, this was not the
case in spite of Goebbels best efforts. In the next section, we will delve into the
world of the American broadcasters in service to the Third Reich and explore the
motivations and rhetoric employed by these atypical radio commentators.
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American Voices of Nazi Propaganda
In July of 1943, a Federal grand jury indicted nine American citizens in
absentia for broadcasting Nazi and Fascist propaganda from Berlin and Rome.
These announcers, in the words of the indictment, did “knowingly, intentionally,
feloniously, traitorously and treasonably adhere to the enemies of the United
States…giving to the said enemies aid and comfort” by repeated broadcasts of
propaganda designed to “persuade citizens of the United States to decline to
support the United States in the conduct of war” (Shirer, 1943, p. 397).
The lone broadcaster from Rome was the American writer/poet, Ezra
Pound whose anti- Roosevelt and anti-American rhetoric made him well known
before and during the war. His lack of comfortability with the German language
kept him in Italy, although he would have fit the mold of those broadcasting from
Berlin (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 76). He was found “insane and mentally unfit for
trial” in 1946 and was sentenced to a mental institution for the criminally insane
outside of Washington DC where he remained for the next twelve years (p. 78).
Pound once remarked to a fellow writer, “An insane asylum is the only place I
could bear to live in, in this country” (p. 78)!

Fred Kaltenbach
As the American forerunner of all the Berlin broadcasters, Kaltenbach was on the
air to North America before the start of the war. There was no doubting his
loyalty as evidenced by the following from Shirer’s Berlin Diary, “Most Nazis find
him a bit ‘too American’ for their taste, but Kaltenbach would die for Nazism” (p.
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529). He was born in Dubuque, Iowa and was the son of a German immigrant
butcher. In spite of being arrested on suspicion of spying for America on his first
visit to Germany in 1914, Kaltenbach recalled the experience twenty-five years
later for his Nazi superiors:
I was swept by a powerful emotion and something inside of me said,
“I am going home.” That was back in 1914 when I visited the land of
my forefathers as a young high school student. Ever since then I
have done what I could to further the relations between the land of
my fathers, Germany, and my native land, America. I love them
both (Edwards 1991, p.8).
He remained in Berlin after earning his Ph.D. and began regular broadcasts to
America in 1939, all the while claiming dual patriotism and describing America as
his ‘sweetheart’ (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 47). Kaltenbach utilized his Midwestern
drawl in his rhetorical “Weekly Letter” to the folks back in Iowa. The following
example is from the second letter in his running series:
All well in Berlin, American films showing, plenty of food, foreign
culture appreciated (e.g. presentation of play by Hungarian); no
enmity to French, present conflict senseless, Germany no
aggressive design in West, only looks East, Germany broken ring
around her and retains only peaceful reconstruction to do. Why
does England want to continue war? She can’t beat Germany by
blockade. On the contrary Germany will increase use of submarine
against English shipping. (p. 47)
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Kaltenbach would later begin to personalize his letters by addressing them
to an old schoolmate Harry Hagemann, “by that time a practicing lawyer, no
doubt made increasingly uncomfortable by this embarrassing and one-sided
relationship” (p. 47). Here is a portion of a “Dear Harry” letter broadcast by
shortwave on January 2, 1940:
The American people should not be astonished at the enormous
popularity enjoyed by Hitler in Germany. Hitler gives life and time
for his people: his selflessness has earned him popularity.
Christmas holidays given up to be with his soldiers at the front.
Where did Chamberlain, Daladier spend Christmas? Hitler was the
first soldier of the Reich among soldiers, not Commander-in-Chief.
(Edwards, p. 10).
The British, who could sometimes dial into Kaltenbach’s talks, decided
that he was deserving of an name similar to that bestowed upon “an Oxfordaccented Nazi broadcaster who had become internationally famous,” Lord HawHaw whose real name was William Joyce (p. 10). Therefore, Lord Hee-Haw,
took full advantage of the opportunity presented to him by the British recognition
in a broadcast of February 13, 1940:
Lord Haw-Haw has joined the distinguished ranks of soldiers,
statesmen and American Heiresses who have achieved British
titles. And now the “Daily Telegraph” of 27th January calls me the
American Lord Haw-Haw. I’ll try to live up to that honor. Perhaps
later I will get the C.B. but never quite a K.G. as even the Lord High
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Pretender to the throne of Neptune, Winston Churchill, hasn’t got
that yet. The “Daily Telegraph” wants to give me a cap and bells,
but what’s to stop a jester telling the truth? Anyhow, I’ll do my best
to make Americans give English pretensions in this war, the big
Hee-Haw. England is fighting for the freedom of the seas—HeeHaw. England is fighting for the rights of small nations, including
India and Ireland—Hee-Haw.

English methods, including the

hunger blockade and incitement of Russia against Germany are
humane—Hee-Haw. England thought the Germans would revolt—
Hee-Haw.

England thought Germany would attack the Maginot

Line—Hee-Haw. Churchill thought he could tackle submarines and
magnetic mines—Hee-Haw.

England thinks she can starve

Germany and hang up her washing on the Siegfried Line—HeeHaw. (pp. 10-11)
Lord Hee-Haw also had a series of regular slots on the air including that of
the author of the Saturday night “Military Review” and the series “British
Disregard for American Rights” (Rolo, 1940, p. 28). His informal, Midwestern
style was apparent in the role of “Mr. Reader” who announced several of the
evening’s current topics. In the series “Jim and Johnny” Kaltenbach plays Jim,
the know-it-all Canadian milkman who educates his friend on world politics. In
“Friendly Quarrel” Kaltenbach is the honest American, Fred, whose views are
“demolished with compelling arguments spiced with heavy-handed wisecracks”
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by the astute German, Fritz, played by former American professor turned Nazi
propagandist, Otto Koischwitz. (Bergmeier & Lotz, pp. 47-48).
Kaltenbach liked jingles, puns, gag-lines, and referring to a fictitious
country called “Monrovia” which behaved as Hitler would have America behave
towards Britain, “News flash: Monrovia seizes British gold deposited in
Monrovian banks as security for debt payments…The Government of Monrovia
sends cruisers to protect Monrovian mails to Europe” (Rolo, 1940, p. 28). His
acronym for the BBC was “Bullitt-Biddle Corporation – Atrocity Manufacturers
Unlimited” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 49).
After three years of German military defeats and worsening conditions in
Berlin, Kaltenbach’s lightheartedness began to wane.

On July 30, 1943, he

replied on the air to his indictment for treason against the United States:
Technically I suppose I am guilty of treason-of treason to Roosevelt
and his warmongers, but not to the American people.

If I took

service with the German radio as a free lance commentator in the
autumn of 1939, two years before the U.S. officially entered the
war, it was done out of a genuine desire to promote good relations
between Germany, the land of my fathers, and America, the land of
my birth. It was clear to me from the start that the war in Europe
was not an ideological war, but a fight for the future of the German
people. Since that time, it has become a fight for the existence of
the German people...If I am engaged in treasonable activity against
my native land, I am doing so under the conviction that this war has
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never for a moment been America’s war. This war began on the
European continent, in settlement of primarily European problems
and affairs. Germany never had the slightest intention of carrying
the war across the ocean…If Germany declared war on the U.S.A.
on 8 December 1941; it was only a formality, because Roosevelt
had for more than a year before that date been making undeclared
war against Germany. I am not an enemy of the American people,
but I shall remain the implacable enemy of those forces in America
who wish to deny Germany her rightful place in the European sun.
If that be treason, make the most of it. (Edwards, pp. 13-14)
After the fall of Berlin, Kaltenbach was captured by the Soviets on July 14,
1945. He was incarcerated at detention camp “xyz” near Frankfurt on the Oder.
When U.S. military intelligence learned of his situation, they offered the Russians
two captured Nazi SS guards as a prisoner exchange (p. 15). At this point, the
Soviet secret police denied holding Kaltenbach, which ended all attempts at
returning him to the States to stand trial. He died of supposed natural causes in
October 1945 at the age of fifty (p. 15).

Constance Drexel
Discussing the cultural achievements of Germany and introduced to her
audiences as a “famous American journalist” and as a “Philadelphia socialite and
heiress,” neither of which were true, Constance Drexel began broadcasting for
the National Socialists in 1940 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 54). She was actually born
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in Germany but was naturalized and grew up in Roslindale, Massachusetts. She
frequently crisscrossed the Atlantic and spent time attending four different
schools, studying journalism in Europe. Her education was completed in Paris at
the Sorbonne in time to witness the outbreak of World War I and volunteer as
one of the first American Red Cross nurses (Edwards, p.16).
She reported for the Chicago Tribune while covering the Paris Peace
Conference and eventually became an advocate of women’s rights and the
suffrage movement. Drexel also has the distinction of being the first woman
political correspondent on Capitol Hill (p. 17). She was a supporter and activist
for many causes including the League of Nations, and international reform
movements; in fact, elements of Adolf Hitler’s restructuring movement in National
Socialist Germany were similar to her own, “… such as the greater role of
German women in the new Reich, the eradication of a parasitic social elite,
welfare legislation for minors, and social hygiene regulatory laws all impressed
her” (p.19). Her association with the Nazis began in the mid-thirties while on
working holidays to Germany. Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry would assign her
to write fitting articles for them (p.19).
Drexel’s efforts at establishing herself back home as a foreign affairs
columnist went largely unnoticed, however; a pro-Nazi bias was undeniable in
her writings. She abruptly quit a position with the McClure Syndicate’s papers in
1939 and left for Germany to visit her ailing mother in Wiesbaden (p.19). The
ulterior motive was uncovered when she was introduced to the Berlin press corps
tens days after the German invasion of Poland (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 53).
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Initially, Drexel covered the social activities of what was known as the
American colony in Berlin. Rolo describes her as one speaking in an eastern
American accent with occasional “Germanisms” surfacing due to long years
spent in the fatherland (Rolo, 1940, p. 30). As she became more acclimated to
the political situation, Drexel based her interest in Nazi culture on “aesthetic
principles handed down from Ancient Greece, that is, truth and beauty”
(Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 54). While attending a Wagnerian Festival in the town of
Bayreuth, she reportedly said to Richard Wagner’s daughter-in-law, Winifred,
“Oh, you are the girlfriend of Adolph Hitler…” (p. 54)!
Categorizing her as “a sort of forlorn person and a rather shabby
journalist” (Edwards, p. 20), William Shirer seemed to be annoyed by Drexel’s
repeated advances toward him for favors and the possibility of employment.
Apparently, she was not taken seriously by her American colleagues:
Constance Drexel, an insignificant, mixed-up, and ailing woman of
forty-six who always had a bad cold, used to tell me during the first
winter of the war in Berlin that she needed money-and wouldn’t I
hire her as a broadcaster? But she went over to the service of Dr.
Goebbels mainly because she had always been pro-German and
pan-German and since 1933 had been bitten by the Nazi bug. The
money the Germans paid her no doubt was welcome, but she
would have taken mine (which had an anti-Nazi taint) had I been
fool enough to hire her. (Shirer, 1943, p. 397)
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Her descriptions of life in Germany centered on social and cultural aspects
in a rhetorical effort to convince her audiences in America that the pressures
associated with the war were not an issue for the German people (Edwards, p.
19). When her talks strayed a bit and took on a political character, her Nazi
employers were rather embarrassed. On August 25, 1940, she broadcast the
following after the U.S. sent the ocean liner American Legion to Europe in an
effort to round up citizens who had become, due to the war, stranded on the
Continent, “It is possible the government deliberately sent the ship through the
war zone in the hope that it might create an international incident which would
arouse American public opinion to the point of entering the war” (Bergmeier &
Lotz, p. 54). In 1942, the German government supposedly found documents
indicating that American diplomats had encouraged the British to declare war
against Germany. To this revelation Drexel added, “I was among those who saw
the documents and had no doubt that they were the genuine article” (Edwards, p.
20). Drexel confided to a fellow journalist, Joseph C. Harsch that the Nazis were
now writing her scripts and she had no editorial control. Harsch believed that she
actually had no idea that she was being used while working for the National
Socialists (p. 20).
Constance Drexel was arrested in Austria by American G.I.s in August of
1945 after naively divulging her identity to a Stars and Stripes reporter
(Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 54). She spent time in internment camps and prisons until
being send back to the U.S. in 1946 to face her treason indictment. She had
always maintained her innocence:
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I was only interested in culture, in Beethoven and music and things
like that…They said I was giving aid and comfort to the enemy. I
was always against the war.
President

Roosevelt’s

I thought that I was following

line—you

know,

harmonizing

things

(Edwards, pp. 20-21).
U.S. attorneys investigating the case in Germany were unable to justify further
prosecution.

Therefore, a federal judge dismissed the treason indictment in

1948, due to lack of evidence. She died eight years later at a cousin’s home in
Waterbury, Connecticut (p. 21).

Edward Leopold Delaney
Delaney took a rather circuitous route to his position behind the Berlin
microphone not long after the start of the war. He was born in Illinois in 1885 and
had worked as an actor, film distributor, stage producer, author, press agent, and
marketing manager for MGM (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 50). After the Stock Market
crash of 1929, Delaney was in and out of the U.S. quite frequently. Roosevelt’s
re-election irritated the future broadcaster due to the President’s pro-Soviet
recognition policies (Edwards, p. 23).
His unswerving anti-Roosevelt criticisms were noticed by the German
Embassy in Washington and resulted in an invitation to Berlin.

He was

welcomed by Dr. Hans Schirmer, chief of the Reich Foreign Office’s Radio
Department (p. 23). They discussed a job opening for Delaney that involved
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writing and broadcasting human-interest material with complete editorial freedom
and no travel restrictions:
The Nazis paid him the standard traitor’s salary of 1,000 marks a
month ($400 at the official rate of exchange) and threw in a
comfortable apartment off the Kurfuerstendamm out of which some
unfortunate Jew had been thrown. But he probably could have
done just as well at home—except the flat—since in terms of prices
1,000 marks really amounted to only $250. With a little luck, no
doubt, he could have earned $62.50 a week right here. (Shirer,
1943, pp. 397-398)
Using the name “E.D. Ward,” Delaney began his broadcasting career
claiming to be “an American correspondent and observer.” He made it a point to
distance himself from the National Socialist doctrine and maintain his
independence (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 51). On August 30, 1940, Delaney told his
audience, “I am allowed to say on this totalitarian station that…I am not an
advocate of their [Nazi] political philosophy” (Graves, 1940, p. 604). Delaney felt
that he was now being afforded the chance to neutralize what he regarded as
Allied propaganda with his “objective slant to central European affairs” (Edwards,
p. 24).
When American correspondents characterized wartime Berlin as gloomy
and depressing, Delaney was ready with his reply, “Naturally things are not the
same as in peacetime, but the surprising thing is that they are not worse. That
they are not is due to the amazing organization of economic genius” (Bergmeier
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& Lotz, p. 51). He also warned listeners of German U-boat commanders who
might fall for Roosevelt’s trap of sending convoys straight into their periscope
crosshairs. Ex-President Hoover’s call for neutrality was praised during the 1940
Republican convention (p. 51) as was Henry Ford’s refusal to manufacture
aircraft engines for Britain (Edwards, p. 29). A favorite practice of Delaney’s was
that of confirming his own perception of war hysteria in America by interviewing
returning Europeans from the States. He also took special delight in ridiculing
gossip of an Axis-led invasion of North America:
I present my newly discovered plan for the invasion of
America…The new air bases which Germany will use for this
invasion will be on submarines.

The newest U-boats will have

quarter-decks, after-decks, shelter-decks; all filled with planes
which will take off and land at speed. These semi-porpoises can
deliver

their

bombers

as

far

inland

as

St.

Louis

or

Pittsburgh…Similar airplane carriers, submarines of course, then
go up other rivers as far as Minnesota. All are designed to take
diesel engines and fuel will be made from the by-products of corn.
German chemists will see that two crops of corn are raised each
year, which will give us more fuel than planes.

Other airplane

carriers will go up the St. Lawrence and it is said they can navigate
the Niagara Falls, so they can reach Chicago. This airplane-andsubmarine carrier is secretly known as the Sixth Column. I could
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tell you more of this stupendous scheme but it might be censored.
(Edwards, p.29)
Delaney characterized growing British-American war cooperation as His
Majesty’s attempt re-write history and re-colonize North America.

This was

considered his “scoop” of the war:
Why was the Duke of Windsor sent to the Bahamas? The Duke is
to be the First Viceroy of Britain in Washington when the two
nations are melted into one.

It’s not so fantastic as it sounds.

Having an American born wife he would be well received into the
post of Governor General—sort of assistant to the President. Or
would the President be subordinated to him? Who knows? Not I.
least of all the people of America. They’ll be told about it when
details are all worked out, and only then. Just now you’re being
informed in advance by E. D. Ward in Berlin.

Good night.

(Edwards, p. 27)
As America’s entry into World War II became more apparent, Delaney
continued to tow the Nazi Party line of rhetoric designed to keep the U.S. neutral.
He criticized Roosevelt’s belligerent politics and made this statement shortly
before Pearl Harbor:
The declaration of war will be catastrophic for the United States.
Not only in men and materials, in blood and tears, but in the loss of
our priceless heritage of independence and principles.

The

meaningless and deceptive slogans about salvaging democracy
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and upholding the principles of Christian civilization will prove to be
but shibboleths that lead to shambles. This war is for control of
European politics and the economic life of Europe’s many nations,
regardless of the phrases used to camouflage it.

(Bergmeier &

Lotz, pp. 51-52)
A few weeks after the Japanese attack, Delaney told his American audience that
Roosevelt had invited the assault in order to gain a superior leadership role in the
world conflict. He then continued that FDR offered up Pearl Harbor commanding
officers Admiral Kimmel and General Short as scapegoats in an effort to hide the
“sinister scheme” (Edwards, p. 33).
Delaney become bitter and angrier as the war progressed.

The CBS

correspondent in Berlin, Edwin Hartrich said that, “after a while he became rather
a tragic figure. He couldn’t find an audience to listen to his line of preaching.
Even the Nazis avoided him” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 52).

To William Shirer,

Delaney by then was simply “bored and boring” (p. 52). Leaving Berlin in 1943,
Delaney went to Slovakia and was present two years later for the Soviet
occupation of the city. He confided to a couple of reporters from Stars and
Stripes magazine that he was the E.D. Ward who had made broadcasts for the
Nazis. The reporters promptly turned him in to Czech authorities (Edwards, p.
35) and thus began a series of internments until his repatriation in 1947
(Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 52). His trial defense centered upon his assertion that he
was being prosecuted for writing anti-Soviet literature. The jury agreed and the
indictment for treason was dismissed. Subsequently, his new persona found him
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on the lecture circuit, speaking as a fervent anti-Communist. His publicity poster
slogan read “Delaney Was Behind the Iron Curtain When It Fell: He Tells All!!”
(Edwards, p.36) Edward Leopold Delaney, a.k.a. E.D. Ward, lived to the age of
86 before he was struck and killed by an automobile at his home in Glendale,
California in 1972 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 52).

Otto Koischwitz
Like Drexel, Koischwitz was a native German born in 1902.

After

graduating from Berlin University, he was unable to find work in the post-war
economic climate. He emigrated to the U.S. in 1925 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 55).
Upon arrival in New York City, Dr. Koischwitz found temporary teaching positions
at Columbia and New York Universities. In a 1943 broadcast, he recalled one of
his first memories of Columbia that he paralleled with recent Allies bombings in
Cologne:
In 1925, after completing my course at Berlin University, and
imbued with ideals of international understanding and brotherly
love, I visited the U.S.A.

I saw over the main entrance of the

Columbia University School of Mining the symbol of the miners
chiseled in stone—two crossed hammers and over them a big white
blob. A professor told me that the greeting of the German miners,
“Gluck auf,” meaning “Good luck,” was inscribed there, but in 1917,
these two words had been erased. His revelation shook my faith in
international goodwill…If that stone on Columbia’s Mining School
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poisoned my mind seven years after the end of the last conflict,
how much hurt will the damage done by the Cologne Cathedral
inflict upon those who caused it, and upon their children and
children’s children. (Edwards, p. 65)
In 1928, Koischwitz gained an assistant professorship at Hunter College
as a member of the German faculty where his ensuing, extensive, publication
record seemed to go unnoticed. His lectures were controversial and centered on
contrasts between decadent Western culture and the ideals of Teutonic
civilization (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 55). Koischwitz spoke of the great courage of
Siegfried and the brilliance of Hitler’s favorite composer, Richard Wagner. “He
openly attacked ‘the frauds committed by Jewish writers,’ asserting that people
‘think with their blood, not with their intellect’ and sneering at ‘degenerate western
literature’” (p. 55).
In 1938, in spite of his newly acquired U.S. citizenship and impressive
academic record, Hunter College tenured him at the rank of assistant professor,
insulting, what he felt were his conscience and nationality (Edwards, p. 70). The
last straw came one year later when the American Council Against Nazi
Propaganda reported his classroom politics to the department of education
resulting in a leave of absence without pay (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 56). After
resigning his position, he returned to Europe within weeks after the start of the
war. With his family first settling in Denmark, Koischwitz would later answer “the
call of the blood” by moving them to Berlin where he joined the Nazi Foreign
Ministry’s new broadcasting division (p. 56).
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Playing the role of “Fritz” opposite Kaltenbach in the “Friendly Quarrelers”
series, Koischwitz, complete with his natural German accent, first used the term
“Britality” to explain Britain’s self-righteous assertions of monopolistic civility
(Edwards, p. 74). Cited as an example of “Britality” was the English mockery of
their native language usage by the Americans, which the ordinary British citizen
referred to as “slanguage” (p. 74). Koischwitz and Kaltenbach also aired “Jim
and Johnny” about a politically wise milkman and “his unemployed, non-paying
Canadian customer” (Graves, 1940, p. 603). Contributing to the Nazi’s official
American neutrality policy, he said on July 16, 1940, “there is a far greater
similarity between American democracy and German National Socialism than
there is between old-fashioned English class distinction and Americanism” (p.
612).
Koischwitz also created a new program called “Dr. Anders and Little
Margaret.”

While Margaret, an American, was visiting her grandmother in

Germany, Dr. Anders, one of his many stage names, would read letters from the
girl’s school mates back home in the States (Edwards, p. 74). By answering her
friends over the shortwave, Margaret would describe the wonderful, idyllic life she
was experiencing such as her daily routines, delicious meals, favorite German
songs, and her pleasant bedtime customs (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 56).
June of 1940 saw the debut of Dr. Anders as host of the “College Hour”
where one could listen to such lectures as “The Law of Historical Evolution,”
“Typology”, “Surrealism,” and “The Problem of Freedom” (p. 56).

In the

September 24 issue of The New York Post, this show as described as “cultured,
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gentle, intelligent and charming” but soon the programs became more Nazified.
Topics shifted early in 1941 to “Numerology,” “James Joyce,” and “The Name of
Germany” (p. 56).

Koischwitz looked at war in a Darwinian sense as an agent

of “predetermined evolution” and warned the Americans not to interfere in this
natural process:
There are certain things you cannot escape.

For instance, you

cannot escape symptoms of old age, even if you dye your hair.
Suddenly you look much older than you would look without those
experiments. Likewise, mankind cannot escape a new age when it
has matured…England went to war to destroy what it called
Dictatorship.

Now, the British are forced by circumstance…to

establish the most rigid Dictatorship imaginable in their own
country…The establishment in Germany of an authoritarian
government on the basis of leadership was the result of slow and
natural evolution, and an expression of the will of the people.
Churchill, on the other hand, lacks the support of the masses.
England, which wanted to escape dictatorship at any price, ran into
it. (Edwards, p. 75)
Koischwitz grudgingly dismissed the idea that America had forced Britain
to declare war and surmised that after Britain and Germany had fought to their
respective material depletions, the way would be clear for American world
domination. His rhetoric was clearly focused on American neutrality as the best
option for the English (Graves, 1940, p. 614).
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“O.K. Speaking” was another program where Koischwitz became “The
Man Who Knows.”

Mr. Okay would begin sentences with the word

“confidentially” and claimed to have insight penetrating the inner circle of the
Roosevelt Administration (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 56), and knew of the methods
whereby Americans were being “duped” by their so-called leaders, “There are
certain facts…that Washington officialdom is concealing from the public.” He
was also heard to remark on this program, “…alien elements are administering
American policy and diplomacy” (Rolo, 1940, p. 30). After it was announced that
the Americans would be sending equipment to the Soviet Union, Mr. Okay hinted
at Roosevelt’s interest in providing Russian soldiers with boots because of FDR’s
shares of stock in the shoe industry (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 56).
Once the U.S. had entered the war, the strategy employed by Koischwitz
changed to a type of cynical scare tactic. As Americans at home were sitting
down to their first wartime Thanksgiving dinner in 1942, they heard this holiday
message on his program:
Today is Thanksgiving Day. Be thankful for having reaped some of
the glory of Britain’s defeats in the Far East; for the disaster of
Pearl Harbor, for the heavy losses of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific,
for the losses of U.S. merchant ships in the Caribbean and Atlantic,
the Artic. Be thankful for rising prices, higher taxes, and a lower
standard of living; for increased working hours, oil restrictions,
limitations of individual freedom, the muzzling of American liberty.
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Be thankful for U.S. cooperation with Bolshevism. Be thankful that
American boys sit in Iceland, or Northern Ireland, or die 1,000 miles
away from home in every corner of the world. Don’t forget the main
thing: be thankful that between you and Stalin stands the German
Army! (Edwards, p. 87)
Immediately prior to the Normandy landings, Koischwitz wrote a radio play
titled “Vision of Invasion” (partial script available in Edwards, pp. 94-95). Heard
on May 11, 1944, this “doomsday drama” created a sobering image of the
impending battle (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 58). Mildred Gillars, a.k.a. Axis Sally
who had collaborated with Koischwitz on interview visits to P.O.W. camps,
played the part of an American mother, “Everybody says the invasion is suicide.
The simplest person knows that. Between seventy and ninety percent of the
boys will be killed, or crippled for the rest of their lives” (p. 58).
Within a week after the landings, Koischwitz was in France attempting to
deflect the long-feared, and now the reality of Germans fighting on a second
front.

He broadcast the following on June 15, 1944, “War profiteers on the

London and New York exchanges go wild with joy, whilst tens of thousands of
bodies litter the beaches of north-western France, waiting in vain for a decent
grave” (p. 58). Actually, the total Allied casualties on D-Day were estimated at
10,000, including 2500 dead (D-Day Museum, 2004).
William Shirer, writing for a New York City newspaper, elaborated on
Koischwitz role as a “roving” correspondent:
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Otto Koischwitz…long ago discontinued his breezy broadcasts
under the name of O.K.

Goebbels, for some reason, sent the

professor to the firing line as a “front-line reporter.” His specialty
was broadcasting eyewitness accounts from the various battle
fronts on which the Americans were facing Germans.

Since

General [Omar] Bradley’s Americans began their race through
France, I have not been able to catch any more broadcasts by him.
Presumably he began moving too fast to allow for a pause at the
microphone (Edwards, pp. 96-97).
The former Hunter College professor’s last broadcast came from Paris on
July 26 as he hammered away at the theme of deteriorating Franco-American
relations, “They [Frenchmen] are becoming better Europeans, realizing that
Bolshevism would be the sole beneficiary of an Allied victory” (p. 97).

Otto

Koischwitz died shortly thereafter on August 31, 1944 in a Berlin hospital of heart
failure and tuberculosis (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 59).

Jane Anderson
Born in 1893 in Atlanta, Anderson earned her reputation as a legitimate
journalist while working for the London Daily Mail and the Daily Express during
the first war. Her bold style provided dispatches from front line positions that
included interviews with soldiers on both sides of the conflict (Edwards, p. 43).
By 1917, the strikingly beautiful redhead was moving in influential political
and diplomatic circles in Paris.

A 1942 FBI file elaborated on the Parisian
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episode in her life, “… Jane Anderson had no reputation of promiscuity, but was
not a woman of entirely rigid virtue” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 63). She returned to
New York after the war, went back to Paris in the early 1930’s, and eventually
married a wealthy Spanish aristocrat, the Marquis Alvarez de Cienfuegos (p. 63).
Historical fate put her in position to witness the Spanish civil war while
rekindling her passion for journalism.

She became the Daily Mail’s war

correspondent after a positive response from a cable sent to London asking for
the assignment (Edwards, p. 49). Reverting to her old style of reporting from the
front with the troops, this time Francisco Franco’s Nationalist forces, she again
endured the hardships of war with the troops and reported on the many atrocities
committed by anti-Franco, Loyalist forces, “…seeing defenseless prisoners
brutally slaughtered, of rapes and crucifixions, and of unspeakable excesses
against the church” (p. 49). These experiences undoubtedly led to her later antiCommunist sentiments that attracted the interest of the Nazi propagandists a few
years later.
Anderson was captured late in September of 1936 and was charged with
spying for Franco. During the next six weeks of confinement in Madrid, she was
tried and found guilty on charges of espionage and subsequently sentenced to
death (Edwards, pp. 49-50). She successfully smuggled a message from her
prison cell to the U.S. embassy and was released on the condition that she
immediately left the country (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 64).
Back in America, her adventures and her anti-Communist rhetoric paid
dividends on the lecture circuit. Catholic Digest declared Jane Anderson “the
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world’s greatest woman orator in the fight against Communism” and Time
magazine quoted Monsignor Fulton Sheen who regarded her as a “living martyr”
(Edwards, p. 64). In a later Berlin broadcast, Anderson expressed her outrage at
the blatant American disregard for Spain in that country’s time of crisis:
I had not been twenty-four hours upon American soil before I had
confirmed…that from the pulpits of the land of the Star-Spangled
Banner, no word of the God-fearing had been lifted against the
hordes from Moscow which had descended upon Madrid to unleash
upon a Christian land rivers of blood as the first stride forward in
world revolution. (Shirer, 1943, p. 402)
Anderson and her husband returned to a safer, Franco-controlled Spain in
November of 1938. One year later, she was in Berlin at the outbreak of the war,
where her reputation as a staunch anti-Communist speaker appealed to the
Propaganda Ministry (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 64).

She joined the shortwave

broadcasting staff but did not begin her work until April 14, 1941 when she was
introduced to American audiences as “the world-famous Catholic, twice
condemned to death by the firing squad in Spain, whose lectures in the United
States were endorsed by the Archbishop of Washington” (p. 64). She included
the following remarks in her first broadcast, “Germany gives the Church the
strength of her sword, the weight of her wealth, and the protection of her law” (p.
64).

She later told her listeners of the “dynamic life of the Reich” and

unashamedly compared Hitler to Moses, “He had reached to the stars, and the
Lord’s will would prevail” (p. 64).

Goebbels personally discussed policy with
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Anderson on May 10th, when she was told, “We must grab America by the horns
now. There is no point in treading gently any more” (Edwards, p. 52).
The following month marked the debut of her own show Voice of Europe
with its strange opening and closing line, “Always remember, progressive
Americans eat Kellogg’s Corn Flakes and listen to both sides of the story.” The
background music was a recording of the Benny Goodman orchestra’s
nonsensical hit Scatterbrain (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 64).
The invasion of Russia in June of 1941 marked the end of refraining from
anti-Soviet remarks that were agreed upon in the non-aggression pact with
Moscow. Afterwards, Anderson was observed by Sington & Weidenfeld, authors
of The Goebbels Experiment:
Since the invasion of Russia an Englishwoman [sic] named Jane
Anderson has moved into the foreground of German broadcast
propaganda to North America. This somewhat hysterical woman,
who claims to be an ardent Roman Catholic, used to broadcast
accounts of toleration shown in the Third Reich for the Roman
Church. She reverts continually to the subject of ‘maltreatment’ by
the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War. Her talks, which
nearly always contain highly coloured accounts of atrocities
committed by the ‘Reds’ during the Spanish war, occasionally
border on the pornographic. (Bergmeier & Lotz, pp. 64-65)
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An American monitor had noticed a similar tone in Anderson’s rantings, “If her
microphone hysteria is any clue to her personality, she is probably mentally
unhinged” (p. 65).
The end of her broadcast career came innocently enough on March 6,
1942 when she attempted to counteract enemy propaganda concerning reports
of food shortages in the Reich:
Last night my gentleman friend and I went to the bar at the Hotel
Adlon. There, on silver platters, were sweets and cookies galore. I
ate Turkish cookies, a delicacy I happen to be very fond of. My
friend ordered great goblets of champagne for the two of us, and
into the champagne he put liberal shots of cognac to make it more
lively. Sweets and cookies and champagne, not bad! (p. 66).
American monitors realized an opportunity to use these statements against the
ration-conscious German people. The plan worked to perfection as Anderson’s
remarks were translated and re-broadcast to the fatherland where she was
promptly taken off the air (p. 66).
Jane Anderson and her aristocrat husband were arrested in Innsbruck in
April of 1947.

In light of her Spanish nationality through marriage, the U.S.

Department of Justice openly decided not to prosecute the treason indictment of
four years earlier (p. 66).
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Robert Best
To understand the rhetoric of Best, it is important to consider his South
Carolina roots. He was the son of a Methodist minister whose ministries were
spread out over twelve congregations in twenty-five years (Edwards, 1982, p.
73). Best divided his school years between private and public institutions and
entered Wofford College at sixteen, finishing his coursework in 1916, graduating
in half the required time (p. 73).
World War I produced “Lieutenant Robert Best” who served in the coastal
artillery and balloon corps. He stayed in the Army for a short time after the war
and resigned his commission to enter the School of Journalism at Columbia
University.

It was his strong, personal narrative style more than talent that

helped his efforts at the time (p. 74).
After graduating from Columbia in 1922, he received a Traveling Pulitzer
Scholarship that allowed him to study and travel abroad for approximately ten
months. Initially, he covered the activities of the League of Nations in Geneva for
a few noteworthy publications but failed at establishing a European-American
student exchange program that was to be financed with German war reparation
money coming from the British (p. 74).
Best was becoming caught up in the lifestyle and political intrigue of
Europe and decided to stay in spite of his expired scholarship and meager funds.
He eventually settled in Vienna and found work in 1923 as a stringer for the
Berlin office of United Press International (p. 75). It was not the professional
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status he had hoped for, but it enabled Best to continue the lifestyle he had
grown fond of during his early, impressionable years.
His unofficial office was actually a reserved table in the Café Louvre,
which also became a meeting place for some of the world’s leading political
journalists: Dorothy Thompson, Sinclair Lewis, H.R. Knickerbocker, John
Gunther, Eric Gedye, M.W. Fodor, Edgar Mowrer, Whit Burnett, George Seldes,
Edwin L. James, Walter Duranty, Jim Mills, and Vincent Sheean (Shirer, 1943, p.
398). Best would never match his guests’ formidable writing talents, but instead
won their respect through his news brokerage service that built up a massive
force of political informants (Edwards, p. 75).
Best was quite the ostentatious character at his Café Louvre table, and
became the inspiration for two fictional books based on his life story, William L.
Shirer’s The Traitor (1941) and John Gunther’s The Lost City (1964) (p. 75).
Shirer noticed the “inbred charms of a dyed in the wool Southerner” manifested
in Best’s folksiness and story telling abilities. Dorothy Thompson described him
as an inexperienced youth devoid of significant associates. By the early 1930’s,
Best’s reputation was that of an eccentric (p. 75).
The Nazi side of Austrian politics began to interest Best as early as 1932
when Gunther’s The Lost City had him moving in Nazi circles. In spite of this,
Best had a genuine concern for some of his Jewish associates, especially on the
night of the Anschluss in March of 1938 (p. 77). Shirer felt that Best started
going Nazi after Hitler came to power (p. 78). Best’s UPI boss, Hugh Baillie had
persistent suspicions about his employee’s loyalties confirmed in no uncertain

226
terms, “…One night at dinner he gave us the full treatment, enthusiastically
explaining the Nazi idea of brotherhood. From others we heard about his liaison
with […] the most extreme local Nazis.” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 68) UPI colleague
Joseph W. Grigg had a similar response to Best’s political views:
He talked as a convinced Nazi and I quickly came to the conclusion
there was no point in arguing with him about politics. I will say,
however, that he was sufficiently professional so that this strong
pro-Nazi bias did not appear to color his news coverage.
(Edwards, p. 78)
However, it was Dorothy Thompson, “on behalf” of the American press corps,
who delivered a contemptuous critique of Best in 1942, the year he began
broadcasting from Berlin to North American audiences:
Bill Shirer says…it’s [Best’s defection] because you stayed too long
in Europe and went European. With all due respect to Bill, I think
that is hooey. You went Nazi and going Nazi isn’t going European.
Nazism is as anti-European as it is anti-American.

Lots of

American correspondents lived for years on end in Europe and
became much more “Europeanized” than you ever did, Bob Best.
Why, you never even properly learned the German language. They
did, and read European history and philosophy, sociology and
psychology, and entered deeply into European culture…No, Bob,
that doesn’t explain you. The truth is that you remained after 20
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years as intellectually lazy and just about as ignorant as you were
when you arrived. (pp. 78-79)
Best remained in Vienna despite the exodus of most fellow journalists
following the Anschluss. He was aware of the difficulties being faced by other
correspondents in their readjustment to American life and began to associate
with the feelings of those low-paid, middle class workers in Europe that were ripe
for the offerings of Fascism (Shirer, 1943, p. 399). After fifteen years of service,
he was now the bureau chief of a non-existent office having advanced little in
status and salary (Edwards, p. 79). His bosses viewed him as a low-level liaison
with street tipsters and stringers.

This professional mid-life crisis stole his

enthusiasm for work and contributed to his growing anti-Semitism considering
himself a victim of Jewish interests (p. 79). Best summed up his lot in life as
Europe stood once again at the brink of war:
Over the past years there has been an increase in the number of
non-Jewish correspondents who […] chose to covet favor of the
Jews as a certain road towards notoriety and, therefore, towards a
small fortune. They chose to do this instead of telling you the truth.
In my 19 years as a journalist in Europe […] I chose, I am proud to
say, an uncompromising stand, and I remained, in consequence,
comparatively unknown to the wider public in America and Britain.
(Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 67)
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany’s subsequent
declaration of war on the United States found Robert Best in the unenviable
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position of enemy alien. He was arrested by the Gestapo and spent ten days in
prison before reporting to a resort spa that was serving as a detention center
near Bad Nauheim. He was detained there with 144 other American journalists
and diplomatic personnel with whom he had slight contact (Edwards, p. 80).
Within two months Best had petitioned the Reich Propaganda Ministry for
permission to remain in occupied Europe. Citing his desire to mend “the broken
ties” between his country and Germany and accepting the explanation of his selfexile from America as a distain for Jewish dominance over U.S. society, the
German Foreign Office granted his request. He left for Berlin on March 2, 1942
(p. 81).
After his arrival, Best was directed to Werner Plack, chief of the radio
division for the Nazi Foreign Office. Plack was familiar with Best’s short stint as a
broadcaster with Radio Vienna and recruited him for similar work in Berlin by
convincing the American that Germany could offer him the electronic forum of
addressing his fellow countrymen on the dreadful condition of society and politics
in the U.S. (p. 81). Best accepted and offered his services as a means of uniting
the two countries in the struggle against Bolshevism and international Jewry. His
Radio Berlin debut on April 10, 1942 included the following remarks:
Who are you anyway? This is one of the many questions which
many would like to put to me at this moment. But unfortunately, I
must remain for you merely ‘Mr. Guess Who,’ your self-appointed
correspondent for the New World Order. (p. 81)
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Thus, “Mr. Guess Who” began his eighteen months on the shortwave.

He

taunted Roosevelt as “funny Frankie,” the slave of America’s Jewish interests,
spoke angrily against Semitic control of Masonic lodges in the U.S. (Best was a
32nd degree Mason), and told American audiences of Soviet cannibalism on the
Eastern Front (p. 82).

These types of unstructured and unrelated rantings

resulted in an eventual rift with his Nazi superiors in the newsroom. As a result,
Best personally wrote to Goebbels to complain about “petty opposition to his
work” (p. 82).

On May 21, 1942, on-air references were made by Best

concerning a new found mastery being afforded him by his new situation:
My pleasure is increased…by the fresh hope which the scope of my
activity gives me for the future of America, for Britain, and the
world. Of the most divine sanctity of my crusade for the overthrow
of kike rule in America and Britain I have no doubt whatever.
(Shirer, 1943, p. 400)
In October of 1942, he began a farcical campaign for Congress urging
listeners to elect him as their protest candidate, “I shall do my best to bring about
peace before America has fallen into a state of complete chaos and Jewish
slavery.” He called himself “the alarm clock of America’s sleeping conscience.”
(Edwards, p. 82)

Through his series, “Best’s Berlin Broadcasts,” or as he

preferred to call them, “Berlin’s Best” and “Best’s Little Life-Savers” (Bergmeier &
Lotz, p. 68), he spoke of BBB clubs being prepared in the U.S. to support his
entry into the 1944 Presidential race (Edwards, p. 82).

As Roosevelt’s

successor, Best told audiences he would summon American arms from Europe
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and execute “one Jewish gangster” for every American killed in combat. He
characterized his indictment for treason in July of 1943 was as a “smear tactic”
by Roosevelt aimed at discrediting his U.S. candidacy for President (p. 83). It
was apparent that Best had convinced Goebbels, whose ignorance of America
was enormous, that his candidacy was actually throwing a wrench into the U.S.
elections; otherwise, valuable airtime would have been devoted to other topics
(Shirer, 1943, p. 400).
After the “impregnable Atlantic Wall” rhetoric was vaporized on D-Day,
Best reverted to talks on secret weapons like the psychologically intimidating V.1
buzz bombs and actually aired a tour of the factories where the rockets were
being manufactured (Edwards, p. 84). In October of 1944, the Allied airborne
disaster at Arnheim was one of the last references to the progress of the war
made by Best (p. 84). When Warsaw fell to the Soviets in January of 1945, Best
pleaded with America to allow “Europe” to follow its own fate while praising Hitler
as “a valuable partner to the U.S. A. in the fruitful exchange of cultural and
material values.” (p. 85)
Best eluded capture after the war until February of 1946 when British
security police found him living on his wife’s farm in Austria (Bergmeier & Lotz, p.
69). He was turned over to American authorities and interned for ten months
near Salzburg before his flight to America with fellow broadcasting collaborator,
Douglas Chandler, to face their treason indictments (p. 69). On his fifty-second
birthday, April 16, 1948, Best was found guilty. Six weeks later, he was fined
$10,000 and sentenced to life imprisonment (Edwards, p. 86). He suffered a
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cerebral hemorrhage in 1951 and died in a Federal prison hospital in Missouri on
December 16, 1952. Robert Best was buried in Pacolet, South Carolina, his
hometown (p. 86).

Douglas Chandler
With piccolos playing “Yankee Doodle” and coconut husks mimicking the
sound of horse hooves, Douglas Chandler took to the air on Berlin Radio as
Revolutionary war hero “Paul Revere” in April of 1941 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 59).
Raised in Boston and Baltimore, Chandler served for a short time with the
U.S. Navy during World War I. He was unpopular with others due to his air of
superiority and continuous talk of poetry, art, and music (Edwards, 1991, p. 116).
In 1924, while working as a freelance columnist, he married Laura Jay Wurtz,
great granddaughter of the first chief justice of the U.S., John Jay, and the
daughter of wealthy Westinghouse inventor and Carnegie Tech professor from
Pittsburgh, Alexander Jay Wurtz (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 59). The Wall Street
crash of 1929 shifted Chandler from his self-proclaimed specialty in financial
matters to an assistant editor’s job with the Baltimore Sunday American
authoring a weekly news summary column entitled “This and That” (Edwards, p.
116).
He became disenchanted with his career, blaming his misfortune on some
type of Jewish conspiracy that should not have been allowed to happen in
America (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 59). His decision to live in Europe was described
as “the sloughing off of inhibited provincialism” (Edwards, p. 117).

This
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pronouncement set in motion a series of moves and chain of events that
eventually put Chandler behind the Nazi microphone, broadcasting to America
from Berlin.
Chandler and his heiress wife and two children left for Europe in
September of 1931 and stayed on the French Riviera. In 1933, they moved to
Starnberger See, close to Munich and met two Nazi members of the foreign
press department, Ernst Hanfstaengl and Rolf Hoffman (Bergmeier & Lotz, p.
59). They went out of their way to make sure their American guests saw the best
side of the Reich’s welfare organizations and introduced the Chandlers to many
British and American journalists in Munich at the time (Edwards, p. 117). Austria
was the next stop during the winter of 1933-34 and when spring arrived, the
Chandlers began a tour of the Balkans.

That summer they were living in

northern Yugoslavia while making many trips to both Greece and the island of
Corfu (p. 118).

After several months in Innsbruck, the family settled in

Freudenstadt in the Black Forest where the children were sent off to boarding
school. At this point, Hoffman re-appeared and invited Chandler to one of the
great Nazi party rallies at Nuremberg and later to an anti-Comintern convention:
The effect of this detailed and personal presentation of the havoc
wrought by Soviet Bolshevik aggression on my mind was deep and
lasting and undoubtedly contributed much to the decision which I
made six years later…I formed a few real friendships among these
men with two or three of whom I corresponded for several years.
(p. 119)
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Chandler used his new German Ikon camera on a trip to North Africa in
1936 and had several of his photos accepted by the National Geographic
Magazine. He became a contributing correspondent for the next three years and
did a special layout on Berlin in 1937 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 60). The Chandlers
were in Göttingen in late 1936 and met the future chairman of the Foreign
Ministry’s expert committee on propaganda for America, Dr. Ernst Ulrich von
Bülow and his American heiress wife, Ida Thomas of Michigan (p. 60).
Approximately one year later, Chandler would once again attend a Nazi
party rally in Nuremberg as the guest of Rolf Hoffman. This time, Chandler met
with linguist Charles Sarolea, a retired chair of French Literature at Edinburgh
University. He invited Chandler to lecture on Anglo-German relations and Hitler’s
practical vision of a “new order” (p. 60). After Edinburgh, the Chandlers were
guests of British Nazi sympathizers, Admiral Sir Barry Domvile, and his German
born wife, Alexandrina. Domvile’s periodical, The Link, was populated with many
articles written by those in favor of appeasement (p. 60).
The next episode in Chandler’s life would highly influence his future
broadcast rhetoric.

While on assignment for the National Geographic in

Yugoslavia, he became acquainted with the Dalmatian coast and the island of
Korcula (Edwards, p. 124). He brought the family there and settled until August
1940 when their residence permit was abruptly rescinded. Chandler believed
that this action was taken by the Jews living on Korcula, who regarded him as a
Nazi due to his many trips to Germany and his supposed ties to Italian Fascists
(p. 125).
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After another move, this time to Florence, Chandler learned from the
American community that they were upset with Roosevelt’s meddling in
European affairs. He claimed that he was urged from all sides to employ his
talent and name in some beneficiary manner, however; his offer to broadcast for
Italian radio was coolly received (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 60).
Undaunted, Chandler contacted his former acquaintance Dr. von Bülow,
who arranged a meeting with Dr. Hans Schirmer, head of the German Foreign
Ministry’s broadcasting division (Edwards, p. 126). Unbeknownst to Chandler,
Dr. Goebbels at the time was searching for an American personality of the same
radio ilk as the wildly popular Lord Haw-Haw. The intention was to build a vast
U.S. listening audience, if only by being amusing (Shirer, 1943, p. 402).
Chandler offered to work with the status of an uncompensated freelance
radio commentator.

Dr. Schirmer’s reply indicated that the proposal was

unworkable; the American had to accept payment for his services.

Further

negotiations fixed Chandler’s salary at 1,800 marks with an initial six-month
contract, “I was overjoyed because America is my home and I love it” (Bergmeier
& Lotz, p. 60). Laura wrote in her diary, “Thank God Douglas has this wonderful
opportunity to serve the U.S.A.” (Edwards, p. 127)
Chandler’s schedule consisted of delivering fifteen-minute broadcasts six
times per week. He cast aside the “Paul Revere” pseudonym in order to connect
the audience with his other journalistic endeavors (Bergmeier & Lotz p. 60). He
initiated his broadcasts with the same salutation, “Misinformed, misgoverned
friends and compatriots” (Shirer, 1943, p. 402). On the air, he repeatedly berated
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America’s partnership with Great Britain.

The following is from his first

broadcast:
Tonight I, an American observer, come galloping on the radio. With
bloodshed and agony we freed ourselves from England. Are we
going to enslave ourselves today?

...Among the melting pot

medley of American people are untold thousands of descendents of
the minute men whom Paul Revere electrified into action. But the
word “minute” is undergoing a change in pronunciation.

Today

these descendants are apparently “minute” men because of their
impotence in deciding national issues. (Edwards, p. 128)
Predictably, Chandler had many issues with his new employer including
no office or secretary as promised.

His workspace was one of “chattering

colleagues and clattering typewriters” that contributed to an exceedingly
uncooperative attitude within his new Berlin environment (Bergmeier & Lotz p.
61). This was compounded by a lack of interest in helping his family with living
accommodations and a salary that was often months behind. Actual physical
discomfort came as a result of Chandler having to read news scripts and interject
propaganda-supplied material into his own programs:
I would be seized by violent paroxysm which centered in my solar
plexus and caused me during my time of writing a violent diarrhea
each day. I was suffering from acute headaches and experienced
great difficulty with my eyes. (p. 61)
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At the conclusion of his first six months, Chandler departed on a leave of
absence, warning that he might not return. However, by December of 1941 he
was back in Berlin re-negotiating his contract, which included “full official support
in matters of daily existence” (p. 61). Other improvements included half of the
original on-air workload, regular meetings with Karl Schotte, head of the North
America zone, and an increase in pay to 2,500 marks per month making him one
of the highest compensated employees on the short wave radio staff (p. 61).
These improvements did not make Chandler any easier to work with as
his behavior became unpredictable and increasingly peculiar. A U.S. flag was
painted on the doors of his maroon Mercedes that was confiscated by the
Gestapo after Pearl Harbor (Edwards, p. 131). He wore a swastika set against
crossed Axis flags on a lapel pin in the studio. After his wife Laura died in the
summer of 1942, he fell into a depression that included the excessive use of
alcohol and the need for sleeping pills (Bergmeier & Lotz p. 61).
His anti-Roosevelt rhetoric intensified behind the microphone as he
zeroed in on Washington in an effort to make the most of any perceived
American opposition to F.D.R. who was being manipulated by his Jewish
advisers:
The terrible fate of Atlantis compares favorably with the fate
prepared for America by Jewry: the ruthless Bolshevisation of the
American continent.

Roosevelt, himself an offspring of Spanish

Jews, is a mere tool of the Jewish conspiracy against all Nordic
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Aryans…Only through the letting of Jewish blood can America be
set free. (Edwards, p. 134)
For the implementation of “Jewish plans for world domination,” Roosevelt
was nominated for a so-called “Meddle Medal.” Chandler went so far as to agree
that revenge was in order for Pearl Harbor, not against the Japanese who were
forced into the conflict, but against the real instigators of the war, the Jews
(Bergmeier & Lotz p. 61).

The story of his expulsion from Korcula Island

surfaced again, this time he blamed “international Jewry” for destroying his
writing career (p. 61).
Late in 1943, he married Maria “Mia” Moorgat from the Lower Rhineland.
The couple was transferred to Vienna where Chandler’s programs could be
recorded and forwarded to Berlin (p. 61). From February 1944 until the end of
the war, he hosted a series on American poetry, “Poets and musicians were the
ultimate peacemakers, for in troubled times they provided mankind with that
central ingredient to international understanding—love of beauty” (Edwards, p.
144). The Allied landings in Normandy forced Chandler to further moderation, a
fact that he admitted during his trial a few years later. In October, the Chandlers
moved to Bavaria where he was arrested and released in May of 1945
(Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 62). He was later re-arrested in February 1946 by the FBI
and held in a U.S. Army detention center until boarding a December flight back to
America with fellow broadcaster Robert Best to face treason charges (Edwards,
p. 145).
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Chandler faced the same fate as Best, a guilty verdict, a $10,000 fine, and
a life prison sentence. In January of 1962, the Attorney General’s office decided
to release the seventy-four-year old convicted Nazi propagandist if he returned to
Germany under the care of a daughter from his marriage to Laura Jay Wurtz
(Bergmeier & Lotz, pp. 62-63). In spite of the fine having never been paid and
the Bonn Foreign Ministry’s refusal to allow Chandler back into what had become
West Germany, daughter Sylvia petitioned President Kennedy to commute the
sentence. He did so on August 5, 1962 and Douglas Chandler left America for
Tenerife in the Canary Islands (p. 63).

Donald Day
He was one of the last recruits of the Nazi propagandists. Day had been a
newspaper reporter for many years in Europe and became well known for his
anti-Soviet rhetoric in articles written for the Chicago Tribune (Bergmeier & Lotz,
p. 70).
He was born in Brooklyn, NY in 1895 into a newspaper family.

His

younger sister, Dorothy Day, would gain notoriety working as a Catholic lay
activist (Edwards, 1991, p. 150). After gaining experience from a few newspaper
jobs in the U.S., Day became fascinated with the developments in Russia
following the October Revolution of 1917 (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 70). In view of
the fact that western journalists were barred from the country, Day accepted a
challenge from none other than William Randolph Hearst to find a way into the
Soviet Union and report on internal activities for the Hearst newspapers in
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America. If Day was successful, he would be placed on the payroll at $100 a
week, if not, he would be fired (pp. 70-71).
To aid in his scheme, he married Etta Fox who was employed by a New
York-based Soviet bureau created by a revolutionary figure who had fought
against the Czar, Professor Ludwig K. Martens (Edwards, p. 154).

An anti-

radical hysteria was sweeping the U.S. at the time and the entire 46-member
group, including Mr. and Mrs. Donald Day, were deported to the Soviet Union in
January 1921 (p. 154).

However, at the Latvian-Russian border, Day was

“singled out as a member of the capitalist press” and was forced to return to Riga
where he would subsequently cover developments in the Soviet Union for Robert
McCormick’s Chicago Tribune as a regular correspondent (Bergmeier & Lotz, p.
71).
Day’s anti-Semitism became apparent at the outbreak of World War II
when he blamed Germany’s bad press on “international Jewry.” His contention
was that Britain should appreciate Hitler’s “new order” and the “terrific vitality” of
National Socialism (p. 71). Day was forced from Riga to Helsinki when Soviet
troops moved into Latvia in June 1940. After predicting a quick German victory
following their invasion of Russia, Day was escorted to the front at Leningrad and
filed this somber dispatch in September 1941:
Towards midnight there was a lull. Leningrad’s burning factories
and buildings cast their glow up into the sky…less than 30 miles to
the east about 2,000,000 women and children were starving in a
besieged city without hope of rescue or reinforcements…There is

240
no merriment [in the Finnish lines].

All were watching the

southeastern sky in the direction of Leningrad. (Edwards, pp. 178179)
As Soviet resistance improved and the German offensive campaign
stalled, Day wrote that the Russians were taking a direction in the war that would
not benefit their American and British allies:
There were persistent rumours in Stockholm about negotiations
between the Soviet and German governments which may lead to a
truce on the eastern front.

[…]

There is a mutual respect

developed by eight months of ferocious fighting.

The Soviet

government was the first to make the advances now said to be
under discussion. The chief reason for Moscow’s proposals was to
pressure the Allies into opening up a second front on the continent
of Europe. (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 71)
Reaction in the U.S. characterized Day as a traitor as evidenced in the March 18,
1942 edition of P.M., a New York City daily:
What is the purpose of Tribune publisher Robert McCormick and
his associates in printing such stuff as that dispatch from
Stockholm?

[…]

If he doesn’t know that the above story is a

message which Berlin—Tokyo—Rome is trying to dump on us; if he
doesn’t yet know that the Axis’ divide and conquer strategy is
designed to split England, Russia, and the United States […] his
paper should be suppressed for the duration. […] Neither freedom
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of speech nor freedom of press permits McCormick or any other
political Quislingist to drive a wedge between the United States and
its Allies. He, and his Tribune, and ‘his allies’ have gone too far this
time. (pp. 71-72)
The U.S. State Department agreed and had Day’s passport impounded in
Stockholm. The Tribune then fired him after their Baltic correspondent asked for
a leave of absence to enlist in the Finnish army. This potential “unfriendly act,”
as characterized by the U.S. ambassador to Finland, steered Day to Helsinki and
into a position of language translator for the Finnish government (p. 72).
As the Soviets pushed further into Finland in the summer of 1944, Day
realized that a weakened Germany could no longer “guarantee the territorial
integrity of Finland” (Edwards, p. 181). He therefore decided to seek shelter
inside Germany and left for the relative safety of Berlin where the German
Foreign Ministry saw his potential as a broadcaster, even at such a late date in
the war (p. 181).
Day’s short career began on August 31, 1944 when Berlin radio
announced their latest edition as a “20-year-veteran correspondent for the
Chicago Herald Tribune [sic]” (p. 182).

Day told his audience that he had

become a victim of political maneuvering, “…Just consider me as a veteran U.S.
newspaper correspondent whom Mr. Roosevelt and his friends have placed,
through their intrigues, on the other side of the fence” (p. 182). On October 7,
Day denied the existence of a black market in Berlin “because money could not
corrupt justice in Germany as it did in the democracies” (Bergmeier & Lotz, p.
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72). One of Day’s more incredulous broadcasts occurred in mid-January 1945.
The subject of discussion was American P.O.W.s and how they had been lied to
by Roosevelt concerning the horrors of Nazi tyranny:
Did you know that Roosevelt is using Jewish-Bolshevik-Communist
terrorist methods to intimidate U.S. P.O.W.s; that political
commissars of the U.S. Army land in Germany by parachute to be
captured and placed in P.O.W. camps, so they can terrorize U.S.
soldiers there? The prisoners are threatened with courtmartial after
the war just because they complain of the Bolshevik regime in
Russia or the imperialistic British. (Edwards, p. 183)
After the Dresden air raid of February 17, 1945, Day bestowed the “Order
of the White Feather” on U.S. Army Air Corps General Spaatz “…for acts of
exceptional cowardice in bombing German cities filled with pitiful refugees”
(Bergmeier & Lotz p. 72).

One week later, American audiences heard Day

describe heroic subsistence inside Berlin:
Owing to the Red Army’s advance into Upper Silesia, Berlin Hotels
and private homes are without heat and hot water. Eight weeks’
food coupons must last for nine weeks, and we must make up with
un-couponed vegetables. The horrors of life are enhanced by the
air raids, and need to dress in a cold room at every alert…I thought
so little of Berlin had been left to bomb that these large-scale raids
would cease; but I was mistaken…Sleeping in a room with no
windows in freezing weather is not pleasant.

Life would be

243
unendurable, but for the unostentatious heroism of everyone.
(Edwards, p. 182)
With the end in sight for Germany, Day bemoaned the fact that his own country
had so much to do with the downfall of the Nazi government.

This grim

statement was broadcast to America on March 29, 1945:
It is hard to believe that a Christian people should gang with a
barbaric nation to try to exterminate another Christian nation, solely
because the victim of this conspiracy expelled the Jews from its
country…The Jews will not return to Europe because no European
country wants them. That is why the Jews are determined Europe
shall be destroyed. (p. 183)
In June 1945, Day turned himself in to the U.S. military in Bavaria. He
was interrogated for four days and released. However, he was re-arrested in
May 1946 and held for nine months at the Intelligence Service Interrogation
Center near Frankfurt (p. 183). Due to the nature of his broadcasts and the
relatively short time spent behind the microphone, Day was informed on
December 23, 1946 that the Department of Justice was “no longer interested in
his case,” although entry to the U.S. was being denied (Bergmeier & Lotz, p. 73).
Day and his wife chose to live in Bavaria where he wrote articles for the
Daily Press in Ashland, Wisconsin and Fria Ord in Stockholm. Permission to
return to Finland was granted in 1953. After cancer surgery in 1962, Day was
granted a new U.S. passport and reinstated by the Chicago Tribune as stringer
based in Helsinki. A heart attack claimed his life on September 30, 1966 (p. 73).

244
Chapter Six- Epilogue
Organization
One of the chief reasons for the early success of Nazi-dominated radio
was that they plainly saw its potential as a propaganda weapon; the previous
Weimar government did not. Goebbels spoke often of the “spirituality” of modern
radio as the means of a “transformation in the worldview of our entire society”
(Goebbels, 1933). This spirituality was linked to what the National Socialists saw
as their modern political movement.

The Reich Propaganda Minister further

believed that the work of the National Socialist revolution would have been
impossible without the radio, therefore; the preparation and central organization
of the new medium was imperative.
Goebbels indicated that the bureaucracies associated with the Weimar
organization of radio failed to take into account the “spiritual and political
responsibilities” (Goebbels, 1933) of radio that the Nazis believed in to a much
greater degree than their predecessors.

The spiritual energy and flexibility

needed to reach the masses was not in the best interests of committees, boards,
and commissioners. The organizational call to “Spartan simplicity and economy”
(Goebbels, 1933) was intended as a building block for the immediate and long
range radio plans of the Reich.

An increase in productivity was seen as a

potential result.
With all radio activities under central leadership, spiritual tasks were
placed before technical tasks, and a leadership model was introduced “to provide
a clear worldview and to present this worldview in flexible ways” (Goebbels,
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1933).

This organizational structure and accompanying rhetoric would

necessarily be altered to fit the changing kismet of war.
By theoretically defining rhetoric organizationally within the context of
radio propaganda in Nazi Germany, we find all of Crable’s necessary elements
present within the Propaganda Ministry bureaucracy giving us a model that
points towards his notion of a “fourth great system of rhetoric,” where the
organization itself is the real “rhetor.”
Representation takes on a dual meaning as described by Toulmin using
Kant’s terminology. The organization processes a private image, the realm of
inner experience, or a “vorstellung” (Crable, p. 195).

This image is of the

organizational “self” and of the organization’s “publics.” The organizational “self”
of the Propaganda Ministry’s broadcasting division was that of an infallible
gatekeeper of Nazi ideology. Meanwhile, the Ministry’s “private image” of the
public is well documented in a shared disdain for the masses by Hitler and
Goebbels. Individuals and publics also create private images of themselves and
the organizations in their environments. As time progressed in the twelve-year
rule of the Party, German citizens were less enchanted with those controlling the
new medium of radio and were driven to engage in forbidden “black listening” to
foreign broadcasts.
Displaying the public manner in which something operates is the creation
of a “darstellung.” Toulmin explains this as showing something “in the sense of
setting it forth, or exhibiting it, so as to show in an entirely public manner what it
comprises, or how it operates” (p. 195). Goebbels was quick to point out the
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advantages of a nationalistic, community experience available through radio.
The broadcasting organization within the Ministry had the capability of welcoming
all Germans into the fold as one great nation. From this participation, one’s own
private image could be summoned through involved vicarious listening.
Crable adds another dimension to representation using the metaphor of a
“magic act” and its accompanying elements of “sleight of hand” and
“misdirection.”

As an audience member, we are directed or prompted and

accordingly see what we have been told to see. This was as close to “the facts”
as the German people were allowed. In the representation, we are enthralled as
things “appear” and “disappear” but this is not the “magic.” The failure to see
what is really occurring is the “magic” and is a highly rhetorical process (p. 123).
This ability embodied the pure and evil genius of the societal manipulation
conceived and carried out by Dr. Goebbels with the aid of the newly created
propaganda instrument of radio.

Programming
With messages wearing the mask of nationalism for the home audiences
and veiled propaganda to others, radio became the perfect instrument for
spreading the Nazi doctrine to millions around the world. The lack of attention
paid to propaganda in the First World War was seen by the new regime in 1933
as a crucial mistake by Kaiser Wilhelm and later by the Weimar Republic
government.

There was a grudging admiration on the part of the National

Socialists for the successful efforts of their World War I enemies, especially the
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British. With Hitler and Goebbels witnessing propaganda’s earlier effect on their
own compatriots, they became strong advocates of its subsequent use in gaining
power and control. Therefore, they specifically proceeded to sell the German
people on the wonders of vicarious participation in major events and the cultural
continuity achievable through the new medium of radio.
Under the guise of restoring national pride through participation, the
German people in the innocent act of listening to the radio, were squarely
situated in a rhetorical situation.

By applying the elements of constraints,

audience, and exigence, in Bitzer’s formula for the rhetorical situation, we see
that the Nazis were concentrating a considerable amount of effort in the
modification of exigencies within German society and other countries in the
world, using propaganda-laden discourse. As Rolo explains, these strategies of
exigence modification can take many different routes based on the ebb and flow
of political situations. The modification was accomplished early in the war but
became increasingly difficult as German military defeats continued to wreck
havoc on the all-important image of the Third Reich.
These politically tough times led to uncharacteristic, at least in the Nazisense, changes in programming that contributed to the radio remaining “the good
companion” for the German soldier and civilian (Goebbels, 1942).

Goebbels

admitted that the National Socialists’ control over programming had to be much
more flexible, “Our extensive interest in the radio…after the seizure of power has
taught us that radio programming is a matter of practice, not of theory, and that
there is no program that satisfies everyone” (Goebbels, 1942). The Propaganda
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Minister’s rare display of honesty in 1942 was a prelude to a relaxation of the
constant bombardment of political messages. He reminded the German people
that the major events were inevitable from now on and that they need not “be
reminded of them all the time” (Goebbels, 1942). Everyday life in the Reich was
becoming more uncertain as the war progressed and radio programmers did their
best to adapt to these changes. In this contributory manner, the success of Nazi
broadcasting on the home front was discernible by avoiding an overtly,
propagandistic, outer shell when this habitual approach became impossible.
People were made to feel that radio was to be their constant comrade throughout
the war, “…it should raise the hearts and touch the conscience” (Goebbels,
1942).
Therefore, to please those worried about cultural decline, serious classical
music continued to be offered as well as lighter music and entertainment for
those seeking a source of relaxation from the demands exerted on them by the
war.

Since music programming outnumbered political commentary by about

seven hours to one, the Nazis knew that their selection of composers and music
had to coincide with their overarching ideology. Racial, ethnic, and inspirational
considerations were used as guiding mechanisms for inclusion or rejection of
selections being considered. With minor image modifications, most of the great
German Masters were given preference since their music had the ability to affect
the masses emotionally, in much the same manner as the uniquely selected
public speakers trained by the Nazi Speaker System. The Nazis did not want
people to think; they wanted desirable and robotic responses to their messages.
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Speakers and Ideology
The spoken word enjoyed considerable political success in contemporary
Germany with Hitler as the role model for all Nazi speakers. Even as a stage
manager, Hitler left nothing to chance. The ingredients for mob hysteria were
routinely present, “expectancy, strained attention, appeals to the emotion with
consequent loss of critical thinking, compact seating arrangement, group activity,
ritual, uniforms, flags, and group insignia” (Lambertson, p. 125).
This mob mentality was perceived as the best sounding board for Hitler’s
ideas. Primitive, emotional reactions were attainable by this method as Hitler
pounded the audience with simple, non-intellectual ideas. While this took place,
the master orator would exert “a strange magnetism on the susceptible which
compels obedience” (p. 130), resulting in comparisons to the technique of
hypnotism.
Hitler’s audience analysis was thought to be highly intuitive “…which
infallibly diagnoses the ills from which the audience is suffering” (pp. 126-127).
By capitalizing on pre-conceived notions, he merely had to fan the flames instead
of having to light the fire. Ideological pillars of Nazism, such as notions of antiSemitism, were already present in the souls of the German people long before
the National Socialist movement. This convenient arrangement was exploited to
the fullest by the extensive training provided to those participating in the Nazi
Speaker System.
The ability of the spoken word to move the masses to action is clearly
expressed through the writings in Mein Kampf.

Stressing simplicity and
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repetition, this indoctrination technique was customized to fit Hitler’s personal
views, “The ‘great masses’ receptive ability is only very limited and their
understanding is small, but their forgetfulness is great” (Hitler, p. 234). The Nazis
also understood that their country’s disregard for the use of propaganda in the
First War was an error that was consequently magnified by the successful
propaganda efforts of the Americans and British.
In linking the Nazi speaker’s rhetoric to the ideological ideals of the Party,
McGee’s theory of the “Ideograph” becomes a useful tool.

Existing in real

discourse, these words function as agents of political consciousness (McGee, p.
7).

A distinctive ideographic example is the Nazi conception of an all-

encompassing worldview, Weltanschauung. Much of this invented terminology
eventually found a home in the mainstream language of German society.
Hitler’s insistence on the simplicity of message theme was incorporated
into the training provided for those wishing to become Party speakers in the
Reich. There was no patience for the methods of interpretation exercised by
intellectuals. Blind faith, unquestionable obedience, and strict adherence to Nazi
policies were sought after virtues in speaker selection.

Those aspiring to

become speakers without the benefit of “coming up through the ranks” during the
Kampfzeit, were aided by the publication of Redner-Fibel, a practical guide
endorsed by the Party as a channel to effective political speaking. Written by
Nazi theorist Hans Krebs, this textbook of sorts followed normal and acceptable
public speaking guidelines.

However, the instruction was accented with the
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means to present a favorable impression of the goals germane to the National
Socialist movement.
By demonstrating the inherent difficulties experienced in a speaker’s move
from the public stage to the radio microphone, we raise a reasonable possibility
that such occurrences did indeed take place and could have been mandatory for
some speakers in the twelve-year reign of the Nazis.

Radio dictated major

adjustments in delivery technique and required a speaker to cope with the
absence of a visual audience.

The German broadcasters and their enemy

counterparts in the U.S. had somewhat similar approaches to the new medium if
one is objective enough to disregard political content.

However, National

Socialist ideology produced the necessity for the Third Reich announcers to
employ a rhetorically charged new type of language whose purpose was to serve
the Party’s goals by infiltrating everyday speech; it was called Nazi German.

Language
Ellul has identified two serious dissociations caused by propaganda. The
transformation of words in propaganda is characterized by one’s language, an
instrument of the mind, taking the form of a “pure sound,” such as symbols that
automatically evoke feelings and reflexes (Ellul, p. 180). This is a direct result of
the devaluation of thought, anxiously coveted by Hitler and Goebbels.
The second dissociation is the action of the propagandist in forcing us to
live in his or her verbal world, which he or she has created. In this type of
existence, one becomes insulated from reality and conscience is destroyed (Ellul,
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pp. 180-181), making the implementation of subversive political action a much
easier undertaking. When language censorship was extended into the mass
media, the Nazi-controlled radio acted as an agent between the National
Socialist government and the German people.

These episodes of language

regulation were actually grounded in a flood of daily directives issued to
members of the media by the Propaganda Ministry while being successfully
screened from public perception.
Marcuse saw the new German language of the Nazis as a derivative of
the practical and mythological layers of culture, accented with an anti-Christian
attitude linked to failures of the past. The Party understood the post World War I
political and economic frustrations of the people and fed the appetite for
economic development, nationalism, racism, and national respect that the
German nation demanded of the world. Marcuse noticed the German people
falling into a “technological rationalization” that he translated as a most
formidable weapon of conquest.
The entire basis for Nazi propaganda was easily found in the pages of
Hitler’s Mein Kampf. The language used correlates his belief in simple message
construction, therefore we see a profusion of folk proverbs and metaphors
intermingled with messages of racial hatred and political plans for the seizure of
power and expansion.

McGuire’s close textual analysis of Mein Kampf

convincingly presents the dialectical tension in Hitler’s myth where meaning is
created by deliberately repeating mythic structures. Themes of birth, death, and
renewal are followed within the narrative structure of the “Nazi Bible.” Kenneth
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Burke notes the many unification devices used by Hitler and some interesting
sexual symbolism in Mein Kampf. Of particular note is Burke’s distain for the
Nazi “bastardization” of religious thought found in the book. He warns that this
type of misuse can easily lead to the establishment of similar fascist states.
Language regulation of the press and radio became an essential
ingredient in maintaining the “crowd mentality” control that the Nazis practiced.
Language suited to the National Socialist ideology was stressed. Certain words
were actually reserved exclusively for Party use as were words used in
describing the enemy and the historical development of the movement, i.e.
Kampfzeit, meaning early time of struggle (Michael & Doerr, p. 235).

Other

language areas identified by Townson and closely monitored by the
propagandists were word usage associated with the German progress of the war,
references to terms used by the British, Americans, or Soviets, and language
used in describing Germany’s relationship with her few allies.
The totalitarian nature of the National Socialists found valuable utility in
the language regulation of the German people. Hitler and Goebbels stressed a
simplistic message that featured abundant repetition as a means of reaching the
masses.

The collective whole of a “crowd mentality” was targeted and was

attainable through radio; Germany was more important than the individual
German. The ghost-like ideology of the Nazis was loosely structured to fit the
emotion of the occasion.
Censorship of the media and educational venues began almost
immediately upon Hitler’s taking office.

Media censorship was the source of
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major problems in attempts to accurately report on the reversals encountered in
the Russian offensive. The military defeat at Stalingrad posed new challenges
for the Nazi propagandist who was faced with choosing an unfamiliar strategy.
They decided on the glorification of the event with the language of mythic rhetoric
and symbolism as key ingredients. While press directives stressed the “heroic”
nature of the struggle, Goebbels succeeded in turning the military catastrophe
into a “Wagnerian celebration.”

Shortwave
It was successful propaganda strategies such as the media’s orchestrated
reaction to the defeat at Stalingrad that Goebbels tried to implement and export
on shortwave radio to American audiences. The Nazi strategy was forced to
walk a delicate line between not antagonizing the American audiences’
confidence in an Allied victory, which might put U.S. neutrality at risk, and the
Third Reich’s matter-of-fact policy of winning the ongoing “European” war. This
dilemma would badger the German radio’s North American Service until the
attack on Pearl Harbor, when U.S. neutrality became a moot point.
The Princeton Listening Center, through the monitoring of these
shortwave broadcasts, identified early Nazi radio strategies that ran the gamut
from driving a political wedge between the U.S.--British alliance, to outright
intimidation based on visions of an economically and politically unfavorable
American way of life resulting from German-dominated world leadership (Childs
& Whitton, 1972, p. 80).
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The eight Americans indicted for treason as Nazi broadcasters had their
rhetorical roots fertilized by exceedingly brittle emotional attachments to their
native America. Kaltenbach could not wait to return even after being accused of
spying while visiting Germany during the First World War as a teen. Delaney had
no immediate family and made trips to the U.S. before the war in support of
business ventures. While some like Best and Chandler left the U.S. for what they
believed would be forever, others returned only after the war had ended. Drexel
was planning to return to Europe when she died in 1956 (Edwards, 1991, p. 187).
In searching for a motive, couched in at least a cultural expression,
Edwards looks at sociologist Robert E. Park’s marginal man concept for a useful,
yet, partial explanation:
The marginal man…lives on the margin of two cultures—that of the
country of his parents and that of the country of his adoption, in
neither of which he is quite at home. We know…that this so-called
marginal man is likely to be smart, i.e. a superior though sometimes
a superficial intellectual type…The Christian convert in Asia or
Africa exhibits many, if not most of the characteristics of the
‘marginal man’—the same spiritual instability, intensified selfconsciousness, restlessness, and malaise. (p.187)
Most of the future Nazi propagandists had unsettled childhoods or had
become world citizens at an early age. It is fair to say that expatriation may have
resulted in a search for some type of kinship; a missing sense of belonging was
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coveted. However, as most discovered, the Nazis were not amenable to their
respective situations.
Their broadcast rhetoric was born out of disrespect for individual freedoms
that interfered with Hitler’s visions.

Perhaps these American turned Nazi

propagandists believed that the rigid, hierarchical organization found in Frederick
Taylor’s scientific management principles and exhibited by Hitler’s bureaucratic
government, were the answers to a kaleidoscope of political and economical
experiments that had strangled European progress since the First World War (p.
188).
As products of nineteenth century experience and thought, the radio
traitors “grew up in a society that had institutionalized regionalism, racism, social
stratification…and the confining tenets of white Anglo-Saxon Protestantism,” (pp.
188-189) but Goebbels expected them to interpret the revolutionary nature of
National Socialism. They were ill equipped to wrestle with the complexities of a
twentieth century government’s attempt to control mass society (p. 189). Let us
also not lose sight of the relative immaturity of the medium of radio.
Edwards contends that the eight indicted for treason were a serious
detriment to Germany’s propaganda efforts. There can be no doubt in the Nazi’s
passionate belief in the power of the spoken word -- the model being Adolf Hitler
as orator. However, these neophyte broadcasters were not in front of a visible
live audience and were certainly not in Hitler’s league as speakers. Most were
legitimate newspaper correspondents whose experience with radio was woefully
inadequate to have an impact since political content was privileged over on-air
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technique. A writer’s copy was written to be read, not spoken, and the radio’s
intimate quality germane to a Rooseveltian “fireside chat” became blatantly
absent to U.S. shortwave audiences. The Nazis were only interested in finding
Americans who would tow the party line at the microphone.

Those

communicators in possession of a much needed “radio personality” such as the
popular British expatriate William Joyce, a.k.a. Lord Haw-Haw, were an
extremely rare find.
U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle claimed to have never listened to
these short wave broadcasts and even suggested that if Americans were
becoming angry over what they heard, the government ought not to take action
since it was probably good for the war effort (Edwards, pp. 190-191).

The

decision to prosecute the infamous eight was based on the military’s insistence
that the traitors were a threat to national security and subsequently worked
towards their convictions (p. 191). Perhaps the treasonous broadcast rhetoric
did affect an inconspicuous, influential, few in positions of authority in
Washington.
The Audiences
However, what can be said of the masses? Did the Nazi inspired radio
propaganda and accompanying rhetoric have its desired effects? For the first
nine or ten months of the war, the German people had a favorable reaction to
domestic radio broadcasting (Herzstein, p. 404). When it became apparent that
the quick initial victories in Poland, France, and the Low Countries were only part
of much longer than anticipated drawn-out war, the evasions and repetitions of
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Nazi programming began to wear thin on the public as witnessed by William
Shirer in October 1940:
Radio news is no better and of late I have noticed more than one
German shut off a news broadcast after the first couple of minutes
with that expressive Berlin exclamation: ‘Oh Quatsch!’ which is
stronger than ‘Oh, nonsense!’

‘Rubbish’ is probably a better

translation. (Shirer, 1941, pp. 541-542)
Illegal “black listening” in different regions of the Reich had grown to
alarming proportions by 1942 in spite of the severe punishment if one were to be
discovered. Goebbels misread this phenomenon as “ingratitude, contemptible,
low,” but most Germans simply wanted more military news.

It was not

necessarily the Nazi direction they rejected, only its policy on news censorship
(Herzstein, p. 405).
Nazi short wave broadcasts were characterized as a potential, rather than
actual, danger in America.

The Princeton Listening Center concluded that

Americans who listened to short wave broadcasts on a regular basis amounted
to not more than one percent of the population (Childs & Whitton, p. 305). They
also warned Washington about the temptation to skirt the unpopular issues in
much the same way as the “guilty” German broadcasters:
Such broadcasts [short wave] have not in any sense been a threat
to our national morale.

Nor will they constitute such a threat

provided the integrity of our domestic news services is preserved,
and provided further that government agencies in the United States
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refrain from taking any actions which impair essentially the quality
and comprehensiveness of the information supplied by our
domestic communication agencies. If, however, during the stress
and strain of war the people of the United States lose confidence in
their press and radio; if, because of censorship and misleading
propaganda, American citizens believe they can no longer rely
upon these agencies for an adequate picture of the world outside,
then, and only then, will they turn in large numbers to external
sources of information such as foreign short-wave broadcasts. (p.
305)
What we find in the above caveat is a moralistic and ethical blueprint for a free
society, as it relates to the construction and dissemination of news in both good
times and bad. Why do some audiences fall victim to propaganda while others
do not? The answer lies in the following from Kris & Speier:
In no society can the persuasiveness of the propagandist eliminate
the impact of facts; all he can do is to re-interpret them. But in
some situations propaganda finds a more fertile ground than in
others. The strong and the free care little for propaganda and can
rely upon traditional values when in distress.

Anxious and

uncertain people are more likely to be influenced and may search
for the guidance that propaganda pretends to offer. (p. 477)
Critical thinking on the part of the citizenry is an essential component to
any democratic form of government. Without the ability to question, judge, and
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decide, the governed run the risk of becoming subjected to the “lunatic fringe” of
their own population where demagogues may emerge by means of various
rhetorical strategies. When public speakers or the media deprive audiences of
the ability to reflect critically on important issues that will ultimately affect the
whole of society, the very nature of the democratic form of government is
severely threatened. “In a democracy one of the gravest dangers is that the
average citizen shall not think…Cooperative problem-solving is the hope of our
nation, not the dogmatic utterances of a dictator” (Lambertson, 1942, p. 130).
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